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Abstract
The group threat hypothesis is part of the conflict theoretical perspective,
which has been one of the most dominant and useful theories in the fields of
criminology and criminal justice for decades. The usefulness of this perspective
relates to the understanding it provides of how the law can be used by those in
power as a measure of control. The use of law as a method of control has a long
history in the US society, and there are many examples from which to pull. This
project examines the use of one set of laws, felony disenfranchisement
legislation, to determine if these laws can be seen as a method for controlling a
subgroup of the population. Historically, felony disenfranchisement legislation
has been a part of the American legal system from the founding of this country.
While the laws have changed many times, the constant has been an effort to
disenfranchise a segment of the population deemed as dangerous and prevent
such groups from participating in the political process through their votes. Using
data on African American population, arrests, and incarceration, this study tests if
the strictness of disenfranchisement legislation is associated with the size of
African American population, as well as African American arrest and
incarceration rates. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to
understand the nature of felony disenfranchisement legislation and to determine
if disenfranchisement legislation could be used as a tool to control African
Americans. The qualitative analysis indicates that African Americans are more
impacted by disenfranchisement laws in two regards: the criteria that leads to
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disenfranchisement and the requirements for vote restoration. However, the
research hypotheses are partially supported by quantitative analysis. That is,
while results indicate that the proportion of African Americans in a state is
correlated to the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law, there is no
relationship between the arrest and incarceration rates and either the strictness
of disenfranchisement legislation or the difficulty of the vote restoration
procedures. These results point to limitations of using the group threat
hypothesis to understand the relationship between disenfranchisement law and
criminal justice operation.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The group threat hypothesis is part of the conflict theoretical perspective,
which has been one of the most dominant and useful theories in the fields of
criminology and criminal justice for decades. The usefulness of this perspective
is the understanding it provides of how the use of the law provides a measure of
control to those in power. The use of law as a method of control has a long
history in American government and there are many examples from which to pull.
This project examines the use of one set of laws, felony disenfranchisement
legislation, to determine if these laws can be seen as a method of controlling an
entire segment of the population. More specifically, this study is an examination,
not of the disenfranchisement laws themselves, but rather the group threat
hypothesis is used to understand the nature of disenfranchisement legislation
and policies.
The disenfranchisement of persons convicted of a felony offense, that is,
the removal of voting rights, has deep roots in the American legal system, and
disenfranchisement laws have a firm foundation in Supreme Court decisions and
state laws. For example, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the court
held that, although the right to vote was essential to a democratic society, felony
disenfranchisement legislation was acceptable. In Richardson v. Ramirez, 418
U.S. 24 (1974), the court held that disenfranchisement legislation were not
inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, which stated that all citizens were
guaranteed equal treatment under the law, and therefore, disenfranchisement
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was viewed as an acceptable form of punishment. The roots of these laws are in
the concept of “civil death” found in English common law and Ancient Roman
legal codes (Parkes, 2003). “Civil death” involved the sacrifice of all land
holdings, the inability to hold office, and the loss of any right to vote for those who
violated laws. Denial of the right to vote of those who have violated the law
continues to be practiced in the United States, although it has been abandoned
in other democratic nations, such as Great Britain and Germany (Fellner and
Mauer, 1998; Mauer, 2002; Parkes, 2003). Many recent changes made to
United States disenfranchisement laws have further enhanced the restrictions
(Fellner and Mauer, 1998).
A discussion of contemporary felony disenfranchisement legislation is not
as simple as stating that, once a person is convicted of a felony, they are
permanently disenfranchised. There are different levels of disenfranchisement.
Generally, however, one can narrow the levels of disenfranchisement into three
broad categories (Taormina, 2003). First, disenfranchisement may be mandated
for only the period of incarceration for a felony offense (Taormina, 2003). That is,
once released from prison, voting rights are restored. Second, a person can be
disenfranchised for the period of incarceration plus a predetermined time during
post-incarceration release (Taormina, 2003). For example, the state of Alaska
mandates that a person be disenfranchised during incarceration as well as
throughout any period of parole (Alaska Statute § 15.05.030). Lastly,
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disenfranchisement can occur on a permanent basis upon conviction of a felony
offense (Taormina, 2003).
However it is applied, the literature has suggested that felony
disenfranchisement is a method of social control of groups (Behrens, Uggen, and
Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Mauer, 2002; Pettus, 2002). In this
case, control is exercised by limiting voting rights. The act of voting is important
to the political participation in a democratic society as it ensures individuals have
a voice to effect change. Full voting participation by all citizens protects
everyone, as it prevents a small majority from utilizing power to dominate.
According to Justice Thurgood Marshall, “a temporal majority could use such a
power to preserve inviolate its view of the social order simply by disenfranchising
those with different views” (Marshall in dissent, Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.
24, 1974).
With the national war on drugs and other tough-on-crime legislation, there
has been an increased emphasis on controlling offenders in American society
(Garland, 2001; Tonry, 1995). This control can be seen in the use of mandatory
minimum sentencing, three-strikes laws, and other legislation designed to
strengthen current legal sanctions (Tonry, 1995). The United States has seen a
35% increase in prison incarceration in the last decade, and that number is
expected to increase (Tonry, 2004; United States Department of Justice, 2004).
With current disenfranchisement laws in place, increased prison incarceration
rates have resulted in large numbers of disenfranchised individuals.
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African Americans represent only 13% of the United States population, but
make up 45% of the prison population (Census, 2000; United States Department
of Justice, 2004). The disproportionate racial make-up of incarcerated offenders
and the use of felony disenfranchisement codes create disproportionate
disenfranchisement of African Americans. As a consequence, African Americans
are not fairly represented in political decisions and are unable to participate in the
political process to address the grievance of unfair representation.
These race effects suggest the utility of the conflict perspective in
examining felony disenfranchisement laws (Behrens, Uggen and Manza, 2003;
Ewald, 2002; Fletcher, 1999; Giles and Kaenan, 1994). Conflict theory is one of
many theoretical perspectives utilized to explain the United States criminal justice
system and its operation. Conflict theory argues that power, either the desire to
attain it or maintain it, motivates individuals and groups to control others
(Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Quinney, 1997). Consistent with this approach,
the group threat hypothesis offers particular theoretical promise. The group
threat hypothesis is based upon the conflict perspective and is therefore similar
in orientation. However, while conflict theory emphasizes interests (group or self)
and power in general, it does not provide a clear definition of conflict of interest or
conflict of power. The group threat hypothesis focuses on a specific situation of
conflict of interests and power, meaning the threat posed to the dominant group
by minority groups, in this case racial minorities. This threat causes race
prejudice among members of the dominant group and they attempt to re-
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establish their dominant position by various means, including aggression,
discrimination, violence, social/crime control (Blumer, 1958). Blumer (1958)
argues that “essential to race prejudice is a fear or apprehension that the
subordinate racial group is threatening, or will threaten, the position of the
dominant group. Thus, acts or suspected acts that are interpreted as an attack
on the natural superiority of the dominant group, or an intrusion into their sphere
of group exclusiveness, or an encroachment on their area of proprietary claim
are crucial in arousing and fashioning race prejudice. These acts mean ‘getting
out of place’” (p. 4). The group threat hypothesis posits that those in power will
attempt to control any group perceived to be a threat to that power (Blalock;
1967; Blumer, 1958). It is the control of a class based upon the perception that
they are a threat to the majority that distinguishes the group threat hypothesis
from the larger conflict perspective. That is, the group threat hypothesis focuses
on perception, not necessarily reality. Those in power formulate and utilize laws
to control those that might undermine their power. Reliance on the concepts of
power and control has made both the conflict perspective and the group threat
hypothesis effective tools in explaining criminal sanctions (Black, 1980; Beirne
and Quinney, 1982; Chambliss, 1995; Collins, 1984; Olzak, 1992). These
concepts also suggest the utility of the conflict perspective generally, and the
group threat hypothesis specifically, in explaining civil sanctions connected with
criminal sanctions, such as felony disenfranchisement. Scholars on felony
disenfranchisement have used both Marx’s concept of “dangerous class” and the
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group threat hypothesis’ concept of “negro menace” to explain the
disproportionate representation of minorities in the disenfranchised population
(Behrens, Uggen and Manza, 2003).
Although felony disenfranchisement has been discussed in the literature,
understanding of its nature and its effects on minority populations is still limited.
Few empirical studies of disenfranchisement explore the impact of these codes
on minorities nationwide (Behrens, Uggen and Manza, 2003; King and Mauer,
2004; Parkes, 2003). Additionally, although the group threat hypothesis has
promising explanatory powers for the persistence of disenfranchisement, the
hypothesis has not been tested sufficiently to validate it as an explanation for the
laws specifically as an expression of power and control. Problems such as
sample size and data affect the generalizability of the research findings to date
(Behrens, Uggen and Manza, 2003; Cardinale, 2004; King and Mauer, 2004;
Mauer and Kansal, 2005). For example, King and Mauer (2004) utilized data for
only one major metropolitan area (Atlanta, GA), Cardinale’s (2004) study
included interviews from fifty persons in Los Angeles, and Mauer and Kansal
(2005) examined data on disenfranchisement and restoration for fourteen states.
Additionally, even when state-level and national-level data have been used, as in
Behrens, Uggen, and Manza (2003), the data gathered failed to include
information regarding the diversity of state’s disenfranchisement laws and the
voting restoration procedures. State differences in strictness of
disenfranchisement and restoration procedures were not fully examined. Most
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research on the topic has addressed state differences on the strictness of laws
that remove the vote from offenders, but the actual voting restoration processes
of these states have not been addressed. Restoration processes, which vary
from automatic restoration to mandating multiple requirements, may enhance our
overall understanding of how strict these state laws may be and what effects
these laws have on former offenders specifically and on voting generally. For
example, a state may have a strict disenfranchisement law that would remove
the vote of any offender once they have committed a felony offense, but may
have an automatic restoration process. This state law may, in fact, be less strict
overall than a state that disenfranchises only when the offender is incarcerated,
but makes that disenfranchisement permanent. Not examining differences in
strictness of disenfranchisement and restoration procedures likely masks state
differences in the divergent effects of disenfranchisement laws on racial
minorities and obscures explanation of the laws themselves.
To address some of the problems in the literature, this study examines
disenfranchisement legislation and its effects on the African American population.
The specific purpose of this study is to test conflict theory, using group threat
hypothesis to understand the nature of disenfranchisement laws. Because
conflict theory and the group threat hypothesis focus on power and control by the
majority and further argue that law is used as a method of control over those that
may threaten the majority, conflict theory and group threat hypothesis could
explain the nature of disenfranchisement laws. That is, disenfranchisement laws

8
could be explained as being an additional control mechanism utilized by the
majority to control a perceived threat. Because the group threat hypothesis may
help explain how a perception of threat from a minority group might lead to
greater emphasis on controlling the minority group, through the use of
disenfranchisement laws, the research hypotheses for this project are drawn
from the group threat hypothesis. Additionally, although Blalock’s initial threat
hypothesis was not specific to African Americans as the threatening group, given
the history of racial prejudice directed towards African Americans (Chapter
discusses this in more detail) the focus of this study will be on the African
American population. Further, although African American arrest and
incarceration rates may not precisely fit with Blalock’s assessment of the size of
the minority population being considered a threat, the increase in arrests and
incarceration of African Americans may reflect, or may be a result of, the effort to
control the perceived threatening group. Based upon Blalock’s (1967) concept of
racial threat being related to the relative size of a minority population, this study
measures racial threat, in part, as the number of minorities arrested and
incarcerated. The argument is that as the number of African Americans in a
state increases, the perception among the dominant class is that of an increase
of power of African Americans. To diminish this perceived increase in power, the
ruling class creates legislation aimed at controlling African Americans. This
legislation is then enforced by the criminal justice system that acts as the control
apparatus of the ruling class. The criminal justice system is then utilized to
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control African Americans by enforcing the laws through arrest and then through
incarceration of more and more African Americans. Ultimately then, the criminal
justice system generally, and felony disenfranchisement legislation specifically,
act as control mechanisms over those considered a threat to the ruling class.
Therefore, the use of African American arrest and incarceration statistics is also
important as a measure of power a perceived threat. As such data on African
American arrest and incarceration rates are included as a measure of group
threat.
This study tests the following hypotheses:
1) The greater the proportion of minorities in a state’s population, the
more restrictive the state’s disenfranchisement laws;
2) The more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement laws, the higher the
state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration; and
3) The higher a state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration, the more
difficult the voting restoration procedures.
Disenfranchisement legislation, voting restoration laws as well as information on
racial composition of arrest, racial composition of incarceration and racial
composition of population in 50 states and the District of Columbia was used to
test these hypotheses. A more detailed description of the methods used for
analysis is presented in Chapter 4.
This study is important for a variety of reasons. First, this study will
contribute to the literature of conflict theory and the group threat hypothesis by

10
providing an additional test of the group threat hypothesis. Secondly, this study
will improve understanding of the nature of disenfranchisement laws. This study
will accomplish this understanding through a qualitative examination of the
disenfranchisement laws in each state. Additionally, the voting restoration
procedures for each state will also be closely examined. By examining the laws
and the restoration procedures it is believed that a deeper understanding of the
nature of disenfranchisement can attained, going beyond simply an examination
of the numbers of the disenfranchised. Lastly, this study should contribute to the
knowledge of how law is used as a control mechanism generally, and how law is
used to control racial minorities specifically. By examining the laws themselves,
as well as the data on arrest and incarceration of minorities, the impact on racial
minorities should become clearer. The study, then, will ultimately improve
knowledge about racial relations in the criminal justice system. A deeper
understanding of the impact disenfranchisement laws have on specific groups
may assist in the creation of laws that are equal in design and effect.
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Chapter 2: Disenfranchisement in the United States
This chapter reviews the literature on disenfranchisement in general and
the disenfranchisement of those who have committed a felony offense in
particular. This review begins with a selective history of disenfranchisement in
the United States, followed by an examination of contemporary felony legislation.
A history is needed in order to establish a foundation for the current state of
disenfranchisement codes. This chapter concludes with an examination of
research on disenfranchisement as well as an evaluation of the gaps in the
current literature.
History of Disenfranchisement in the United States
Disenfranchisement is rooted in ancient Greek and Roman times (Parkes,
2003). In Europe, during medieval times, persons who violated the law of the
land in an “infamous” manner were subject to “civil death” (Fellner and Mauer,
1998; Parkes, 2003). Civil death entailed “the deprivation of all rights,
confiscation of property, exposure to injury and even to death, since the outlaw
could be killed with impunity by anyone” (Fellner and Mauer, 1998, p. 2). The
idea of “civil death” was continued into English law in the form of “civil disabilities”
(Brodie, 1991). According to Brodie (1991), civil disabilities entailed not simply
the loss of the franchise, but the loss of other liberties as well, such as the loss of
the right to own property, the ability to inherit and bestow wealth, the right to hold
public office, the right to file a lawsuit, and the right to execute any other legal
function.
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Although not all aspects of ‘civil death’ or ‘civil disability’ were brought over
to America from England, the disenfranchisement of criminal offenders was.
Nearly all of the thirteen original states had some form of criminal
disenfranchisement and with the growth of the country came the expansion of the
disenfranchisement laws (Fellner and Mauer, 1998). According to Fellner and
Mauer (1998), by the middle of the 1800s well over half of the then 34 states
making up the United States had some form of law that disenfranchised criminal
offenders. It is, however, important to note here that during this time in America,
felons were far from the only ones lacking the rights to suffrage. Those without
property, women, African-Americans, and those deemed illiterate and or feebleminded, were also denied the right to vote in the early period in our country’s
history (Porter, 1969; Keyssar, 2000). In fact, suffrage was far from universal, as
it was effectively limited to those wealthy white men who owned property, roughly
six percent of the entire population (Porter, 1969; Keyssar, 2000).
The United States Constitution and the Right to Vote
Although voting is one of the most basic civil rights, the Constitution
originally drafted by the country’s forefathers failed to enumerate voting rights for
any specific population or group (Parkes, 2003; Weedon, 2004). In fact, the
Constitution does not provide American citizens with a right to vote (Parkes,
2003). Additionally, there is no Constitutional guarantee of elections of
government officials, nor is there a specific enumeration of the qualifications of
those who can and cannot vote (Parkes, 2003). Rather, the Constitution leaves it
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up to the states to determine those qualifications the voter must have (U.S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 2).
Since the time the Constitution was drafted, however, amendments have
been made to advance civil liberties through the enumeration of voting rights.
Although the changes to voting rights have mandated the inclusion of many
denied the right to vote due to race, gender, age, in many cases the prohibition
against felony offenders was strengthened. With the Civil War, the Emancipation
Proclamation, and the Thirteenth Amendment, which ended government
sanctioned slavery (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 13, 1865), the United States
and the Constitution itself faced numerous changes requiring new laws designed
to protect our country’s newest ‘citizens,’ the former slaves. Again, although the
Constitution failed to enumerate the right to vote, rapid changes taking place in
the United States after the Civil War necessitated, for the first time, the
specification of individual rights, including the right to vote.
The Fourteenth Amendment, better known as the amendment
guaranteeing equal protection under the law, articulated that all citizens,
including those freed from slavery, were essentially equal (U.S. Constitution,
Amendment 14, Section 1, 1868). However, in spite of the equal protection
clause, the right to vote was still limited primarily to white male property owners
(Keyssar, 2000; Porter, 1969). Felony offender disenfranchisement statutes
were in place in many states and the language of the Fourteenth Amendment
strengthened those statutes by authorizing individual states to disenfranchise any
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of their citizens for “rebellion or other crimes” (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14,
Section 2, 1868).
Ironically, the Fourteenth Amendment, which was designed to guarantee
equal protection for all citizens under the law, may have actually contributed to
the glut of disenfranchisement legislation during Reconstruction (Behrens,
Uggen, and Manza, 2003). Although Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees equal protection under the law for all citizens, it is the ‘other crimes’
phrase of Section 2 that allowed many states during the Reconstruction era to
undermine the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment by enhancing their felony
disenfranchisement laws (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14, 1868; Behrens,
Uggen, and Manza, 2003). It is clear from both the rapid increase of felon and
ex-felon disenfranchisement legislation during the period as well as from
statements made during state constitutional conventions that a primary focus of
these legislation was to retain a modicum of control over newly freed slaves
(Key, 1949; Kousser, 1974).
The Fifteenth Amendment, however, provided that “the right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude” (U.S.
Constitution, Amendment 15, Section 1, 1870). Although the Fifteenth
Amendment provided the franchise to African Americans, women, including
African American women, were not mentioned until 1920 with the ratification of
the Nineteenth Amendment which specified that “the right of citizens of the
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United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of sex” (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 19, 1920).
Additionally, the age requirement for the right to vote was not specified by the
United States until 1971, when the Twenty-sixth Amendment placed the voting
age at 18 (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 26, 1971). As can be seen, although
the Constitution as originally drafted failed to enumerate a specific right to vote
we have continued to broaden voter classifications to include most adult
Americans of all races and both genders. A group not included in this
broadening of the voter rolls included those who had been disenfranchised due
to the commission of a felony offense.
Although the general outcome of these constitutional amendments was
to increase voting rights to all and to create universal suffrage, the ultimate
decision as to who specifically was allowed to vote was left to each individual
state (Boyd and Markman, 2001; Chin, 2004; Ewald, 2002; Parkes, 2003;
Weedon, 2004). As will be demonstrated, the decision to leave voting decisions
to the states resulted in wide disparity in voting rights from state to state.
Ultimately, the decision to allow the states to establish their own voting rights and
practices within the framework of the constitutional amendments led to conflicting
laws and eventually to the establishment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as well
as changes made to the Act in the years since.
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Voting Rights during the Civil War 1861-1865 and the Reconstruction Era
The Civil War was arguably one of the most important events in U.S.
history in the fight for universal suffrage (Keyssar, 2000). The Civil War was not
fought to give the franchise for those that had been left out of the process of
government, but the war and events following set the stage for the constitutional
battle over civil liberties and the right to vote (Keyssar, 2000, McPherson, 1988).
The Civil War, while ending slavery, also led to a movement to diminish the
political impact of freed blacks (Keyssar, 2000). Chief among the methods to do
so was limiting the right to vote (Keyssar, 2000). According to McPherson
(1988), the end of slavery presented numerous problems for the South. Among
these problems was the impact that such a large population of blacks might have
on the political landscape of the South (Keyssar, 2000, McPherson, 1988). The
massive influx of suddenly eligible voters was beginning to become a reality in
January of 1863 when President Lincoln issued the final Emancipation
Proclamation and subsequently emphasized the enlistment of the newly freed
black men into the Union Army (Franklin, 1994). It was not, however, until the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, which effectively ended government
sanctioned slavery in January of 1865, that the large increase in voters was
realized (Franklin, 1994; Keyssar, 2000).
Despite the substantial impact of the Civil War, the Emancipation
Proclamation, and the addition of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, freed blacks found difficultly exercising their new rights (Franklin,
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1994). According to Keyssar (2000), white’s reaction to these changes,
particularly in the South, impacted voting rights in this country. That is, the
Reconstruction Era, even more than the Civil War, the Emancipation
Proclamation, and the Thirteenth Amendment, had the most profound impact on
who was able to vote and to what extent that vote would be counted (Franklin,
1994; Keyssar, 2000).
Massive opposition by Southern states to the ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment led to the passage of state voting laws that were, on their face, raceneutral, but, in effect, limited the ability of blacks to vote (Behrens, Uggen, and
Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Pinaire, Huemann, and Bilotta, 2003;
Uggen and Manza, 2002). Although these laws varied from state to state, “raceneutral” voting barriers included literacy tests, poll taxes, and the addition of or
enhancement to felon disenfranchisement provisions (Behrens, Uggen, and
Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Pinaire, Huemann, and Bilotta, 2003;
Uggen and Manza, 2002). Ultimately, these laws were little more than “new
forms of ‘Jim Crow’ legislation meant to target African Americans in particular,
with the intention of disqualifying them from the vote” (Pinaire, et al., 2003,
p.1525).
Although felony disenfranchisement laws were already in place in most
states during the period of reconstruction, many of these laws were enhanced to
further limit African American suffrage (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003). All
these felony disenfranchisement enhancements include restrictions designed to
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disenfranchise African Americans specifically (Shapiro, 1993). For example,
crimes such as miscegenation and theft, thought to be most often committed by
blacks, could result in disenfranchisement (Shapiro, 1993). In fact, “between
1890 and 1910, many Southern states tailored their criminal disenfranchisement
laws, along with other voting qualifications, to increase the effect of these laws on
black citizens” (Shapiro, 1993, p. 540).
Criminal disenfranchisement laws became stricter during the period of
reconstruction following the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment (Behrens,
Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Shapiro, 1993). According to Fellner and Mauer
(1998), the State of Alabama provides an illustration of racist attitudes of the
time. Alabama lawmakers in 1901 “openly stated that their goal was to establish
white supremacy” (Fellner and Mauer, 1998, p. 3). To that end, Alabama state
lawmakers included in the State Constitution a clause that made a conviction for
the crime of “moral turpitude” grounds for permanent disenfranchisement (Hull,
2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Mauer, 2002). Further, Alabama legislators, in
the process of revising the Alabama constitution in 1901, included the crime of
“wife-beating” as a crime of disenfranchisement “as it would disqualify sixty
percent of the Negroes” from the right to vote (Hull, 2003, p. 47).
Alabama was not, of course, the only state to either add or enhance
disenfranchisement legislation. Many of the former Confederate States
attempted to counteract established rights for freed African Americans by
revamping their criminal codes to increase disenfranchisement opportunities,
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primarily because these criminal codes “had express constitutional sanction”
unlike grandfather clauses, poll taxes, and literacy tests (Hull, 2003, p. 47). For
example, in an 1890 ruling from the Mississippi Supreme Court, the change of
the criminal code was praised by the court when it stated, “restrained by the
federal constitution from discriminating against the Negro race, (the convention)
discriminated against its characteristics and the offense to which its weaker
members were prone … burglary, theft, arson, and obtaining money under false
pretenses were declared to be disqualifiers, although robbery and murder and
other crimes in which violence was the principal ingredient, were not” (cited in
Hull, 2003, p. 53). In fact, the ‘crime’ of miscegenation would disqualify one from
the vote in Mississippi although the crime of rape would not (Hull, 2003;
Thompson, 2001). As Thompson (2001) states, “for almost a century thereafter
you couldn’t lose your right to vote in Mississippi if you committed murder or
rape, but you could if you married someone of another race” (p. 19).
The State of Virginia provides another example of a state that illustrated
disdain for the new constitutional amendments and for African Americans (Hull,
2003). During the 1901 Virginia State Convention, Senator Carter Class stated,
“Discrimination! … That, exactly, is what this Convention was elected for – to
discriminate to the very extremity of permissible action under the limits of the
Federal Constitution, with a view to the elimination of every Negro voter who can
be gotten rid of legally, without materially impairing the numerical strength of the
white electorate” (cited in Hull, 2003, p. 53). The State of Florida drafted a
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constitution in 1868 to include the disenfranchisement of ex-felons “as well as
anyone convicted of larceny, a crime that courts were given special jurisdiction
over in 1865 because of ‘the great increase in minor offenses, which may be
reasonably anticipated from the emancipation of former slaves’” (Hull, 2003, p.
54).
One needs only to examine the results of the legislation of the
Reconstruction era to see effects on African American voting numbers. Consider
the state of Mississippi, for example; in 1867, African American voter registration
totaled nearly seventy percent of the eligible African American population. After
the felon disenfranchisement statues were created and the state criminal code
reworked in 1890, African American voter registration dropped to six percent of
the eligible African American population (Hull, 2003). As Hull (2003) states, “As
with so much of this country’s past, a large part of the history of felon
disenfranchisement hangs on the issue of race. It’s no coincidence that blacks
are harmed the most by felon disenfranchisement; many of the laws seem to
have been drawn up for that purpose” (p.53).
Contemporary Laws on Disenfranchisement in the United States
Although each state possessing a disenfranchisement law has the ability
to create statutes to suit their own needs, one thing links these laws together:
they all disenfranchise offenders who have committed a felony. This section
examines the creation and implementation of contemporary felony
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disenfranchisement legislation and the requirements for reinstatement of voting
rights.
Disenfranchisement Legislation
Although the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment,
the disenfranchisement of felony offenders acts as an extra form of punishment
that eliminates, in some cases for life, the opportunity to regain full citizenship
(Mauer and Kansal, 2005). The United States is the only industrialized nation
that prevents ex-convicts from voting (Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Mauer, 2002;
Parkes, 2003). In fact, every state except Maine and Vermont places some
restrictions on the voting practices of current and or former felons (Mauer &
Kansal, 2005).
Variations in laws across states are not isolated to disenfranchisement
legislation, of course. Because the United States Constitution has left the
creation of most laws, including voting regulations, to the individual states, the
laws themselves will be inconsistent (Mauer and Kansal, 2005). Despite the
inconsistent content of the laws, certain elements of the laws allow for
categorization. Each state that disenfranchises felons does so for a specified
period of time. This specification of time period allows these laws to be placed in
four separate categories. Maine and Vermont do not disenfranchise felony
offenders at all (Taormina, 2003). Of the 48 state codes, 12 disenfranchise
felony offenders permanently; 23 states disenfranchise for a period of
incarceration and a period of post-incarceration, such as parole; and 14 states
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disenfranchise only for the period of incarceration (Taormina, 2003). The District
of Columbia has a disenfranchisement code that falls into the third category,
disenfranchising only for the period of incarceration (Taormina, 2003). This
classification is presented in Table 2-1.*
Just as states have free reign in determining what their laws declare, they
also have the ability to determine which crimes trigger disenfranchisement
(Ewald, 2002). For example, some states mandate those convicted only of
felony offenses be disenfranchised (Ewald, 2002). Other states, such as New
York, mandate that disenfranchisement only result upon incarceration for a
felony, not simply a conviction (N.Y. Election Law § 5-106). Some states, such
as Illinois, allow for disenfranchisement for a third misdemeanor offense,
particularly if those offenses are drug related (Thompson, 2001). According to
Thompson, “three out of every five felony convictions don’t lead to jail time, and
there’s no clear line you have to cross to earn one. Being convicted for driving
although intoxicated three times bans you from voting in numerous states. Being
caught with one-fifth of an ounce of crack earns you a federal felony, but being
caught with one-fifth of an ounce of cocaine only earns a misdemeanor” (2001,
p.18). As an example, a person can be convicted of a felony in the state of
Florida for stopping payment on a check of more than $150, if there is intent to
defraud (Florida Statute § 832.041). In Delaware a person can be convicted of a
felony after a third offence of driving under the influence (DCA § 4177), while in

*

For Table 2-1, columns represent three levels of disenfranchisement. States that do not
disenfranchise at all appear with none of the three columns checked.
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Table 2-1: Disenfranchisement Statutes
(adapted from Taormina, 2003)

State

Incarceration

Parole

Alabama

X

X

Alaska

X

X

Arizona

X

X

Permanent
Requires Restoration or
Pardon

X

X
On second offense

Arkansas

X

X

California

X

X

Upon incarceration

Colorado

X

X

Includes misdemeanors

Connecticut

X

X

Delaware

X

X

Includes misdemeanor
election violations

Some crimes unpardonable

D.C.

X

Florida

X

X

Georgia

X

X

Hawaii

X
Upon incarceration

Idaho

X

X

X

X
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Table 2-1: Disenfranchisement Statutes (Continued)
(adapted from Taormina, 2003)

State

Incarceration

Illinois

X

Parole

Permanent
Requires Restoration or
Pardon

Includes some misdemeanors

Indiana

X

X

Iowa

X

X

Includes some misdemeanors

Kansas

X

X

Kentucky

X

X

X

X

X

Includes pre-conviction
holding

Louisiana

X

Maine

Maryland

X
Includes some misdemeanors

Massachusetts

X

Michigan

X

Depends on crime & recidivism

Includes misdemeanors

Minnesota

X

X

Mississippi

X

X

Missouri

X

X

Montana

X

X
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Table 2-1: Disenfranchisement Statutes (Continued)
(adapted from Taormina, 2003)

State

Incarceration

Parole

Nebraska

X

X

Permanent
Requires Restoration or
Pardon

Plus 2 years post-discharge

Nevada

X

X

X
Violent or second offense only

New
Hampshire

X

New Jersey

X

X

New Mexico

X

X

New York

X

X

Only if incarcerated

North Carolina

X

North Dakota

X

Ohio

X

Oklahoma

X

Oregon

X

Pennsylvania

X

Rhode Island

X

X

South Carolina

X

X

Includes misdemeanors

X

X
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Table 2-1: Disenfranchisement Statutes (Continued)
(adapted from Taormina, 2003)

State

Incarceration

South Dakota

X

Parole

Permanent
Requires Restoration or
Pardon

Includes suspended
sentences

Tennessee

X

X

X
Some crimes unpardonable
depends on crime & time
period

Texas

X

Utah

X

X

Vermont
Virginia

X

X

Washington

X

X

West Virginia

X

X

X

X
For bribery of state official only

Wisconsin

X

X

Wyoming

X

X

Incarceration Only: 13 States and the District of Columbia
Incarceration and Parole: 23 States
Permanent: 12 States
No Law: 2 States

X

27
Tennessee it takes four convictions of DUI to earn a felony (TCA § 55-10-403).
In the main, existing studies show that felony disenfranchisement has had
a disproportionate impact of disenfranchisement on minority populations (Fellner
and Mauer, 1998; Hull, 2003; Parkes, 2003; Pinaire, et.al., 2003; Weedon, 2004).
In 2003, approximately 4.7 million Americans were disenfranchised; 36 percent
of whom were African American with approximately 60 percent being white (Hull,
2003; Parkes, 2003; Pinaire, et.al., 2003; Weedon, 2004). These numbers
reflect a disproportionate impact on African Americans, given that nationally, less
than 13 percent of the population is African American (U.S. Census, 2000).
When the population and disenfranchisement figures are examined by individual
state, the statistics indicate a similar disproportion. For example, in Iowa, the
state population is nearly 95 percent white and two percent African American, yet
the disenfranchised population is 69 percent white and 26 percent African
American (Census, 2000; Fellner and Mauer, 1998). Twohey (2001) presents
the example of Florida, stating that “altogether, 500,000 Florida residents – 4.6
percent of the state’s voting-age population – have served time behind bars for
various crimes and thus are unable to vote because of the ban…(N)early
170,000 black adult men in Florida – roughly 25 percent of the state’s black male
residents – can’t vote because of a current or past conviction” (p. 46).
Comparing the approximately 25 percent disenfranchisement rate for African
Americans in Florida to the statewide population of 15 percent African American
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is further indication that disenfranchisement has a racially disproportionate effect
(U.S. Census, 2000; Twohey, 2001).
Reinstatement of Voting Rights
As with the revocation of voting rights, no state has an identical system for
restoring the vote. Despite variations, restoration procedures can be categorized
into two distinct groups: automatic restoration and restoration that requires some
form of petition to the state. There is, however, some variation within these
categories as well. For example, in the first category, automatic restoration,
reinstatement of voting rights depends upon exactly when the state classifies an
individual as “released.” Massachusetts, for example, is among the states that
grants the restoration of rights to vote automatically upon release from actual
incarceration in a state prison (Massachusetts Annotated Laws Chapter 51, § 1).
Other states, such as Alaska, Indiana, and New York, automatically restore an
offender’s right to vote only after those offenders have been released from parole
(Love, 2005).
In the second category of restoration, those which require some form of
petition, variation exists as well. This variation is not simply when the offender
may petition (after incarceration or after parole), but also varies in the form the
petition takes. For example, North Carolina allows ex-felons to petition for
reinstatement, by paying all fines associated with the offense, following release
from any form of state custody, which would include a period of parole (NC
General Statute § 163-55). Arizona’s restoration process, like the one in
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Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi, requires that an investigation of the offender
be conducted in order for voting rights to be restored.
Even in states that disenfranchise for life, mechanisms are in place to
regain the vote (Allard and Mauer, 2000; Mauer, 2002). In permanent
disenfranchisement states like Alabama, for example, those wishing to regain
their franchise must furnish a DNA sample and seek a pardon from the state
parole board (Mauer, 2002). No legal reason for such mandate is apparent other
than blocking those attempting to regain the ability to vote (Mauer, 2002).
Further, as Mauer and Kansal (2005) explain, although it is certainly true that
most states that disenfranchise felony offenders have mechanisms in place to
enable ex-convicts to reestablish their voting rights, many of these are
cumbersome with the effect of discouraging voting.
Florida’s voting restoration process contains 23 qualifications “ranging
from the type of crime you committed to your financial status” (Thompson, 2001,
p. 17). The financial status requirement states, in part, that the ex-felon cannot
be in debt to the State of Florida for more than $1000 (Mauer and Kansal, 2005;
Thompson, 2001). For former offenders who face substantial court-mandated
fines and/or restitution payments, this requirement may prohibit them from
regaining their voting rights (Mauer and Kansal, 2005; Thompson, 2001).
Provided the affected former felon can traverse the “type of crime” issue and the
monetary fines, Mauer and Kansal (2005) claim that the State of Florida asks
extensive questions relating to background, such as manner of death of the
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former felon’s parents. They argue that questions like these have nothing to do
with voting restoration and merely serve to make the process longer and more
difficult. Such a process resulted in only 1 out of every 300, or less than one-half
of one percent, of former felons who attempt to do so actually regaining their right
to vote in the State of Florida between 1998 and 2004 (Mauer and Kansal,
2005).
It appears that systems of restoration vary as widely as the state laws to
eliminate voting rights in the first place (Love, 2005). Because of such disparity
in both the process of disenfranchisement and in the restoration of voting rights,
any attempt to discern the true nature of disenfranchisement legislation is difficult
at best (Love, 2005).
Research on Contemporary Disenfranchisement
Research on the contemporary use of disenfranchisement legislation has
expanded in recent years. This research can be seen as falling into two distinct
categories: research on the nature, as well as the political and legal aspects of
disenfranchisement and research on the consequence and impacts of
disenfranchisement laws. In this section, the current literature on felony
disenfranchisement is examined according to these two categories.
Ewald (2002) examined the historical practice of disenfranchisement, not
only in the United States, but also in ancient and medieval times. Ewald (2002)
used a historical perspective to explain how the current laws on
disenfranchisement emerged. In addition to this historical review, Ewald also
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examined the premises of the American legal system and how it has influenced
the continued use of the practice of disenfranchising criminal offenders. Ewald
argued that, although felony disenfranchisement had deep roots in American law,
these roots were paradoxical in nature, particularly in a country that espoused
freedom and democracy. Ewald stated that a critical understanding of these laws
and the historical context and ramifications of disenfranchisement could only
“lead Americans today to conclude that the policy is incompatible with modern
understandings of citizenship, voting, and criminal justice” and the laws should
therefore be eliminated (2002, pp. 1134-35).
In another historical and legal essay, Pettus (2002) examined felony
disenfranchisement legislation and the connection with political freedom as part
of her study exploring the legal aspects of disenfranchisement laws. Pettus
(2002) examined the historical context of disenfranchisement legislation and
argued that these laws were incompatible with the idea of political freedom and
that they created a society in which the disenfranchised were ruled by those who
retained the right to vote. In essence, Pettus (2002) argued that
disenfranchisement legislation, as currently practiced, not only went against the
idea of a democratic society, but also brought into question the general
legitimacy of criminal law. Pettus (2002) made this argument, in part, because of
the disproportionate racial impact of the criminal justice sanctions. This
disproportionate racial make-up of the American prison population resulted in
disproportionate numbers of racial minorities that were denied true citizenship, in
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that they were no longer allowed to participate in the political system in society
(Pettus, 2002). These laws then, according to Pettus (2002), contradicted any
conceptualization of citizenship in a democratic society.
Schall (2004) examined the compatibility of felony disenfranchisement
legislation with citizenship theory. In his paper, Schall (2004) discussed not only
the historical context of why the United States maintains a ban on felon voting,
but also explored whether or not disenfranchisement could be justified in a
society that espoused democratic citizenship. Schall (2004) argued that
disenfranchisement was incompatible with any definition of citizenship, in that the
right to vote was an essential part of citizenship. Voting was the means by which
a citizen could express their desires and by choosing the leadership of their
government (Schall, 2004). Additionally, “because felon disenfranchisement
does not serve any penological goals, the deprivation of convicts’ political
liberties cannot be justified as punishment” (Schall, 2004, p. 32). Ultimately then,
Schall (2004) stated that felony disenfranchisement was incompatible with the
idea of citizenship in a democratic society and should be abandoned.
Like authors discussed above, Parkes (2003) agreed that, although
arguments exist for felon disenfranchisement legislation, the racial impact of
these laws make them untenable. Parkes (2003) stated that although the racial
impact alone should be enough to justify the repeal of disenfranchisement
legislation, the laws in the United States should be carefully scrutinized and
brought in-line with other countries, regardless of any racial impact the laws may
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have. In her paper, Parkes (2003) described disenfranchisement in the U.S.
criminal justice system and compared it to the Canadian criminal justice system
that recently overturned all prisoner disenfranchisement laws by declaring that
the laws were unconstitutional. According to Parkes (2003), while there may be
reasons to deny the vote to current or former felons, these reasons did not
override the restitutive effect that enfranchisement has, “disenfranchisement
profoundly affects a person’s dignity and relegates him or her to the status of
second-class citizen or even sub-human” (p. 92). By allowing former felons (and
in the Canadian case, even prisoners) to vote, society begins the process of
healing and restoring every citizen, regardless of their criminal history (Parkes,
2003). Parkes (2003) stated, that restoration of total citizenship should be one of
the main goals of the criminal justice system and because disenfranchisement
goes against that goal it should be eliminated.
The work of Ewald and Parkes, among others, has spawned additional
research that may provide a more in-depth understanding of felony
disenfranchisement generally. An example of this type of research is a 2002
study by Manza, Brooks, and Uggen in which they attempted to ascertain public
opinion on felony disenfranchisement legislation in the United States. By
ascertaining public opinion on the issue of disenfranchisement, the authors
attempted to provide a more in-depth understanding of disenfranchisement. This
study was relevant in that public opinion may have influenced the use of
disenfranchisement legislation. Utilizing the Harris Interactive monthly telephone
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survey, the researchers asked respondents several questions about their
attitudes towards crime, criminals, and the rights of criminal offenders (Manza,
Brooks, and Uggen, 2002). A national sample of 1000 adults was gathered using
a random stratified sampling technique to ensure that representative sample was
attained (Manza, Brooks, and Uggen, 2002). The researchers asked a series of
questions designed to gage the respondent’s attitude regarding
disenfranchisement based upon whether the offender was incarcerated, on
probation, or on parole. An additional set of questions asked the respondent to
judge between the seriousness of criminal offenses (e.g. a violent offender vs. a
generic offender) and whether or not they impacted the disenfranchisement of
offenders. Both the attitudes on the status of the offender (incarcerated,
probation, parole) and type of criminal offender (generic, violent, white collar, sex
crime) were treated as dependent variables, while attitudes toward the criminal
justice system and support for civil liberties were treated as independent
variables (Manza, Brooks, and Uggen, 2002).
Using logistic regression, the researchers tested whether or not an
individual’s attitude toward civil liberties and the criminal justice system impacted
their views on whether or not civil liberties were extended to criminal offenders
(Manza, Brooks, and Uggen, 2002). The findings suggested fairly strong public
support for enfranchising those offenders that were currently on probation (68%)
or parole (60%), while showing limited support (31%) for allowing currently
imprisoned offenders the right to vote (Manza, Brooks, and Uggen, 2002).
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Further, when tested against the type of criminal offense committed by former
offenders, the findings were similar in regards to support for restoration of civil
liberties: generic offenders (80% support), white-collar offenders (63%), violent
offenders (66%), and sex offenders (52%) (Manza, Brooks, and Uggen, 2002).
Manza, et.al (2002), argued that the difference between the support level for the
generic offender and the sexual offender may indicate a particularly poor view
the public holds towards sex offenders rather than a view that these offenders
should be denied the right to vote. Generally, the findings indicated that the
public appears to support the enfranchisement of former offenders, as well as
those on probation, or on parole regardless of type of offense committed (Manza,
Brooks, and Uggen, 2002).
Throughout much of the literature on felony disenfranchisement the
disproportionate racial make-up in the criminal justice system was a theme.
Fletcher (1999) for example, argued that the impact on racial minorities due to
disenfranchisement was no different than the impact due to drug laws, such as
the differential punishment meted out for crack versus cocaine, or the
disproportionate impact of the death penalty on minority offenders. All three of
these cases (disenfranchisement, drug laws, and the death penalty) acted to
treat criminal offenders, particularly those of a racial minority group, as an
“untouchable” in today’s society (Fletcher, 1999, p. 1898). More specifically,
Fletcher (1999) argued that felony disenfranchisement was simply another
“technique for reinforcing the branding of felons as the untouchable class of
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American society” (p. 1895). Part of Fletcher’s argument against the use of
disenfranchisement legislation was the “mystical” and “fanciful” argument of the
need to maintain the “purity of the ballot box” (1999, p. 1899). The argument that
voting by current and former offenders would harm “the purity of the ballot box”
was based on the idea that criminal offenders would taint the voting process
(Fletcher, 1999). This belief, Fletcher argued, goes against the rationale of a
legal system based on fact, and therefore has no place in the American legal
system. Further, Fletcher (1999) argued that because there is a disproportionate
number of racial minorities represented among this permanent underclass,
disenfranchisement continues to perpetuate the view that the criminal justice
system is racist, if not in intent, certainly in outcome.
Hench (1998) furthered the argument that racial minorities were
disproportionately impacted by disenfranchisement legislation by emphatically
stating that “minority voting rights are dead” (p. 730). Although the main premise
of her work was to examine the overall impact of the disenfranchisement of
minorities, not just of those who have committed criminal offenses, Hench (1998)
discussed the specific impact of the felony disenfranchisement laws on the
minority community. Essentially, Hench (1998) argued that the increased
incarceration rate of minority offenders has amounted to the dilution of the
minority voting power. Because the racial disparity in incarceration has
increased, she argued, felony disenfranchisement was indistinguishable from
many of the historic attempts to prohibit minorities from exercising their rights
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(Hench, 1998). Although Hench admitted that there were other motives, aside
from race, in the voting prohibition of criminal offenders, she argued that race
was an overriding factor that could not be ignored. Hench stated that “the
unsavory facts are that present day felon disenfranchisement has its roots in a
mentality that assigned people of color to the status of non-person, and that
these laws continue to operate with discriminatory effect” (1998, p. 771). It is this
discriminatory effect that Hench believed needs to be the focus of any
examination of disenfranchisement (Hench, 1998).
In another study, King and Mauer (2004) examined the impact of felony
disenfranchisement on minorities and their voting power in Atlanta, Georgia. The
goal of this study was to determine if there was a disenfranchisement impact on
the black population at the local level (King and Mauer, 2004). In addition to
determining the percentage of persons (black and non-black) who were
disenfranchised, this study examined the overall impact disenfranchisement has
on voter registration for neighborhoods in Atlanta (King and Mauer, 2004). Using
Atlanta zip codes and correctional data, King and Mauer (2004), estimated the
total number of disenfranchised persons, by race, for each of twenty zip codes
that could be identified as covering a geographical area (King and Mauer, 2004).
Zip codes reserved for businesses were excluded from the analysis (King and
Mauer, 2004). Additional data related to race, ethnicity, median household
income, and poverty rate were attained from the United States Census Bureau
(King and Mauer, 2004).
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King and Mauer (2004) determined that one in seven black males in the
Atlanta area was disenfranchised due to a felony conviction (King and Mauer,
2004). Further, the rate of black male disenfranchisement was eleven times
higher than that of non-black males in Atlanta (King and Mauer, 2004). Some
neighborhoods had a black male disenfranchisement rate of over twenty percent
while no neighborhood had more than a four percent disenfranchisement rate for
non-black males (King and Mauer, 2004). The authors argued the proportion of
black males that were disenfranchised in each area indicated a substantial racial
impact from disenfranchisement legislation (King and Mauer, 2004). However,
the more important finding, according to King and Mauer, was that black male
voter registration rates were even more impacted by disenfranchisement laws.
This was illustrated by the finding that sixty-nine percent of the voter registration
gap between black males and non-black males was a function of
disenfranchisement legislation (King and Mauer, 2004).
Fellner and Mauer (1998) provided a more rigorous empirical research
study on the impact of felony disenfranchisement legislation in the United States.
Utilizing data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Fellner and Mauer attempted
to ascertain the national and racial impact of felony disenfranchisement laws
across the country. Because data on the size of the disenfranchised population
was not available, the authors were required to make estimates on the size of the
disenfranchised population, based on data from 1995. These estimates were
needed as some states disenfranchised for all felonies, while others
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disenfranchised only for a second felony conviction (Fellner and Mauer, 1998).
To complete the data set used for their study, Fellner and Mauer also estimated
the total number of persons with prior convictions, as some states count prior
convictions toward disenfranchisement. Lastly, to be able to judge the racial
impact of disenfranchisement legislation, the number of black males in prison, on
probation, and on parole were estimated for each state of the year 1996 (Fellner
and Mauer, 1998).
After gathering the estimates as described above, Fellner and Mauer were
able to calculate the proportion of the general population for each state that was
disenfranchised, as well the proportion of black males that were disenfranchised
in each state. The findings indicated that being black has a substantial impact in
many states (Fellner and Mauer, 1998). For example, while the total
disenfranchised population for the United States represented two percent of the
total population, disenfranchised black males represented 13.1% of the black
male population. The 13.1% represents approximately 1.4 million black males or
one-third of the total disenfranchised population (Fellner and Mauer, 1998).
When the data were examined by state, two states (Alabama and Florida)
disenfranchised thirty-one percent of the black male population; in five states
(Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico, Virginia, and Wyoming) one in four black males
were disenfranchised; and six other states (Texas – 20.8%; Delaware – 20%,
Rhode Island – 18.3%, Wisconsin – 18.2%, Minnesota – 17.8%, New Jersey –
17.7%) had at least seventeen percent black male disenfranchisement. Based
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on a simple proportion, Fellner and Mauer (1998) were able to show that laws
that disenfranchise felony offenders had a substantial racial impact.
Several studies indicated that there were political consequences of felony
disenfranchisement laws (Manza and Uggen, 2003; Uggen and Manza, 2001;
Uggen and Manza, 2002). For example, Uggen and Manza (2001 and 2002)
utilized the Voting Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to
determine the impact felony disenfranchisement had on voter turnout. As an
additional measure, the researchers used National Election Study (NES) data
covering a twenty-eight year period (1972 – 2000) in an attempt to determine
voter preferences and choice of political candidates (Uggen and Manza, 2001
and 2002). Using these two sources, Uggen and Manza (2001 and 2002),
estimated the expected voter turnout and the expected vote choice of
disenfranchised offenders. Estimates of voter turnout and vote choice were
necessary in this case because there was no accurate “survey data that asks
disenfranchised felons how they would have voted” (Uggen and Manza, 2001, p.
10). Even with this lack of data to measure the exact political consequences of
felony disenfranchisement, Uggen and Manza (2001 and 2002), believed that
their estimates were accurate. Both the CPS and NES obtained data on
demographic information which allowed inferences to be made regarding how an
individual might vote based upon their race, sex, age, and socioeconomic status,
among others (Uggen and Manza, 2001).
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The authors used logistic regression with two dichotomous dependent
variables, whether or not a person would have voted and if that individual would
have voted for the Democratic or Republican candidate. The findings indicated
an estimated voter turnout of thirty-one percent on average for all senatorial and
presidential elections from 1972 to 2000 (Uggen and Manza, 2001 and 2002).
Although the thirty-one percent estimate is far less than the national average∗ for
non-felon voters, the authors argued that the numbers “suggest that a non-trivial
proportion of disenfranchised voters were likely to have voted if they had been
given the opportunity to vote” (Uggen and Manza, 2001, p. 15).
The political party or candidate choice estimate showed similar results.
That is, given the data available, the disenfranchised felon vote would likely had
made a difference in several senatorial and presidential elections (Uggen and
Manza, 2001 and 2002). Based on the estimates, the disenfranchised felon
voter, hypothesized in these studies, indicated an overwhelming preference for
Democratic candidates (Uggen and Manza, 2001 and 2002). Given this finding,
Uggen and Manza (2001 and 2002) argued that disenfranchising felony
offenders provided a “clear advantage to Republican candidates in every
senatorial and presidential election from 1972 to 2000 (p. 16).
In support of this argument, Uggen and Manza examined the actual
elections that took place between 1978 and 2000 to determine if any of those
elections might have turned out differently if felons had the opportunity to vote.
∗

National averages for voting turnout ranged from 33% to 55% during the 28-year period used for
this study.
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After examining all of those elections, the authors found evidence that seven
senatorial elections and two presidential elections were likely influenced by the
disenfranchisement of felony offenders (Uggen and Manza, 2001 and 2002).
Further, the authors argued that the possibility that these elections might have
turned out differently had an influence far beyond the actual election in question
(Uggen and Manza, 2001 and 2002). For example, because the U.S. Senate
had been fairly evenly divided between Democrat and Republican over the
period examined, a shift of even one would have likely shifted the balance of
power in the Senate (Uggen and Manza, 2001 and 2002). Further, with the
incumbent in any election having a decided advantage when it comes to
reelection, a shift from one party to another in 1978, may indeed have had an
impact in that senatorial district for years (Uggen and Manza, 2001 and 2002).
Voter turnout was the main factor under consideration in a 2004 study
conducted by Miles. Using a “triple-differences” framework, Miles tested whether
or not disenfranchisement reduced the voter turnout of African-American men.
The triple differences (or difference-in-differences-in-differences) approach
utilized “three dimensions of comparison to identify a causal effect” (Miles, 2004,
p. 100). Miles (2004) used race (African-Americans vs. Whites) as the first
difference, sex as the second difference, and state disenfranchisement laws as
the third difference in an attempt to determine if there was a causal effect of race
and sex and disenfranchisement laws on voter turnout. Voter turnout was the
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dependent variable and race, sex, and the disenfranchisement law of a state
were all independent variables (Miles, 2004).
Using a sample of twenty-six states, Miles (2004) found that states with a
permanent disenfranchisement law were no more likely to impact voter turnout
rates among black male voters than were states without a permanent
disenfranchisement law. That is, unlike many studies presented here, Miles
(2004) findings suggested that disenfranchisement legislation had no discernable
impact on voter turnout. Miles (2004) suggested that his findings vary from other
studies because previous studies focused too much on the disproportionate
numbers of disenfranchised African-American males and not on the causal effect
on actual voting practices. In fact, Miles argued that “the absence of an effect is
consistent with the view that on average felons belong to a demographic groups
that, although eligible to vote, infrequently exercise that right” (2004, p. 122).
The study conducted by Miles (2004) was a contrast to most research on
the political consequences of felony disenfranchisement. There may be several
reasons for the difference in findings. First, Miles (2004) examined not the
numbers of incarcerated offenders, but rather actual voter turnout numbers.
Second, statistical tests used may have provided differing results. Lastly, the
size of the population in Miles’s study may have resulted in divergent results.
Whatever the reason for the difference in findings between Miles’s study and
each of the other studies, the Miles study appears to be the lone study arguing
that felony disenfranchisement does not have a political consequence.
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The above research has expanded our understanding of felony
disenfranchisement. However, there remain issues in need of resolution. In the
following section, gaps in the literature on disenfranchisement legislation are
discussed.
Gaps in the Literature on Disenfranchisement
An analysis of the literature on disenfranchisement reveals two important
gaps. First, most prior studies of felony disenfranchisement fail to provide a
theoretical framework to explain the nature and practices of felony
disenfranchisement while also providing empirical data (see for example Allard
and Mauer, 2000; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Manza and Uggen, 2003). Thus,
although research on felony disenfranchisement has been conducted, theoretical
explanations of this phenomenon are still inadequate. The lack of a theoretical
framework for most empirical studies results in a collection of empirical data
without explanations of the meaning of the data and why social phenomena exist.
As Bourdieu (1988) states, “theory without empirical research is empty, empirical
research without theory is blind” (p. 774). Second, the empirical studies
conducted to date shows the impact of disenfranchisement on minority offenders
and on society generally, but there has not been a qualitative analysis of the laws
themselves to attain a better understanding of the nature of disenfranchisement.
A qualitative analysis of the laws should provide important insight into
disenfranchisement.
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To fill the gap in the literature on felony disenfranchisement, the present
study examines state disenfranchisement and voting restoration laws in the
United States to address these shortcomings. Specifically, the study seeks to
test the following hypotheses:
1) The greater the proportion of minorities in a state’s population, the
more restrictive the state’s disenfranchisement laws;
2) The more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement laws, the higher the
state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration; and
3) The higher a state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration, the more
difficult the voting restoration procedures.
The group threat hypothesis of conflict theory, which will be discussed in Chapter
3, and both qualitative and quantitative methods are used to answer these
questions. The research hypotheses and research methods are presented in the
Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework
This chapter is devoted to the establishment of a theoretical framework for
the study of felony disenfranchisement legislation. Towards that end, this
chapter discusses the conflict perspective generally, and the group threat
hypothesis specifically.
Foundation of Conflict Theory
The conflict perspective is rooted in Marxian ideas. According to Marx,
“the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”
(1848/1998, p. 79). Although Marx, who was essentially an economist, did not
discuss the issue of crime in much detail, his concepts of class conflict, control,
and power provided the foundation for the conflict perspective (Greenberg,
1981). Marx’s original formulation of conflict was based in economic terms,
principally the capitalism economic system and the conflict between two classes,
the bourgeoisie (who owned the means of production) and the proletariat
(workers in the capitalist economy) (Marx, 1848/1998). Because maximization of
profits is the main goal of capitalism, those who own the means of production
attempt to attain that goal through a variety of means (Marx, 1848/1998 and
1859/1970). One of the means of ensuring the maximization of profits utilized by
the bourgeoisie was to either construct or to control the superstructure in society
(Marx, 1859/1970 and 1867/1967). The superstructure refers, not simply to the
state or government, but also to law, religion, and the dominant values of the
society as a whole (Marx, 1867/1967). According to Marx, by controlling the
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superstructure through influence on the law-making process and through the
creation of laws designed to protect the capitalist economic system, the
bourgeoisie is able to control production and the market (Marx, 1867/1967).
Bourgeois control of the superstructure results in class conflict as the
proletariat became more aware of the alienation and exploitation endemic in the
capitalist economic system (Marx, 1848/1998). As the proletariat became more
class-conscious and determined to change the system, bourgeois control
exercised became harsher to sustain the capitalist economic system (Marx,
1848/1998). Crime was the label applied to the proletarian struggle to overthrow
the system. In response, the bourgeoisie continued to increase criminal
penalties and introduce laws designed to protect the capitalist economic system.
The bourgeoisie, the ruling class as represented by the state, used the law to
protect its interests and control the proletariat (Marx, 1848/1998, 1867/1967).
Although conflict theory is fairly broad and several divergent views on the
theoretical perspective can be found, the primary assumption held by all versions
of conflict theory is that societies are characterized by the conflicts within them
(Greenberg, 1981; Quinney, 1977; Turk, 1969; Vold, 1958; Vold and Bernard,
1986). These conflicts drive many political, social, and legal decisions.
According to Marx, conflict stems from the struggle for power, either to attain
power or maintain power once it is achieved (cited in Greenberg, 1981). Many
theorists have viewed the concept of power and the need to attain and maintain
power as the main factor that spurs many of society’s laws (Bonger, 1916/1969;
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Dahrendorf, 1959; Quinney, 1977; Turk, 1969; Vold, 1958; Vold and Bernard,
1986).
The work of Marx laid the foundation for a conflict perspective in
criminology. Bonger (1916/1969) for example, took many Marxian ideas
regarding the capitalist mode of production and used them to explain how crime
itself was an inevitable by-product of the economic system. According to Bonger
(1916/1969), crime was a result of egoism, which was directly tied to the
capitalist mode of production that emphasized profits first and foremost.
Because of this egoism, there was a greater emphasis placed on protecting
those profits and therefore protecting the persons making those profits, the
bourgeoisie (Bonger, 1916/1969). Although Bonger’s approach is primarily
socio-psychological in nature, he believed that the egoism of individuals in a
capitalistic society helps to create conflict between groups and helps to create
crime. In regards to capitalism causing crime, Bonger argues, “as a
consequence of the present environment, man has become very egoistic and
hence more capable of crime, than if the environment had developed the germs
of altruism” (p. 41). Although crime coming from capitalism was not exclusively a
problem of the proletariat, Bonger (1916/1969) argued that the law was designed
to protect the bourgeoisie and crime, particularly crime committed by the
proletariat, was seen as a threat to that power base in society. It was Bonger’s
connection of capitalism to crime that advanced Marxian ideas and the conflict
perspective.
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Similar to Bonger, Dahrendorf (1959) utilized Marxian ideas to further
establish the conflict perspective as a legitimate means of explaining social
problems. Unlike Marx’s emphasis on the means of production however,
Dahrendorf (1959) argued that conflict was better explained by an individual’s
exercise of authority over others. Although the ability to exercise authority did
include those who owned the means of production (Marx’s Bourgeoisie), it also
included those individuals, such as managers and supervisors, who had some
measure of authority over others (Dahrendorf, 1959). Because of this emphasis
on authority as opposed to means of production, Dahrendorf was able to explain
conflict across societies regardless of what method of production was utilized.
With the addition of authority to Marxian ideas of power, the conflict perspective
expanded into areas other than the economic and political fields that had been
Marx’s focus. Authority, power, and control were all concepts that fed into the
conflict perspective’s ability to explain law as a means managing conflict.
Turk (1969) built on the conflict perspective by explaining that law itself is
the manifestation of the dominant group’s need to control society. Those with
power in society need to protect their power and therefore create laws to control
those they perceive as threatening to that power base. Turk offers numerous
examples of the creation of law to protect power. For example, the creation and
implementation of vagrancy laws in the United States in the 1800s demonstrates
the use of criminal law to control a population deemed as threatening to the
power structure (as cited in Maguire, 1990). Other laws, ranging from alcohol
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prohibition to the criminalization of marijuana, present additional examples of the
use of law to protect society from a perceived threat to the social order (Turk,
1969). Vold (1958) provides another example, arguing that many laws geared
towards juveniles and juvenile gangs were created because juveniles, even
though they hold no real power, were seen as a threat to the “established world
of adult values and power” (p. 211). Vold saw the relationship of conflict, power,
and law as coming from the divergent interest of competing groups – in the
above case, between juveniles and adults. Vold (1958) sums up this argument
by explaining that “whichever group interest can marshal the greatest number of
votes will determine whether or not there is to be a new law to hamper and curb
the interests of some opposition group” (p. 208).
Although Turk appeared to move away from Marxian ideas of the mode of
production influencing conflict, Quinney (1977), like Marx, argues that the power
that controls the law of a society cannot be separated from the capitalist mode of
production in the society itself. Capitalism itself creates conflict between groups
seeking to maximize profit and control society for their own benefit (Quinney,
1977). According to Quinney, “an understanding of crime in our society begins
with the recognition that the crucial phenomenon to be considered is not crime
per se, but the historical development and operation of capitalist society” (1977,
p. 39). This argument is directly tied to Marxian ideas about the capitalist mode
of production and the contradictions Marx believed were inherent in a capitalist
society. Quinney furthered the argument to include a more thorough
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understanding of the connection of the power base in a capitalistic society to the
order in that society. Quinney argues that “when a society generates social
problems (created by capitalism) it cannot solve within its own existence, policies
for controlling the population are devised and implemented” (1977, p. 8).
The conflict theory initially presented by Vold (1958), rather than focusing
on the conflicts of capitalism, instead focused on conflicts of interests between
groups in society. According to Vold, humans are “fundamentally group-involved
beings,” and therefore tend to form groups around related interests (1986, p.
271). Conflict occurs when there is either an overlap in group interests or if one
group’s interests are encroached upon by another group. The creation,
implementation, and enforcement of law follow this same general pattern of
conflicting group interests. For example, when conflicts between two opposing
groups occur, the group that is more able to influence the creation of law is more
likely to control the will of the opposing groups. This control is exercised, not
merely in the creation of the law or in the enforcement of the law, but the control
extends to control of the state. Vold and Bernard (1986) argue, “those who
produce legislative majorities win control of the police power of the state and
decide the policies that determine who is likely to be involved in the violation of
laws. Thus the whole process of lawmaking, lawbreaking, and law enforcement
directly reflects deep-seated and fundamental conflicts between group interest
and the more general struggles among groups for control of the police power of
the state. To that extent, criminal behavior is the behavior of minority power
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groups, in that these groups do not have sufficient power to promote and defend
their interests and purposes in the legislative process” (p. 273-274). These
conflicts of interest result in the waging of a battle for control that is enforced
through the creation and enforcement of law (Vold, 1958; Vold and Bernard,
1986). Crime and crime control can not truly be understood without some
reference to conflict, as criminal law is a reflection of the values and mores of
power holders in society (Vold, 1958; Vold and Bernard, 1986). Greenberg
(1981) continues the argument that the criminal law can be seen as a result of
“the relative power of groups determined to use the criminal law to advance their
own special interests or to impose their moral preferences on others” (p. 4). By
utilizing law and the enforcement of law, control can be maintained. It is,
according to Greenberg (1981), this power that is critical in shaping not only the
law, but also, the structures that enforce the law.
Group Threat Hypothesis
The group threat hypothesis is based on conflict theory. In this section,
the group threat hypothesis is explained and several studies that have tested the
hypothesis are presented. These studies tested the validity of the group threat
hypothesis in various ways and are organized along four separate themes: crime
as a race specific issue, minority population size and increases in diversity,
police department size and deployment practices, and police brutality. Prior to
the discussion of the various tests of the group threat hypothesis, an explanation
of Blalock’s hypothesis is presented.
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The group threat hypothesis was originally formulated by Blalock in 1967
as an expansion of the conflict perspective discussed above. Ultimately, the
creation of the group threat hypothesis came from Blalock’s attempt to formulate
a theory of “minority-group relations” (1967, p. vii). In his attempt to build a
theory, Blalock (1967) brings together socioeconomic factors and the ideas of
competition and power to explain how the increase in minority population, among
other factors, leads to economic and/or political threat and ultimately prejudice
and discrimination among the dominant group. Blalock separates his ninetyseven distinct theoretical propositions into four main categories: socioeconomic
factors and discrimination, competition and discrimination, power and
discrimination, and minority percentage and discrimination. Each of these
categories explains discrimination against minorities in different ways. Under the
category of socioeconomic factors, Blalock (1967) argues, that the “fear of loss of
status” among the majority class leads to avoidance behavior (segregation) and
discrimination against the minority (p. 71). Similarly, Blalock’s second major
category, competition and discrimination, involves a fear of loss by the majority,
but rather than focusing primarily on economic terms, Blalock argues that
competition from minorities leads to discriminatory behavior by the majority.
Blalock (1967) argues that this competition could be a perception of competition
or, simply, the visibility of minorities. That is, the more visible the minority
member, the more they are perceived to be in competition with the majority for
limited resources. According to Blalock (1967), this competition can be expected
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to lead to increased discriminatory behavior and even violence: “forms of
discriminatory behavior based on the threat of competition would entail
considerably more violence and direct injury to the minority” (p. 106).
One of the distinct differences between the group threat hypothesis and
the conflict perspective is articulated by Blalock in his description of power and
discrimination, his third theoretical category. According to Blalock (1967), “one
can think of race relations in terms of intergroup power contests. The term
‘power contest’ is used in preference to one such as ‘power struggle’ in order to
emphasize that there need be no overt conflict” (p. 109). The perspective that
conflict need not be overt in order for power to be exercised opens up the
analysis of race relations to include methods that are “certainly more complex …
and usually much more subtle” than outright and overt racial domination by the
majority class (Blalock, 1967, p.109). In the case of power and discrimination,
Blalock (1967) contends that power itself is a “multiplicative function of two very
general types of variables, total resources and the degree to which these
resources are mobilized” (p.110). That is, the two variables work together to
form an understanding of power and how it is exercised. The more resources
(including money, property, voting rights, etcetera) a group has combined with
the ability to mobilize those resources results in greater power. Discrimination
may result if that power is threatened in some way or discrimination may act as
an impediment to achievement of greater power. Blalock provides an example of
how discrimination can be an impediment to increasing a group’s power, by
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discussing the lack of educational resources possessed by the black minority.
Because black children had been denied equal education through discrimination,
they were far less able to compete with whites after desegregation. This inability
to compete ultimately limits the ability to achieve a resource (higher education)
thereby limiting the ability to mobilize that resource to gain power (Blalock, 1967).
The last of the four main categories of Blalock’s group threat theoretical
propositions is minority percentage and discrimination. Essentially, Blalock
argues that the greater the percentage of minorities in a given population the
greater the perceived threat they pose to the dominant class. The increase in
minority population is particularly important, according to Blalock in the realm of
economics. That is, if minority groups threaten, or are perceived to threaten, the
economic capabilities of the dominant class through competition for jobs, the
greater the chance that the minority group will be discriminated against.
According to Blalock (1967), population size is an important factor in examining
competition, “the larger the relative size of the minority population, the more
minority individuals there should be in direct or potential competition with a given
individual in the dominant group. As the minority percentage increases,
therefore, we would expect to find increasing discriminatory behavior” (p.148).
Ultimately then, “we must remember that there will generally be larger numbers
of the minority in communities with high discrimination rates” (p. 181).
Based on the four categories mentioned above, Blalock (1967) argues that
minorities are more “likely to be selected as targets for aggression to the degree
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that such aggression can serve as a means to other goals” (p. 205). Among
these goals are the reduction of competition and frustration among the majority
class (Blalock, 1967). However, aggression from the dominant class could also
be exercised against the minority group simply based on the perception that
minorities are the cause of frustration among the majority group (Blalock, 1967).
Although there are ninety-seven distinct propositions, the propositions taken as a
whole argue that if minorities are, or are perceived to be, a threat to employment,
political power, education, or any resource controlled by the majority, the
members of the dominant group will utilize whatever power they possess to
control the minority group (Blalock, 1967). This power often takes the form of
aggressive actions against minorities, all in an effort to control the threat.
It was the idea of perception of threat that was picked up on by Liska
(1992) and the various authors in Liska’s edited text in their attempt to explain
crime control policies. These theorists argue that social control is more likely to
be exercised against minority groups that are perceived to be a threat in some
way (Blalock, 1967; Chamblin and Liska, 1992; Jackson, 1992; Liska, 1992).
This threat can be economic, such as competition for employment, but threat can
also be seen in the increase in civil liberties and political power of minority
groups. Essentially, when a subordinate group attempts to, or actually succeeds,
at gaining some measure of power at the expense of the group in power, those in
control perceive the subordinate group as a threat (Blalock, 1967).
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The key to the group threat hypothesis is its reliance on perception of
threat rather than actual threat. That is, the threat does not have to be real. The
nature of the threat is not particularly important either. Various factors can cause
a threat to those in power; it simply depends upon what those in power perceive
as threatening (Blalock, 1967; Jackson, 1992). Threats can range from
increases in size of minority populations, economic advancements by a minority
group, and/or increased political representation among others (Blalock, 1967;
Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Chamblin, 1992; Chamblin and Liska, 1992;
Inverarity, 1992). How the powerful handle these threats varies as well. The
powerful may create new legislation to limit minorities in some way, there may be
enhanced penalties that effect minorities is a disproportionate way, or the
powerful may use agents of state, law enforcement officials, to enhance
enforcement on those that that are perceived as a threat (Arvanities, 1992;
Chamblin and Liska, 1992; Inverarity, 1992). The use of the criminal justice
system as a control mechanism of the state is a prime example of how those in
power can eliminate the threat (Liska, 1992).
Utilizing the group threat hypothesis to examine control by the criminal
justice system, however, does not necessarily imply that these laws are
intentionally discriminatory. In fact, “the key issue is result, not intent” (GeorgesAbeyie, 1990, p. 28). Simply because the results of a law may indicate
disparities in outcome, does not mean that there was any intent to discriminate.
These laws may be seen as institutionalized discrimination, in that disparities in
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outcomes are often the result of established legal factors (Georges-Abeyie, 1990;
Petersilia, 1983; Wilbanks, 1987). Minorities, particularly racial minorities, have
felt the effect of institutional discrimination in education, employment, income
distribution, and the criminal justice process to name but a few (Georges-Abeyie,
1990; McCrudden, 1982). Poorer schools, may be a historic remnant of
segregation, which may lead to few prospects at the managerial or professional
level of employment, which may, in turn, lead to less income for minorities as
compared to whites can all be seen as a result of discrimination that has been
institutionalized over decades.
In the field of criminal justice, established legal factors may include the
examination of an individual’s criminal history when making a sentencing
decision. An individual who has an extensive criminal history will be more
harshly sentenced than an individual who, although they committed the same
offense, has little or no criminal history. Due to the history of overt discrimination
when in comes to African Americans in this country, they are more likely to have
multiple arrests and therefore a more extensive criminal history than whites. So
while utilizing an offender’s criminal history may result in racial disparities in
outcomes (longer prison terms, increase minority percentage in prison), the use
of those criminal histories is not discriminatory in intent. The impact of utilizing
legal factors that may result in institutional discrimination reaches far beyond
increased numbers of minorities in prison. For example, because drug laws*

*

According to the 2004 Uniform Crime Report, drug law violations make up 12.5% of all arrests;
Blacks represent 32.7% of those arrested for drug law violations.
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disproportionately affect minority populations, these same minority populations
consequently tend to become incarcerated and are disenfranchised as a result
(Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Mauer, 2002;
Pettus, 2002). Further, bail and pretrial detention policies, which require full time
employment for an individual to qualify for bail and avoid pretrial detention, while
not overtly racially discriminatory has the result of discrimination in that minorities
that appear before the court are less likely to possess full-time employment
(Demuth, 2003; Schlesinger, 2005). The quality of legal counsel is also impacted
by established criminal justice policies that appear on the surface to be nondiscriminatory. Because the quality of legal counsel often depends on a
defendant’s ability to pay and most minority defendants are not able to afford
quality counsel, they are forced to acquire an attorney from the public defenders
office (Demuth, 2003; Schlesinger, 2005). The massive caseloads of most
members of a public defenders office inhibits their ability to provide a full quality
defense, as a result the defendant tends to suffer the consequences (Demuth,
2003; Schlesinger, 2005). Each of these factors (criminal histories, drug laws,
bail and pretrial detention, the quality of legal counsel) has an impact on
minorities in the criminal justice system. These forms of institutional
discrimination cause disparities in criminal justice outcomes and subsequently in
differential effects of felony disenfranchisement on members of minority and
dominant groups.
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Ultimately, as the above cases show, institutional discrimination is about
result and it requires no overt action for the result to be considered
discriminatory. Behavior of individuals and of institutions no longer needs to be
discriminatory in order for discriminatory effects to occur. According to Knowles
and Prewitt (1969), “behavior has become so well institutionalized that the
individual generally does not have to exercise choices to operate in a racist
manner. The rules and procedures of the large organization have already
prestructured the choice. The individual only has to conform to the operating
norms of the organization and the institution will do the discriminating for him” (p.
143). Such is the case in the criminal justice system and the impact this system
has on minority offenders. However, simply because there is evidence of
institutional discrimination does not preclude divergent explanations of
discrimination, such as the examination of the group threat hypothesis. In what
follows, several studies testing the Group Threat Hypothesis in the field of
criminal justice are presented along four separate themes: crime as a race
specific issue, minority population size and increases in diversity, police
department size and deployment practices, and police brutality.
Although Blalock did not necessarily create the group threat hypothesis as
an explanation of how the criminal justice system operates several researchers
have tested the group threat hypothesis as it relates to crime and the criminal
justice system. Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz (2004), found support for the group
threat hypothesis in their study examining the racial typification of crime (where
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crime is viewed as race specific) and its effects on support for punitive measures.
They used a national telephone survey of 885 randomly selected households and
asked questions regarding respondent’s attitudes toward various types of
punishment. Using regression analysis, the responses were compared to a
variety of dependent variables, including a black crime index (index of crimes
committed by Blacks), fear of crime victimization, and racial prejudice among
others. They found that group threat was related not only to the proximity or the
size of the minority population, but also to the perception of crime as a “black
phenomenon” (2004, p. 380). Specifically, because crime was typified as being
committed by the black minority, the white majority, viewed the black minority as
a threat (Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz, 2004). Chiricos and his colleagues (2004)
argued that this typification of crime was perhaps a better measure of perceived
minority crime threat to the power of the white majority than was size of the
minority population or even the location of the population – size and location of
the minority population was irrelevant if blacks were not equated with crime in the
first place.
The concept of group threat was also examined in a study of racial
profiling in the Richmond, VA police department (Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith,
2003). Petrocelli and his colleagues (2003) examined traffic stops by police
officers, vehicle searches incident to the traffic stop, and arrests occurring as a
result of the initial traffic stop. Additionally, the authors examined the percent of
African Americans and other non-black minorities in the population, the percent
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of families below the poverty level, mean family income, unemployment rate, and
the Part I crime rate to determine if these variables influenced the number of
traffic stops, searches, and/or arrests incident to the traffic stop. Although the
initial traffic stop was not found to be correlated with the racial make-up of the
community or the result of the crime rate of the area, both searches and arrests
were related to the number of blacks in the community (Petrocelli, Piquero, &
Smith, 2003). Thus they found support for the conflict view that increased
numbers of racial minorities resulted in greater police action.
Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg (2002), examined three types of threat in
relation to race: political, economic, and black crime. They defined these types
of threats as follows: political threat was when the percent of blacks in the
population grew to a point where the state viewed them as a threat to the
“political ascendancy” of whites; economic threat was when the percent of blacks
in the population grew to a point that there was increased competition for finite
economic resources (including employment); and black crime threat was when
there was an increase (or a perception of an increase) of Whites being victimized
by Blacks. These threats were treated as independent variables to determine if
they were correlated to the dependent variable of black to white arrest ratios.
Eitle, et. al. used three different measures, one for each type of threat. As a
measure of political threat, the authors used county-level race specific voting
data for the state of South Carolina (the number of blacks who voted). To
measure economic threat, the authors used a black to white unemployment ratio.
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Lastly, to measure the black crime threat, the authors used South Carolina’s
National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data to locate black on white
crimes.
In utilizing county-level data from the state of South Carolina, Eitle,
D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg (2002), attempted to discern if any of these three
types of racial threat were correlated with increased social control over
minorities. Although two of the racial threats, political and economic, were not
supported by the data, there was substantial support for the threat of black crime
hypothesis. According to the authors, “as the percent of violent felony offenses
that involve a black perpetrator and a white victim rises, the likelihood that a
black individual will be arrested for a felony crime also increases” (Eitle,
D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg, 2002, p. 570). The authors further contended that
the same cannot be said for black-on-black crime, which was far more likely to
occur (Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg, 2002). The findings of this study
indicated strong support that black crime is an indicator of group threat. That is,
blacks, as a group, were perceived as a threat by the white majority and were
therefore arrested more frequently and punished more severely (Eitle, D’Alessio,
and Stolzenberg, 2002).
Chamlin and Cochran (2000) examined the race riots in Cincinnati in 1967
and robbery arrests in the months following the riots by using an interrupted timeseries analysis. The authors based their study on Cincinnati Police Department
data for monthly robbery arrests from 1961 through 1973. They also included
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data for other violent offenses (homicide, rape, and assault), although their
primary focus was on robbery. They focused specifically on robbery arrests
because, given arrest data for all violent offenses, robbery “stands out as the
offense most likely to involve Black offenders and White victims” (p. 90).
Because of this, Chamblin and Cochran viewed robbery to be most indicative of
racial threat against whites. Although the aforementioned studies provided some
support for the group threat hypothesis, Chamlin and Cochran’s study (2000)
failed to support the hypothesis. According to Chamlin and Cochran (2000), the
race riots had no impact on the number of arrests for robbery, a crime they
argued was “particularly threatening to the white majority” (p. 96). However,
even with this negative finding, Chamlin and Cochran (2000) argued that their
findings must be examined with caution. By examining only one crime (robbery)
in one city (Cincinnati), they noted that they could not outright reject the group
threat hypothesis (Chamlin and Cochran, 2000).
Ruddell and Urbina (2004) offered another test of the minority group threat
hypothesis in their cross-national examination of population heterogeneity and
punishment practices, which included the abolition of the death penalty. Using
regression analysis on data from 140 nations, the authors attempted to ascertain
whether increased population diversity, economic stress, violent crime, and
political stability influenced the punishment practices of that nation. According to
Ruddell and Urbina (2004), the group threat hypothesis suggests that
punishment (including the use of the death penalty) was one way for the powerful
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in society to control minority populations. In this study, the concept of a minority
group was extended beyond a black/white racial dichotomy. Instead, a minority
group was seen as any group that had a different ethnicity, culture, language,
and/or religion than the majority. Ruddell and Urbina (2004) argued that growing
diversity in societies across the world resulted in increased conflict between
groups as measured by increased rates of social problems, such as crime, which
the majority population attempted to control. Through their examination of the
population diversity, based on national population data, and punishment
practices, such as use of the death penalty, the authors found support for the
group threat hypothesis. The findings indicated that countries that are more
diverse in population are also more punitive. Ruddell and Urbina (2004) argued
that crime and social problems were caused by population diversity, because
population diversity causes crime and other social problems that must be dealt
with by the state and the ruling class, increased population diversity could be
perceived as a threat to the power of the ruling class in that, increased problems
call for increased response from the ruling class. The findings indicated that,
when minority populations grew, the punitive actions of the government also
increased, thus supporting the group threat hypothesis.
Cureton’s (2001) study provided an additional test of the group threat
hypothesis as it related to minority population size. Utilizing the 1990 U.S.
Census and the Uniform Crime Reports for 435 U.S. cities with populations over
25,000, Cureton (2001) contended that whites’ perception of threat is based
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more upon the percentage of blacks in the population than the crime rate of
blacks. He used regression analysis to determine if various demographic
variables (race, income, etc.) determined black and white arrest ratios. Although
the results of his study were mixed, there was support for the group threat
hypothesis. For example, Cureton (2001) found that black arrest ratios were
higher than white arrest ratios for serious criminal offenses (crimes such as
murder and robbery). Cureton (2001) argued that, when one considers that
arrest ratios and criminal conduct were independent of each other, as these data
suggested, it seamed that “elites were able to persuade legal agents to exercise
discretionary justice to constrain and repress minority populations” (p. 164).
Despite the fact that crime was often an intra-class and intra-race phenomenon
and that minorities were more likely than members of the ruling class to be
victims of violent crimes, like murder and robbery, it was the perception that the
ruling class may be in danger that drove the ruling class’s desire to impose harsh
sanctions on minorities. Additionally, Cureton (2001) hypothesized that, based
upon the size of the minority population, the majority may offer some form of
leniency towards the minority, if, in fact the size of the minority population was
considered large. This hypothesis was based on the idea that, “Blacks
committed these crimes (violent crimes) so often that White governing elites
chose to sanction only those serious cases that specifically threatened them”
(Cureton, p. 164). This leniency was supported by the data presented in the
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study, in that arrest differentials of blacks were related, not to the actual crime
rate, but rather to the actual percent of blacks in the population.
Most research on the group threat hypothesis and police resources has
found that the percentage of the minority group in the general population drives
the allocation of resources for police agencies. Using a panel design, Kane
(2003) studied changes in New York police precincts across time. The
independent variables for this community-level study included police force size,
police expenditures, and black and Hispanic population sizes within 74 precincts
in New York City in 1975, 1982, and 1992. Each of these variables was tested
using correlation analysis to determine if they were connected to the deployment
practices within each precinct. The findings suggested that it was the change in
Hispanic population that precipitated changes in police deployment (Kane, 2003).
That is, as the Hispanic population increased, so too did police deployment. No
relationship was found between the black population and police deployment
(Kane, 2003). The lack of a significant finding for black population and police
deployment, according to Kane (2003), was not surprising and was consistent
with the group threat hypothesis. Kane (2003) argued that, over the time period
(1975 to 1992), the black population became highly concentrated in a few
precincts while the Hispanic population increased across the city. Therefore,
“from a minority group-threat perspective, it may be that, while the black
population of New York was perceived as ‘under control’ during the period
studied, the Latino population may have been perceived as threatening because
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of their significant increased representation across precincts” (Kane, 2003, pp.
290-291).
In another study of the relationship between minority threat and police
force size, Kent and Jacobs (2005) found that “population matters” when it
comes to police deployment (p. 751). Like the aforementioned study, Kent and
Jacobs also used a panel design. They examine U.S. cities with populations
greater than 100,000 in three census years (1980, 1990, and 2000).
Independent variables such as African-American and Hispanic population size,
residential segregation, crime rates, and social disorganization variables were
tested against police force size using correlation analysis. After examining
changes in police force size in these U.S. cities from 1980 to 2000, Kent and
Jacobs (2005) found that the size of the minority population (either black or
Hispanic) was positively related to the size of the city’s police force. Additionally,
like the Kane study mentioned above, they found a negative relationship between
police deployment and increased size of the minority population when that
population was highly segregated (Kent and Jacobs, 2005). This negative
relationship was found to be even stronger in the South, which, Kent and Jacobs
argued, may be because “the police in the South are more likely to assume that
black citizens want less law enforcement” (2005, p. 753). Although the findings
appear to indicate that police practices were consistent with the wishes of
minority groups, this practice was not necessarily based on the wishes of
minority communities. Instead, the smaller law enforcement agency size was
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based on the fact that the communities in question were highly segregated.
Because of this high segregation, these minority communities were not perceived
to be as threatening to the majority class as a community that was less
segregated. If their explanation was correct, highly segregated Southern cities
would have smaller police departments, relative to similar size cities in other
parts of the country. According to their results, such was indeed the case (Kent
and Jacobs, 2005).
Along similar lines of minority population size driving police resources,
Katz, Maguire, & Roncek (2002) utilized the group threat hypothesis to explain
increases in the creation and use of police gang units. They used data from 285
U.S. police agencies with 100 or more sworn police officers to determine what
compeled the creation and use of police gang units. The authors examined
arrest rates for those ages 12-24, percent of African Americans in the population,
percent of Hispanics in the population, and income inequality, as possible causes
for the creation of a police gang unit within each of the 285 cities. Much like
other studies discussed herein, there was support for the group threat hypothesis
explanation for the creation of gang units (Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002).
Although the number of blacks in a community appeared to be unrelated to the
creation of specialized gang units, the number of Hispanics did have a significant
influence on the creation of the units (Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002).

In this

case, Hispanics, not blacks, represented the minority group that caused the
creation of gang units. The increase in arrest rates of minority youths posed a
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threat to the power of the ruling class in that, increased arrest were seen as
indicative of an increased problem among a minority class. The finding that
increased arrest of Hispanic youth, as opposed to African American youth, led to
the creation of specialized gang units, may be due in part to the stability of the
size of the black population and the increased Hispanic population over the same
time period (Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002). The findings were supportive of
the group threat hypothesis. The relative size of a minority group caused
increased use of power by the majority.
The last of the four themes of research on the group threat hypothesis,
studies of police brutality also indicated support for the group threat hypothesis.
Although police brutality may not seem relevant here, Petrocelli, Piquero and
Smith (2003) argued that police brutality was relevant to the group threat
hypothesis because, “if law can be seen as the nails that hold society together,
then police can certainly be viewed as the hammer of the state” (p. 2). In one
such study on police brutality, Holmes (2000) examined minority threat as it
related to police brutality as measured by civil rights complaints over a period of
five years (1985-1990). This national study used data from the Department of
Justice Police Brutality study, Uniform Crime Reports, U.S. Census figures, and
the number of civil rights complaints. Using regression analysis, Holmes found
the measures (percent black population, percent Hispanic population, and
income inequality) used for “threatening people” were all positively related to the
use of force by police. However, crime rates, as measured by the UCR, were
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unrelated to the use of force by police (Holmes, 2000). These findings,
according to Holmes (2000), provided support for the group threat hypothesis, in
that the size of the minority population, rather than general crime rates, affected
police use of force.
In another examination of group threat and police brutality, Smith and
Holmes (2003) studied 114 cities with populations of over 150,000 to determine if
the number of civil rights complaints involving police brutality were correlated with
minority population size, minority representation within the police departments,
index crime rates, and the income inequality of the city. Smith and Holmes
(2003) found that the relative size of the black and Hispanic minority population
“amplifies the police’s perception of minority threat and increases the use of
coercive controls such as excessive force” (p. 1055). The use of excessive force
was found to be independent of overall crime rates. The use of force by police
was tied to the actual percentage of blacks and Hispanics in the population. This
finding supported the group threat hypothesis, in that the higher the minority
population, the more force used to control that population.
Most of the aforementioned studies provided support for the group threat
hypothesis. Although none of the studies directly argued that the ruling class
willed the social control of threats, each of them implied such control. That is, the
dominant class utilized law and those who enforced the law as instruments of
social control (Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 2003). The research findings
presented above suggest the usefulness of the group threat hypothesis in
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explaining criminal justice and dominant images of crime. For example, the
group threat hypothesis explained how crime is seen as a “black phenomenon”
(Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz, 2004, p. 380); how the size of police departments and
the allocation of resources to police departments were positively correlated to the
size of the minority population (Kane, 2003; Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002; Kent
& Jacobs, 2005; Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 2003); and how racial profiling and
police brutality were instruments of aggression to control a perceived threat
(Holmes, 2000; Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 2003; Smith & Holmes, 2003). Each
of these studies provided support for Blalock’s initial threat hypothesis. More
specifically, these studies supported Blalock’s assertion that a perceived threat to
the majority class would be met by aggression from the majority.
Blalock’s original hypothesis assumed that an increase in minority
population lead to economic and/or political threat and ultimately these threats
lead to prejudice and discrimination. Although only three of the studies cited
above are specifically related to economic and political threats (Chamlin and
Cochran, 2000; Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg, 2002; Petrocelli, Piquero, &
Smith, 2003) the other studies presented do explain minority threat to the ruling
class albeit from divergent angles (crime typification, the increase in crime and
social problems, increase in minority population, and the increase in arrests by
minority youths).
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Group Threat and Felony Disenfranchisement
Based upon the studies reviewed above, the group threat hypothesis has
been useful in explaining law and the enforcement of law as a method of control.
As such, the group threat hypothesis may be useful in explaining the nature of
disenfranchisement legislation, or legislation designed to remove the voting rights
of those convicted felons, because these laws can exert a measure of control
over a population (criminal offenders) that are deemed a threat to the social
order. Although the group threat hypothesis suggests that criminal law, as
implemented, constrains those who may threaten the power base through arrest
and confinement, disenfranchisement legislation appears to go a step further to
act as a method of control after arrest and confinement. Although the group
threat hypothesis may prove useful in explaining disenfranchisement, to date,
only one study (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003) has applied the group threat
hypothesis to the examination of the practice of disenfranchising criminal
offenders.
Behrens, Uggen and Manza (2003) did apply the group threat hypothesis
to felony disenfranchisement arguing that disenfranchisement legislation was the
result of a perceived threat to the powerful, the threat of the “menace of Negro
domination” (p. 559). Throughout the long history of slavery and racism, the
“menace of Negro domination” became a perceived threat to the existing social
and political order. Over time, racial minorities have gained some economic and
political power (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990), as seen in the increased number of
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elected African American officials at all levels of government in the last century
(Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Reality was,
however, less relevant to the concept of the “Negro menace,” than was the
perception of the dominant class about the increased power of minority groups
(Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003, Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Olzak, 1992;
Quillian, 1996). The perception that African Americans have increased power led
to efforts to control members of this group to limit their power (Behrens, Uggen,
and Manza, 2003).
The control utilized by disenfranchisement legislation was viewed as more
costly to the powerless, as a group, than other forms of punishment such as
incarceration, because it prevented this group from voting and therefore inhibiting
its ability to affect or change the society at the most fundamental level (Behrens,
Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Mauer, 2002; Pettus, 2002).
For minority communities, which already suffer limited political power, any
additional dilution of that power may result in a community that is unable to effect
substantive political change (Pettus, 2002). As Behrens, Uggen, and Manza
(2003) stated, this voter dilution caused by felony disenfranchisement was what
control of the “menace of Negro domination” was referring to. That is, because
of the disproportionate racial make-up of American prisons, the effect of felony
disenfranchisement has had a profound effect on the voting rights of racial
minorities, thereby limiting the ability of minorities and enhancing the control that
could be exercised against them. Essentially, if those in power could control
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those that may threaten that power, and could do so with the support of the
general electorate, then power can be maintained and control of the threatening
classes could be achieved with little effort.
In summary, the concept of power based on the conflict perspective and
the group threat hypothesis may be useful for understanding felony
disenfranchisement policies in the United States. While criminal laws are used to
punish undesirable behavior committed by the lower class and racial minorities;
disenfranchisement legislation appears to extend the power of the law beyond
criminalization to perpetuate the subordinate status of minority groups. In the
following chapter, methods of how the group threat hypothesis can be tested by
disenfranchisement legislation will be presented. Specifically, the study seeks to
test the following research hypotheses:
1) The greater the proportion of minorities in a state’s population, the
more restrictive the state’s disenfranchisement laws;
2) The more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement laws, the higher the
state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration; and
3) The higher a state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration, the more
difficult the voting restoration procedures.
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Chapter 4: Research Methods
The purpose of this research is to examine the nature and practices of
felony disenfranchisement. A qualitative analysis of each of the state laws is
conducted to understand the nature of disenfranchisement and voting restoration
laws across the United States. Additionally, as this project is designed to test the
group threat hypothesis data related to felony disenfranchisement legislation is
utilized for that purpose. This chapter begins with the research hypotheses
followed by a description of methods used to test the research hypotheses.
Research Hypotheses
It has been argued in Chapter 3 that the group threat hypothesis could be
useful for understanding the nature and the practice of disenfranchising felony
offenders. Essentially, the group threat hypothesis argues that the larger a
minority group, the more the majority group feels its power is threatened (Blalock,
1967). This perceived threat leads the majority attempting to exercise power and
control over the minority group through the creation of legislation designed to
limit the power of the minority group (Blalock, 1967). Although there are many
groups in the United States who have been classified as a minority, the main
focus for this project is on African Americans as the minority group threatening to
the white majority. As discussed in previous chapters the history of African
Americans in this country is one overt discrimination in the form of slavery and
Jim Crow laws to more covert discriminatory practices, such as the institutional
discrimination present in many social and economic systems, as well as in the
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criminal justice system. There are many examples of institutional discrimination
in the criminal justice system, from the granting of bail to sentencing practices;
the result of these practices has influenced the racial make-up of those arrested,
convicted, and incarcerated. An additional form of institutional discrimination is
the creation of legal codes that are discriminatory in result while being legitimate
in intent. Along with arrest and incarceration, legal codes are methods of control
used by the powerful in society to control those that may be seen as threatening.
Among the legal codes created to reduce the power of a group perceived to be
threatening are those that disenfranchise its members and not allow them to
participate in the political process (Beren, Uggen, and Manza, 2003).
Because Blalock’s group threat hypothesis argues that the relative size of
a minority group is a primary determining factor in the perception of threat, this
study examines variables related to the size of the African American population
in a state and its connection to the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law.
One of the main questions related to the idea of threat and the size of the
threatening population is how that threat is measured. Certainly, the relative size
of the African American population in a state can be used as a measure of threat,
but other population measures, such as African American arrest and
incarceration rates may prove useful as well. Although African American arrest
and incarceration rates may not precisely fit with Blalock’s assessment of the
size of the minority population, the increase in arrests and incarceration of
African Americans may reflect, or may be a result of, the effort to control a
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perceived threatening group. The use of the police as a means to control certain
undesirable populations of society, such as racial and ethnic minorities, through
arrest is nothing new (Jackson, 1992). In fact, Jackson (1992) argued, the “role
of police officers in U.S. cities in recent decades have varied directly with the
degree of ethnic antagonism” (p. 94). If this argument holds, arrests or more
specifically arrest rates of African Americans can be seen as a measure of racial
threat – a threat that is controlled by law enforcement. Similarly, incarceration
rates of African Americans may also be seen as a way the criminal justice
system handles the perception that African Americans are a threat to the white
majority. In Inverarity’s study of imprisonment as a measure of social control, he
argued that “size, increase, or concentration of the underclass increases the level
of social control independently of the crime rate” (1992, p. 126). This being the
case, rather than focusing solely on the size of the minority population, we can
instead look at the size of the incarcerated population as a measure of societal
social control over a perceived threat. Based on the argument that arrest and
incarceration rates of minorities may be indicative of increased social control of
minorities, data on African American arrest and incarceration rates are included
as a measure of group threat.
Although disenfranchisement legislation typically relies upon felony
convictions, the use of African American arrest and incarceration data was used
as a measure of racial threat for this study. That is, based upon Blalock’s (1967)
concept of racial threat being related to the relative size of the African American
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population, this study measures racial threat, in part, as the number of minorities
arrested and incarcerated. The argument is that as the number of minorities in a
state increases, the perception among the dominant class is that of an increase
of power of the minority class. To diminish this perceived increase in power, the
ruling class creates legislation aimed at controlling the minority class; this
legislation is then enforced by the criminal justice system that acts as the control
apparatus of the ruling class. The criminal justice system is then utilized to
control the minority class by enforcing the laws through arrest and then through
incarceration of more and more members of the minority class. Ultimately then,
the criminal justice system generally, and felony disenfranchisement legislation
specifically, act as control mechanisms over those considered a threat to the
powerful class in terms of competition or simply number. Therefore, the use of
African American arrest and incarceration statistics is also important as a
measure of power over this minority group. The combination of African American
arrest rates, African American incarceration rates, the strictness of the
disenfranchisement code, and the difficulty level of the voting restoration process
for each state provides measures of the exercise of power. That is, African
American arrests and incarceration rates measure threats and the strictness of
disenfranchisement and voting restoration laws measure efforts to deal with
these threats. These measures, along with the African American population of
the states being studied, provided an approach to testing the racial threat
hypothesis. Thus, the present study hypothesizes that: (1) the greater the
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proportion of minorities in a state’s population, the more restrictive the state’s
disenfranchisement laws; (2) the more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement
laws, the higher the state’s rate of African American arrest and incarceration; and
(3) the higher a state’s rate of African American arrest and incarceration, the
more difficult the voting restoration procedures.
Conceptualization and Measurement
The present study defines concepts in the study hypotheses as follows:
1. Felony Disenfranchisement – For the present study, felony
disenfranchisement is an all-encompassing term for the various legal
codes that remove the voting rights of persons convicted of felony
offenses. States vary in the legal definition of what makes a felony
offender and what causes disenfranchisement. The present study
conceptualizes the strictness of disenfranchisement legislation in terms of
the point at which an individual becomes disenfranchised, the length of
disenfranchisement, the association of the length of disenfranchisement
with different types of criminal offenses, and the nature of the crimes
leading to disenfranchisement. A qualitative analysis of felony
disenfranchisement laws in 49 states was performed to determine if the
laws themselves were consistent or inconsistent with the theoretical
framework that treats disenfranchisement as a tool for controlling a
perceived dangerous class. Further, the results of the qualitative analysis
were quantified to create a scale of disenfranchisement used to measure
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levels of strictness. Eleven points from the laws were identified for
quantification purposes: disenfranchisement for some misdemeanors,
during pretrial detention, upon conviction, during probation and/or a
suspended sentence, during incarceration, during parole, during an
additional post-incarceration time period, and disenfranchisement on a
permanent basis after the first offense, after the second offense, for
certain crimes, and based on the time the crime occurred. The process of
this qualitative analysis is explained in the Analytical Procedures section
of this chapter.
2. Voting Rights Restoration – For this study, voting rights restoration is an
all-encompassing term for the various legal codes that restore the voting
rights of persons convicted of felony offenses. All states vary in the
process used to restore the voting rights of those who have been
convicted of a felony offense. The present study focuses on the
procedures and the requirements of the various state codes related to
voting rights restoration. A qualitative analysis of the voting restoration
procedures in 49 states was performed to determine whether or not the
procedures were consistent with the theoretical framework established for
this study. Additionally, the results of a qualitative analysis of the
restoration of voting rights procedures in 49 states were quantified to
create a scale used to measure levels of difficulty in voting restoration.
Eight points from the restoration requirements were identified for
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quantification purposes: whether or not disenfranchisement was
permanent, restoration after the payment of all fines, restoration after an
investigation or review of records, after filing a petition with the court, an
appeal to a board or Governor, providing a DNA sample, having no
pending charges, waiting an additional waiting period or some other
requirement. The process of this qualitative analysis is explained in the
Analytical Procedures section of this chapter.
3. African American Arrest Rate – For the present study African American
arrest rate is defined as the number of African Americans arrested per
100,000 persons. Information on the numbers of arrests for each state
was obtained for the year 2004 by contacting the Criminal Justice
Information Services (CJIS) Division of the FBI. African American arrest
rates were computed using arrest statistics for Part I offenses and
statistics on the total African American population for each state. Part I
offenses were used in this research as they are serious felony offenses
(murder, robbery, etcetera) and all states who disenfranchise do so for
felony offenses.
4. African American Incarceration Rate – African American incarceration rate
is defined as the number of African Americans incarcerated in a state and
federal prisons per 100,000 persons. African American incarceration rates
were computed using incarceration statistics obtained through the Bureau
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of Justice Statistics and statistics on the total African American population
for each state.
5. African American Population – For this research project African American
population is defined as the percentage of African Americans in the
population for each state.
Sample and Data
All states except Maine and Vermont have some sort of felony
disenfranchisement legislation currently in place that acts to control the voting
ability of felons. For the purposes of this research, the District of Columbia is
treated as a state. Therefore, the sample for this study consists of the 49 states
that have felony disenfranchisement laws currently in place and, for comparison
purposes, the two remaining states that do not have disenfranchisement
legislation.
Data for the study were drawn from several sources. First, the
disenfranchisement legislation of the 49 state statutes in the United States was
obtained online through Lexis-Nexis (http://www.lexis.com). Lexis-Nexis is a
computerized data source of all state and federal legislation, state constitutions,
executive orders, and court cases at both the federal and state levels. In
February 2006, the researcher accessed the Lexis-Nexis database of state and
federal legislation and conducted a state-by-state search for state laws or state
constitutions concerning felony disenfranchisement, using the following
keywords: voting, disenfranchisement, felon voting, elections, election law, voter
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registration, and vote restoration. The search resulted in three executive orders,
102 state laws, and 31 state constitutions. Each gubernatorial executive order,
state law and/or state constitution regarding the disenfranchisement of offenders
and the process needed to restore voting rights were added to an electronic file
created in Adobe Acrobat. A complete list of the state codes and/or constitutions
is included in Appendix 1.
Second, information on African American arrests for felony offenses was
obtained from the U.S. Department of Justice. In June 2006, the researcher
attempted to obtain arrest data broken down by state and by race for the year
2004 by utilizing the Sourcebook of Justice Statistics from the U.S. Department
of Justice website. Data from 2004 were utilized as it was the last year that
complete records were available. Unfortunately, arrest statistics broken down by
race and by state were not available from the U.S. Department of Justice
website. Because of this, the researcher contacted the Criminal Justice
Information Services (CJIS) Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
by phone to obtain the necessary data. In June of 2006, the researcher called
the CJIS Division and requested arrest data by state and race be sent to the
researcher’s office. These data were received in paper format in the mail
approximately one month later as aggregate numbers of persons arrested by
state by racial category. As the data available was presented in aggregate form,
the researcher computed arrest rates for African Americans for each state using
the total number of arrests by racial category for Part I offenses in each state and
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the population totals of African Americans for the state. Further, arrest data for
the state of Florida were not available from the Criminal Justice Information
Services (CJIS) Division and were therefore obtained from the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement’s official website. The arrest rate for Florida
was computed using the same method described above.
Third, African American incarceration rates for felony offenses were
requested by phone as an additional measure of group threat. Much like the
problem with racial breakdown of arrest rates discussed above, African American
incarceration rates broken down by state were also unavailable from the
Sourcebook and were therefore attained by phone from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics. The researcher contacted one of the authors of the Prisoners 2004
report and requested the racial breakdown of prisoners by state. The requested
data was sent to the researcher via email. The lone exception to the available
data was for the District of Columbia. According to the Sourcebook (2004), the
jurisdiction over sentenced felons was transferred away from the District of
Columbia as of December 2001. As such, the District of Columbia no longer
operates a prison system and therefore does not have an incarceration rate.
Due to this, incarceration rate for the District of Columbia was listed as missing
data in the data file.
Finally, population data for each state were obtained from the 2000
Census. The U.S. Census Bureau data were gathered from the Bureau’s
American FactFinder website (http://factfinder.census.gov) on June 17, 2006.
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Utilizing the American FactFinder search mechanism, the researcher requested
the total population data for each state and the total African American population
for each state. For each state, the numbers of total population, white population
and African American population were used to compute the percentage of
minorities. The information used to calculate African American arrest rates and
incarceration rates are presented in Appendix 3.
Analytical Procedures
This study used both qualitative and quantitative analyses. For qualitative
analysis, the disenfranchisement laws of the 49 states were examined to identify
those characteristics that lead to disenfranchisement, as well as the various
procedures for voting rights restoration. Most important to the qualitative
analysis however, each state law was analyzed to determine whether or not the
law itself was consistent with the group threat theoretical framework. Each of the
state laws was examined to determine if there was evidence that would indicate if
the disenfranchisement law or the voting restoration process were used as
method of social control over African American populations perceived as
threatening. The nature of disenfranchisement law and the voting restoration
process was explored by examining the laws purpose and/or the meanings of the
stipulations of the law. A qualitative analysis of disenfranchisement and voting
restoration laws and procedures provides a deeper understanding of the nature
of these laws, particularly in relation to African Americans.
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Although qualitative analysis was a main focus of this research, an
additional aspect is to test the research hypotheses, using quantitative methods.
Qualitative data regarding the strictness of disenfranchisement and voting
restoration laws were quantified to produce data for quantitative analysis. Each
state’s disenfranchisement law(s) were examined to determine the point at which
disenfranchisement becomes effective in that state (e.g. during pretrial detention,
upon conviction, or upon incarceration), the level of offense required to
disenfranchise (e.g. misdemeanor or felony), the length of time of the
disenfranchisement (e.g. during incarceration, parole, probation and/or a
suspended sentence, or any additional post-release time after parole), and the
permanence of the disenfranchisement (e.g. permanent for 1st offense, for 2nd
offense, or permanent for certain crimes). To quantitatively determine the
strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law, one point was given for each
indication of strictness found in the state’s laws. These indications of strictness
were counted and a score was attained that was used as a measure of strictness
of that state’s law. Additionally, to determine the difficulty of the restoration
process, the laws for each state were examined to determine what was required
of the offender to restore voting rights. That is, restoration processes were
examined to determine if the restoration was automatic or if some additional
requirement was mandated (e.g. the payment of all fines, an investigation or
review, a petition or an appeal to a court or board, or additional requirement). To
quantitatively determine the difficulty of a state’s restoration process, one point
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was given for each indication of voting restoration difficulty. The indications of
restoration difficulty were counted and a score was attained that was used as a
measure of difficulty of that state’s restoration process. Two charts were created
that illustrate the point totals for strictness level and restoration difficulty; both
charts are presented in the next chapter. A working data file for quantitative
analysis was created in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
and included the following variables: disenfranchisement strictness, voting
restoration difficulty, African American arrest rates, African American
incarceration rates, and proportion of the African American population. The
results of all data analysis are reported in Chapter 5.
The study uses both univariate and bivariate analysis. First, univariate
analysis was utilized to produce descriptive statistics of the sample. Second,
bivariate analysis was utilized to test the research hypotheses. Specifically,
bivariate analysis was used to determine the relationship between the
percentage of minorities in the population (and arrest and incarceration rates)
and the strictness of the disenfranchisement laws on the one hand and the
difficulty of the voting restoration process on the other. Details of the statistical
procedures and the statistical tests of the three hypotheses are provided under
each hypothesis stated below.
Due to the sample size, the study uses non-parametric statistics and exact
methods. Standard methods (Asymptotic methods) compute significance tests
under the assumption that the sample size is large and that the sample is drawn
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from a normally distributed population. Unfortunately, the study sample includes
only 51 cases (including the District of Columbia), and the sample size even
reduces further for several statistical tests, the assumptions for the asymptotic
methods cannot be met. Two statistical procedures, the exact method or the
Monte Carlo method, do not require the assumption of normal distribution and
can provide more reliable results for the tests using small sample sizes. The
exact method computes the significance test based on the exact distribution of
data as opposed to a normal distribution and is therefore not reliant upon the
assumptions required of the asymptotic methods. Similarly, Monte Carlo
methods do not need a normal distribution, nor is sample size relevant. The
difference between the exact and Monte Carlo methods is that while exact
methods always provide accurate the results of significance test, Monte Carlo
methods produce an estimation of the exact p value based upon random subsets
of the data. This difference is important because, while exact methods are
preferable, they are not always possible due to either a sample size that is too
large or due to time and computer memory limitations. Monte Carlo methods are
utilized primarily when the exact p values cannot be attained due to the size of
the data set or the amount of memory in the computer used to perform such
tests. As such, the exact and Monte Carlo methods were used to provide the
most accurate results possible.
Hypothesis testing and associated statistical procedures are described as
follows:

90
Hypothesis 1

The greater the proportion of minorities in a state’s population,
the more restrictive the state’s disenfranchisement laws. The
hypothesis assumes that there is a positive relationship
between the level of strictness of disenfranchisement legislation
and the size of state African American. That is, states with
strict disenfranchisement laws have higher African American
populations than states with less restrictive laws. Bivariate
analysis was used to determine the relationship between the
size of the African American population and the strictness of
disenfranchisement laws. African American population was
defined as the percentage of African Americans in each state.
The percentage of African Americans in a state was treated as
the independent variable and the strictness level of the laws
were treated as the dependent variable. To determine the
relationship between the size of African American population
and the strictness of disenfranchisement laws, two bivariate
analyses were performed: 1) the relationship between African
American population size and the existence of
disenfranchisement laws which is used as a measure of
strictness of legal sanctions against African Americans, and 2)
the relationship between African American population size and
the strictness of disenfranchisement.
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1) The first analysis involves the comparison of the African
American population sizes in states with
disenfranchisement laws and those in states without such
laws. Prior to conducting any analysis, the strictness
level of the laws was recoded into two variables:
strictness2 (states with a disenfranchisement law and
states without a disenfranchisement law) and strictness3
(low, average, or high strictness). After recoding the
variables, the Mann-Whitney U test statistic was used to
determine whether or not there was a statistically
significant relationship between the percentage of
minorities in a state and whether or not that state had a
disenfranchisement law. For this test, the variable
PercentBlack is an interval level variable which indicates
the percentage of blacks in each state and is treated as
the independent variable. The dependent variable for
this test is the recoded variable, strictness2, a
dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a state
has a disenfranchisement law. A significant Mann
Whitney U test statistic would indicate that these
variables are indeed related. It is expected that states
with a larger percentage of African Americans in the
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population will have disenfranchisement laws while states
with smaller African American populations will not. A
comparison of means will confirm the directionality of any
significant effect.
2) The second analysis involves the analysis of the
relationship between the sizes of African American
population and levels of disenfranchisement strictness. It
is hypothesized that states with greater African American
population have stricter disenfranchisement laws. To
conduct this analysis, the variable determining the
strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law was
recoded into a trichotomous variable strictness3 which
indicates whether the state law was of low strictness,
average strictness, or high strictness. Using the recoded
variable, the Kruskal-Wallis H, was used to test whether
there is a statistical relationship between the percentage
of African Americans in a state and the strictness level of
the state’s disenfranchisement law. The Kruskal-Wallis
H, like the Mann Whitney U, is a non-parametric
statistical test which utilizes mean ranks to determine if
there is a difference between variables. In this case, the
Kruskal-Wallis H was used to determine if the size of the
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African American population in a state affected the
strictness of the state’s disenfranchisement law. For this
test, the variable PercentBlack is an interval level
variable which indicates the percentage of blacks in each
state and is treated as the independent variable. The
dependent variable for this test is the recoded variable,
strictness3, an ordinal-level variable indicating whether a
state’s disenfranchisement law is of low strictness,
average strictness, or of high strictness. A significant
Kruskal-Wallis H statistic would indicate that the
strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law varies with
the size of that state’s African American population. A
significant Kruskal-Wallis H statistic would indicate that
differences in means are not due to sampling error, thus
indicate support for the hypothesis presented. A
comparison of means will confirm the directionality of any
significant effect.
Each of the aforementioned tests were performed utilizing
the Exact method to determine the relationship between the
level of strictness of the disenfranchisement law of the state
and the percentage of minorities in the population of the
state. The exact method was used first, and if the exact test
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could not be performed due to either the size of the sample
or the amount of memory in the computer then the Monte
Carlo method was used.
Hypothesis 2

The more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement laws, the
higher the state’s rate of African American arrest and
incarceration. This hypothesis assumes that there is a positive
relationship between the level of strictness of
disenfranchisement legislations and state African American
incarceration and arrest rates. That is, it is hypothesized that
states that have stricter disenfranchisement laws also have
higher rates of African American arrest and African American
incarceration than states with less strict disenfranchisement
laws. Bivariate analysis was used to determine the relationship
between the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law and
the rates of African American arrest and incarceration. For this
hypothesis, the recoded ordinal-level variable, strictness3 (low,
average, and high strictness) was treated as the independent
variable and the African American arrest and African American
incarceration rates were treated as dependent variables. To
determine the relationship between the strictness of
disenfranchisement laws and the African American rates for
arrest and incarceration, two bivariate analyses were
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performed: 1) the relationship between the strictness of the
disenfranchisement law and the rate of African American
arrests for that state, and 2) the relationship between the
strictness of the disenfranchisement law and the rate of African
American incarceration for that state.
1) The first analysis involves the comparison of the different
levels of disenfranchisement strictness of a state’s law
with the African American arrest rate. Using the recoded
variable discussed in the first hypothesis, strictness3
(low, average, high strictness), the Kruskal-Wallis H, was
used to test whether there is a statistical relationship
between the strictness level of the state’s
disenfranchisement law and the African American arrest
rate. The Kruskal-Wallis H is a non-parametric statistical
test which utilizes mean ranks to determine if there is a
difference between variables. For this analysis, the
Kruskal-Wallis H was used to determine if the arrest rate
of African Americans in a state affected the strictness of
the state’s disenfranchisement law. For this test, the
variable strictness3, an ordinal-level variable indicating
whether a state’s disenfranchisement law is of low
strictness, average strictness, or of high strictness is
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treated as the independent variable. The dependent
variable for this test is BArrestBl, an interval-level
variable indicating the African American arrest rate for
each state. A significant Kruskal-Wallis H statistic would
indicate that the strictness of a state’s
disenfranchisement law varies with the size of that state’s
African American arrest rate. A significant Kruskal-Wallis
H statistic would indicate that differences in means are
not due to sampling error, thus indicate support for the
hypothesis presented. A comparison of means will
confirm the directionality of any significant effect.
2) The second analysis involves the comparison of the
different levels of disenfranchisement strictness of a
state’s law with the African American incarceration rate.
Using the recoded variable, strictness3 (low, average,
high strictness), the Kruskal-Wallis H, was used to test
whether there is a statistical relationship between the
strictness level of the state’s disenfranchisement law and
the African American incarceration rate. The KruskalWallis H is a non-parametric statistical test which utilizes
mean ranks to determine if there is a difference between
variables. For this analysis, the Kruskal-Wallis H was
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used to determine if the incarceration rate of African
Americans in a state affected the strictness of the state’s
disenfranchisement law. For this test, the variable
strictness3, an ordinal-level variable indicating whether a
state’s disenfranchisement law is of low strictness,
average strictness, or of high strictness is treated as the
independent variable. The dependent variable for this
test is BIncarB, an interval-level variable indicating the
African American incarceration rate for each state. A
significant Kruskal-Wallis H statistic would indicate that
the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law varies
with the size of that state’s African American
incarceration rate. A significant Kruskal-Wallis H statistic
would indicate that differences in means are not due to
sampling error, thus indicate support for the hypothesis
presented. A comparison of means will confirm the
directionality of any significant effect.
Each of the aforementioned tests were performed utilizing the
Exact method to determine the relationship between the level of
strictness of the disenfranchisement law of the state and the
arrest and incarceration rates of minorities of the state. The
exact method was used first, and if the exact test could not be
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performed due to either the size of the sample or the amount of
memory in the computer then the Monte Carlo method was
used.
Hypothesis 3

The higher a state’s rate of African American arrest and
incarceration, the more difficult the voting restoration
procedures. The hypothesis assumes that there is a positive
relationship between the difficulty in state voting restoration
procedures and the size of state African American populations,
state African American arrest rates and state African American
incarceration rates. That is, states with more difficult voting
restoration procedures have higher African American
populations, and higher African American arrest and African
American incarceration rates than states with more lenient
voting restoration procedures. Bivariate analysis was used to
determine the relationship between the size of state African
American populations, the state African American arrest rate
and the state African American incarceration rate and the
difficulty of the state’s voting restoration process. For this
hypothesis, the percentage of minorities in a state, the African
American arrest rate of a state, and the African American
incarceration rate of a state were treated as independent
variables and the difficulty level of the restoration process was
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treated as the dependent variable. To determine the
relationship between the size of African American population
and the difficulty of the restoration process, two bivariate
analyses were performed: 1) the relationship between African
American population size and whether or not restoration was
automatic or required a petition, and 2) the relationship
between African American population size and the difficulty of
the restoration process.
1) The first analysis involves the comparison of the African
American population sizes of states (population, arrest
rate, and incarceration rate) with states with automatic
restoration and states requiring some form of petition for
restoration. Prior to conducting any analysis, the
difficulty level of the voting restoration process was
recoded into two variables: restoration2 (states with
automatic restoration and states requiring some sort of
petition for restoration) and restoration4 (low, average, or
high difficulty). After recoding the variables, the MannWhitney U test statistic was used to determine whether or
not there was a statistically significant relationship
between the percentage of African Americans in a state,
the African American arrest rate, and the African
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American incarceration rate of a state and whether or not
that state required a petition for vote restoration
(restoration2). For this test, the variable PercentBlack is
an interval level variable which indicates the percentage
of blacks in each state, BArrestBl is an interval-level
variable indicating the African American arrest rate for
each state, and BIncarB is an interval-level variable
indicating the African American incarceration rate for
each state. Each of the aforementioned variables
(PercentBlack, BArrestBl, BIncarB) were treated as
independent variables. The dependent variable for this
test is the recoded variable, restoration2, a dichotomous
variable indicating whether or not a state requires a
petition for restoration of voting rights. A significant Mann
Whitney U test statistic would indicate that these
variables are indeed related. It is expected that states
with a larger percentage of African Americans in the
population (in general population, arrest rates, and
incarceration rates) will require a petition for vote
restoration while states with smaller African American
populations will not. A comparison of means will confirm
the directionality of any significant effect.
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2) The second analysis involves the comparison of the sizes
of African American population in states with different
levels of voting rights restoration difficulty. To conduct
this analysis, the variable determining the difficulty of a
state’s vote restoration process was recoded into a
trichotomous variable restoration4 which indicates
whether the restoration process was of low difficulty,
average difficulty, or high difficulty. Using the recoded
variable, the Kruskal-Wallis H, was used to test whether
there is a statistical relationship between the difficulty
level of the voting restoration process and percentage of
African Americans in a state, the arrest rate of African
Americans, and the incarceration rate of African
Americans in a state. The Kruskal-Wallis H is a nonparametric statistical test which utilizes mean ranks to
determine if there is a difference between variables. For
this analysis, the Kruskal-Wallis H was used to determine
if the percentage of African Americans in a state, the
arrest rate of African Americans, and the incarceration
rate of African Americans in a state affected difficulty
level of the voting restoration process. For this test, the
variable PercentBlack is an interval level variable which
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indicates the percentage of blacks in each state,
BArrestBl is an interval-level variable indicating the
African American arrest rate for each state, and BIncarB
is an interval-level variable indicating the African
American incarceration rate for each state. Each of the
aforementioned variables (PercentBlack, BArrestBl,
BIncarB) were treated as independent variables. The
dependent variable for this test is the recoded variable,
restoration4, an ordinal-level variable indicating whether
a state’s restoration process is of low difficulty, average
difficulty, or of high difficulty. A significant Kruskal-Wallis
H statistic would indicate that the difficulty level of a
state’s restoration process varies with the size of that
state’s African American population (in general
population, arrest rate, or incarceration rate). A
significant Kruskal-Wallis H statistic would indicate that
differences in means are not due to sampling error, thus
indicate support for the hypothesis. A comparison of
means will confirm the directionality of any significant
effect.
Each of the aforementioned tests were performed utilizing the
Exact method to determine the relationship between the
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difficulty level of voting restoration process of the state and the
percentage of minorities in the population of the state as well as
the arrest and incarceration rates of minorities in the state. The
exact method was used first, and if the exact test could not be
performed due to either the size of the sample or the amount of
memory in the computer then the Monte Carlo method was
used.
The results of the tests are presented and discussed at length in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Findings
This chapter reports qualitative and quantitative analyses and the findings.
The first section of this chapter is devoted to the qualitative analysis of each of
the 49 state disenfranchisement laws. For qualitative analysis, the
disenfranchisement laws of the 49 states were examined to identify their nature
and characteristics to determine how they might relate to the group threat
theoretical framework discussed earlier. Among other aspects examined by the
researcher to determine if the group threat hypothesis was supported by
disenfranchisement legislation was the emphasis on the strictness of these
legislation in terms of the point at which an individual becomes disenfranchised,
the length of disenfranchisement, the association of the length of
disenfranchisement with types of criminal offenses, the nature of the crimes
leading to disenfranchisement, and voting restoration procedures. The
researcher obtained all the gubernatorial executive orders, state laws and/or
state constitutions related to either the disenfranchisement of offenders or the
process needed to restore voting rights from the online Lexis-Nexis database
(http://www.lexis.com). Once obtained, the documents were analyzed and the
researcher highlighted sections of the documents related to either the causes of
disenfranchisement and/or the requirements for restoration of voting rights. This
process was used to determine if the nature and characteristics of the laws
supported the contention of the group threat hypothesis, that minorities that are
seen as a threat are controlled by those in power. The second part of this
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chapter is devoted to the report of quantitative analysis and results of hypothesis
testing.
Qualitative Analysis Results
Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia (treated as a state in this
research) all disenfranchise felony offenders for some period of time after the
commission of a criminal offense. Each state has a variety of laws, constitutions,
and/or executive orders related to the disenfranchisement of felony offenders.
These laws, constitutions, and executive orders were examined to determine the
nature and extent of felony disenfranchisement in the United States. The
purpose of this examination was to understand the meaning of
disenfranchisement laws in terms of race and class and relate the nature of these
laws to the group threat hypothesis, in an attempt to either confirm or refute the
hypothesis. After a thorough examination of state disenfranchisement legislation
two major themes became apparent and in both of these themes there is a
connection to the group threat hypothesis. The first theme deals with the criteria
for disenfranchisement in state laws and how these criteria may have a greater
impact on minorities. That is, this analysis is to determine if the criteria in the
laws themselves act as a control mechanism over a segment of the population
that is perceived to be a threat to those in power. The second of the two major
themes entails the voting restoration procedures and the impact these
procedures have on minority offenders. Much like the discussion related to the
criteria for disenfranchisement, an examination of the restoration procedures is
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undertaken to determine whether or not support for the group threat hypothesis
exists. In essence, both the criteria for disenfranchisement and the voting
restoration procedures are examined to determine if they act to limit the ability of
minorities from exercising their right to vote. By limiting the ability of minorities to
vote, first through disenfranchising offenders and then with restrictive voting
restoration procedures, there appears to be an argument that
disenfranchisement laws may act as a mechanism of control over a perceived
threatening group and therefore may be supportive of the group threat
hypothesis. In what follows, the nature of the criteria for disenfranchisement, the
procedures for voting restoration, as well as the impacts of each of these has
upon offenders are discussed in detail in how they support or refute the group
threat hypothesis.
Criteria of Disenfranchisement
The disenfranchisement of offenders is generally based upon a set of
criteria established in state law and some commonalities do exist. Incarceration,
for example, is the most common criterion for disenfranchisement, with all of the
forty-nine states mandating a loss of voting rights when an offender is actually
incarcerated in a prison and/or jail. However, short of disenfranchisement during
actual incarceration, few states have the same criteria. Conviction, types of
crimes for which person is convicted, the number of convictions, probation/parole
and/or a suspended sentence, and even the time frame of the crime for which the
individual was convicted are also utilized as disenfranchisement criteria
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depending upon the state. Each of these criteria for disenfranchisement will be
discussed separately in what follows. These criteria for disenfranchisement,
particularly basing disenfranchisement on number of convictions and types of
convictions, are supportive of the group threat hypothesis in that, offenders who
commit a certain type of crime or offenders with prior criminal histories can be
perceived as an increased threat to the social order and to the dominant majority.
Given the history of African Americans and the criminal justice system, African
Americans are more likely to have criminal histories and are more likely to be
convicted of the offenses that cause disenfranchisement (Tonry, 1995). What
occurs then is that African Americans are more likely to be disenfranchised which
may be perceived as another method of controlling African Americans as a group
threat.
The main criterion for disenfranchisement is that offenders lose their
voting rights based upon incarceration. In fact, every state that has a
disenfranchisement law disenfranchises offenders during incarceration.
However, a second major criterion for disenfranchisement is conviction of a
criminal offense. Twenty-seven states base disenfranchisement on the time of
conviction rather than the time the offender actually enters a correctional facility.
For example, Alaska Statute § 15.05.030 states that an individual is
disenfranchised upon conviction of a felony. Similarly, Kansas law states that the
disenfranchisement period begins upon conviction and continues until the
completion of the sentence (Kansas Statute Annotated § 21-4615). In fact, none
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of the states who base disenfranchisement upon the conviction of an offense
distinguish whether or not the offender needs to be incarcerated for the
disenfranchisement to take effect. This distinction may not seem important,
however, it becomes important when one considers the group threat hypothesis
and how it may explain such a distinction. Much like cases in which bail is
denied, those convicted and then immediately incarcerated tend to be minorities
who cannot afford outside legal counsel who can delay incarceration for either a
limited time (for a few months to get affairs in order) or during lengthy appeals
processes (Bridges, 1997). The conviction criterion then has a larger impact on
those individuals who cannot afford to delay incarceration. Overwhelmingly,
those who cannot afford such a delay are minorities of class and subsequently
race (Bridges, 1997).
Although each of the forty-nine states that disenfranchise do so during
incarceration and the majority (27) do so upon conviction, one state, Kentucky,
disenfranchises even before conviction in certain cases. In Kentucky, any
individual who, although not convicted, is being held “in confinement under the
judgment of a court for some penal offense” during an election may not vote in
that election (Kentucky Constitution, § 145). This provision of the state
constitution appears to include all persons being held in jail or prison awaiting
trial. Therefore, those unable to post bail, or not provided bail, would be
disenfranchised for that election. This criterion in Kentucky law is unique, in that
although all states remove voting rights during incarceration, no other state
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mandates disenfranchisement prior to actual conviction. This provision appears
to have broad consequences among those who cannot post bail or to those not
granted bail as they are disenfranchised without having been convicted in a trial.
Because the majority of persons who cannot post bail are racial minorities
(Bridges, 1997), one can see that this criterion for disenfranchisement has a
dramatic effect on minority offenders in particular. This provision in Kentucky law
then clearly supports the contention of the group threat hypothesis of increased
control of a perceived threat. That is, even without conviction, which could be
argued as proof of a threat to society and to those that control society, those that
cannot post bail are perceived as threatening and are disenfranchised as a
result.
Although Kentucky may be alone in using pre-trial detention as a
requirement for disenfranchisement criterion, the state is among the eight that
disenfranchise due to a conviction of a misdemeanor offense. These eight states
(Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, and South
Carolina), however, all vary on details about what groups of misdemeanor
offenders qualify for disenfranchisement. Four of the eight, Colorado, Illinois,
Michigan, and South Carolina make no distinction between levels of crime
(misdemeanor of felony), as any individual convicted of any crime is
disenfranchised. The remaining four states (Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, and
Maryland) all specify types of misdemeanors for which a person is
disenfranchised. For example, under Maryland law, anyone convicted of an
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“infamous or other serious crime” is disenfranchised (Maryland Constitution,
Article I, § 4). According to the definition, some misdemeanors, such as perjury,
theft, and prostitution are considered infamous crimes in the state of Maryland
(Maryland Annotated Code, Election Law, § 1-101). In Iowa, conviction of an
aggravated misdemeanor results in disenfranchisement (Iowa Constitution,
Article II, § 5; Iowa Code § 48A.6). Although, not clearly defined, an aggravated
misdemeanor appears to be one that involves serious bodily injury to the victim,
where if the crime did not involve serious bodily injury, it would be considered a
misdemeanor (Iowa Code, Title XVI). The “serious bodily injury” clause may
sound like aggravated assault, a felony in the list of Index Crimes; however, the
state of Iowa makes a distinction between aggravated misdemeanors and felony
offenses (Iowa Code, Title XVI). Crimes such as domestic violence and driving
under the influence fall under this category (Iowa Code, Title XVI). For example,
driving under the influence which resulted in no injuries to the public would be
considered a misdemeanor, while driving under the influence which resulted in a
wreck with injuries would be considered an aggravated misdemeanor leading to
disenfranchisement. Lastly, the Constitution of the state of Kentucky states that
any person convicted “of such high misdemeanor as the General Assembly may
declare” is unauthorized to vote (Kentucky Constitution, § 145). However, there
does not appear to be any complete list of what qualifies as a high misdemeanor
in the state of Kentucky.

111
In addition to utilizing misdemeanors as a type of crime criterion, nine of
the twelve states that permanently disenfranchise offenders do so based on the
type of offense committed (Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi,
Nevada, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming). Mississippi, for example,
lists the crimes of murder, rape, bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods
under false pretense, perjury, forgery, embezzlement, and bigamy disqualifying
in the state constitution (Mississippi Constitution, Article 12, § 241). However,
since the court decision in Cotton v. Fordice, which stated that the state
constitution was to be narrowly read, the Attorney General of Mississippi has
expanded upon the list of theft-related crimes that are disqualifying while
simultaneously limited such thefts to felony cases only. In West Virginia, a
conviction for the bribery of a state official is the only offense for which
disenfranchisement is permanent unless granted a gubernatorial pardon (West
Virginia Constitution, Article VII, § 11). Similarly, in Wyoming recidivist and/or
violent offenders must apply for a gubernatorial pardon or the restoration of rights
in order to regain the right to vote (Wyoming Statute § 7-13-105 and § 7-13-803
through 806). Although permanent disenfranchisement may seem a misnomer
based on this discussion, the one state that truly disenfranchises permanently is
the state of Tennessee where any conviction for the crime of murder, rape,
treason, or voter fraud results in permanent disenfranchisement with no
possibility of restoration (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-105).
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The type of crime criterion for disenfranchisement has, like other criterion
discussed herein, is related to the group threat hypothesis. Whether a state
specifies certain types of crimes (such as murder, rape, or violent felonies) or
merely includes some or all misdemeanor offenses as disenfranchisement
qualifiers, the impact is to increase the number of individuals affected by
disenfranchisement legislation. However, by including some misdemeanors (e.g.
theft and prostitution) and specifying certain felony offenses for permanent
disenfranchisement (e.g. violent felonies), the laws in these states appear to be
focusing on minority offenders as they are more often arrested and incarcerated
for the offenses specified (US Department of Justice, 2003). Whether or not the
intent is to focus on minorities the impact on minority offenders is more profound
in that the result of these laws minorities leads to increased numbers of
disenfranchised minorities. Utilizing the group threat hypothesis, it can be
argued that the type of crime criterion, since it focuses on crimes of a group that
is already perceived to be threatening, racial minorities, is utilized by the powerful
in society to further control minorities by preventing them from gaining any power
through the ability to vote.
An additional criterion that appears to have a greater impact on minorities
is basing permanent disenfranchisement on the number of convictions an
offender has. In essence, permanent disenfranchisement is based, in part, upon
the criminal history of the offender. Of the twelve permanent disenfranchisement
states, six (Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia)
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disenfranchise after the first offense and four states (Arizona, Maryland, Nevada,
and Wyoming) disenfranchise based upon conviction of the second offense. For
example, although first time felony offenders in the state of Arizona are
disenfranchised upon conviction of a felony until unconditional discharge, a
secondary felony conviction results in lifetime disenfranchisement. (Arizona
Revised Statute § 13-904, 13-912). The same can be said of Nevada where
offenders who have been convicted of a violent felony or have been convicted of
more than one felony offense are permanently disenfranchised (Nevada Revised
Statute § 213.090). The inclusion of the number of offenses or criminal histories
of offenders as a criterion for disenfranchisement certainly fits into the group
threat argument in two ways. First, including criminal histories disenfranchises
those that have proven, through repeat criminal acts that they are threat to
society and are therefore in need of greater control. Second, including criminal
histories also manages to capture minority offenders at a greater rate, primarily
because minority offenders are often the focus of the criminal justice system and
as such are more likely to have criminal histories (Tonry, 1995). Because of this
criterion then, a perceived threat, both from repeat offenders and minority
offenders with criminal histories can be controlled through legislation. Controlling
this population by limiting voting capability reduces any political power that can
be attained by minorities and therefore could reduce the threat perceived by the
powerful in society.
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An additional disenfranchisement criterion of interest is presented by the
state of Tennessee and is perhaps the most unusual case in disenfranchisement.
Tennessee is the only state that bases disenfranchisement not only on type of
offense, and number of offenses, but also when the crime was committed. For
example, a person convicted of a felony before 1973, or between 1981 and 1986,
or after 1996 must request a gubernatorial pardon or petition the circuit court of
the county in which they reside for the restoration of their civil rights (Tennessee
Code Annotated §40-29-101 and § 40-29-105). However, individuals convicted
of a felony (other than the permanent disqualifiers) between 1973 and 1981
and/or between 1986 and 1996 are automatically eligible to vote upon completion
of their sentence (Tennessee Code Annotated §40-29-101 and § 40-29-105).
Tennessee is the only state that has such a formula for determining the type of
permanent disenfranchisement. At first glance, the time frame criterion does not
appear to fit with the group threat framework. However, examining the time
frame specified for permanent disenfranchisement, the crime rates during those
periods, and what felony offenses were classified as permanent disqualifiers it
appears that there may have been an attempt to utilize disenfranchisement law
to further control populations perceived as threatening. For example, prior to
1973 when the Tennessee disenfranchisement law mandated permanent
disenfranchisement for all felony offenses, crime rates were high and the country
had been through numerous protests for civil rights. During that time, protest
populations, specifically racial minorities, were seen as attempting to gain a
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measure of power and could be perceived as threatening to the dominant white
power base in society. Preventing an increase in political power of African
Americans through permanent disenfranchisement for committing criminal
offenses could therefore be seen as an attempt to further control the perceived
threat posed by the civil rights movement by eliminating the ability of some
African Americans to vote. As such, it is conceivable that the time frame criterion
for disenfranchisement could be explained by the group threat hypothesis.
Up to this point each of the criteria discussed dealt with offenders who
were incarcerated. However, disenfranchisement criteria often extend beyond
incarceration to include parole, probation, and even suspended sentences that
carry no prison time. Parole, as a criterion of disenfranchisement, is common in
that thirty-five of the forty-nine states disenfranchise during a period of parole. Of
these thirty-five states, however, nine have additional post-release time
requirements (Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Virginia and Wyoming). For example, in Arizona, an individual
sentenced to a prison term for a second offense, must wait for a period of two
years after an unconditional discharge before applying for restoration of voting
rights, where an unconditional discharge includes discharge from parole (Arizona
Revised Statute § 13-906). In Delaware, for felony offenses, the restoration of
voting rights is possible upon completion of the sentence and a five-year waiting
period (Delaware Code Annotated, Title 15, § 1701). And in Nebraska, the
disenfranchisement period last for the time of incarceration, probation, parole,
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and for a two-year time period after final discharge of incarceration, probation, or
parole (Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-112 and § 29-2264). Of the six
remaining states that require post-release time, all permanently disenfranchise
offenders based on a variety of factors. Probation (and use of suspended
sentences) as a disenfranchisement criterion is common as well. Thirty-two
states mandate that offenders be disenfranchised for any period of probation
and/or if the sentence was suspended. Of the thirty-two states that
disenfranchise during probation and/or a suspended sentence, only South
Dakota actually articulates that disenfranchisement occurs at the time of
conviction and includes those whose term of incarceration has been suspended
(South Dakota Codified Laws § 23A-27-35). Simply put, if a person is convicted
of a felony offense, but the judge suspends the prison sentence, the offender still
cannot vote until the entire period of the suspended sentence has passed. Not
allowing offenders who are no longer incarcerated to vote does fit with the group
threat theoretical framework. Much like the incarceration argument, offenders on
probation or parole have already proven that they constitute a threat to the
dominant social order, therefore all probationers and parolees could be
considered threatening population. However, because race continues to play a
major role in the criminal justice system, the impact of this criterion is felt more so
by racial minorities. That is, because race is a factor in arrest, conviction, and
incarceration it is a factor in probation and parole. By continuing to
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disenfranchise offenders after they are released from prison, the laws continue to
act as a controlling factor over offenders and subsequently racial minorities.
As discussed throughout permanent disenfranchisement is a factor in
twelve states. Criteria for permanent disenfranchisement of offenders differ
across states and rely on a variety of factors previously discussed, including:
number of offences, type of crime, and even time period in which the crime was
committed. Of the twelve states that permanently disenfranchise felony
offenders, six disenfranchise on the first felony offense (Alabama, Florida,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia). For example, in Florida, all
persons who have been convicted of a felony offense permanently forfeit all civil
rights, unless granted a pardon or restoration of those civil rights by the Governor
(Florida Constitution, Article VI, § 4; Florida Statute 97.041(2)(b); Florida Statute,
Chapter 944.292(a)). In Florida, disenfranchisement becomes effective upon
conviction and is not tied to any specific felony, but rather all felony offenses.
Under Virginia law, any individual who has been convicted of a felony offense
loses their right to vote (Virginia Constitution, Article II, § 1; Virginia Code
Annotated § 8.01-338 and § 24.2-101). In Virginia, the period of
disenfranchisement begins upon conviction and is permanent unless the former
offender is granted a restoration of rights or a pardon by the Governor (Virginia
Constitution, Article V, § 12; Virginia Code Annotated § 24.2-101). As can be
seen from these two examples permanent disenfranchisement is a bit misleading
when one considers that in each of the twelve states, with the exception of
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certain crimes (e.g. there is no restoration for the offense of murder in
Tennessee), there is a method for restoration of voting rights. However
misleading the actual word permanent may be, the reality of these permanent
disenfranchisement states is that rarely do voting rights become restored
(Portugal, 2003). The restoration of voting rights will be discussed in the next
section; however, the impact of permanently disenfranchising offenders can be
viewed as supportive of the group threat hypothesis in that control continues to
be exercised over offenders well after there time has been served. The impact
these laws have on minority offenders is to permanently remove them from the
voting rolls of the state. By reducing the number of minorities allowed to vote,
the power base in society acts to reduce any political power these groups can
attain. Therefore, while the law is racially neutral in wording the effect of the law
is the reduction of eligible minority voters, as these minorities are the same ones
most likely to be incarcerated to begin with. The group threat hypothesis is then
supported by permanent disenfranchisement, in that a group that is perceived to
be threatening is controlled by the powerful in society through legal means.
Some of the crimes for which one can be disenfranchised particularly
misdemeanor drug offenses, theft, and prostitution appears to be aimed at
minority offenders as they are typically the ones incarcerated for those offences
(Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 2004). In Maryland, for example, prostitution, a
crime where minorities tend to be arrested more often than whites, can lead to
disenfranchisement, while patronizing prostitution has no effect on voting rights.
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Additionally, the inclusion of misdemeanor offenses as a criterion for
disenfranchisement increases the opportunity to disenfranchise a variety of
criminal offenders regardless of race/ethnicity, class, and gender. Inclusion of
misdemeanor offenses means that many street-level crimes, such a drug
possession, petty thefts, and prostitution, among others would lead to those
street-level offenders being disenfranchised. These street crimes tend to be the
focus of the criminal justice system and are generally seen as those that
represent disorder in society (Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 2004). It is this threat
of societal disorder that is viewed as threatening to those who control society
(Behrens, Uggen, & Manza, 2003). Because the vast majority of these streetlevel misdemeanor offenders are minorities, the inclusion of misdemeanor
offenses as a disenfranchisement criterion would appear to have a
disproportionate impact on minority offenders. That is, because more minorities
are incarcerated, more minorities are disenfranchised. The larger impact is that
of increased social control over minorities by limiting, through
disenfranchisement, their opportunity to vote which could ultimately increase the
power of minorities as the ability to vote would allow for the ability to shape the
political landscape in society. The disproportionate impact of disenfranchisement
on minorities then supports the contention of the group threat hypothesis that
social control will be exercised over any group (in this case minorities) perceived
to be a threat to the ruling class or the state.

120
The criteria for disenfranchisement in state laws are quite varied. The
effect of these criteria is varied as well, depending upon the state and how these
laws are enforced. Despite the variation, however, each of these criteria appears
to have more of an impact upon minorities than they do upon the controlling
majority class. Because of this, the group threat hypothesis appears to be
supported by the criteria for disenfranchisement.
Voting Restoration Procedures
The word permanently is misleading in the respect that of the twelve
states that permanently disenfranchise felony offenders, eleven have some type
of restoration procedure for regaining the right to vote, regardless of the offense.
Even the lone dissenter among the twelve permanent disenfranchisement states,
Tennessee, allows for restoration on most, but not all, felony offenses. Like
disenfranchisement criteria, restoration procedures also vary depending on the
state. Much like the theme regarding the criteria of disenfranchisement laws
discussed previously, there appears to be support for the group threat hypothesis
when one examines the various restoration procedures. That is, when state laws
specifying the criteria for restoring the voting rights of offenders are examined, it
becomes apparent that the concept of controlling a threat may indeed be a part
of voting rights restoration for offenders.
A majority of states (twenty-eight) allow for the automatic restoration of
voting rights upon the completion of the sentence. The remaining twenty-one
states specify requirements for voting restoration. Of these states, sixteen
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require the payment of all fines and/or court costs associated with the offense.
Of those sixteen states that require payment of fines, only six (Georgia, Indiana,
Minnesota, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Washington) have only that additional
requirement for vote restoration. In those six states, once the fines and/or court
costs have been paid former offenders are eligible to vote. Two additional states,
Connecticut and North Carolina, only have two requirements, to pay all fines
associated with the offense and to file some form of documentation indicating
release with the court of conviction demonstrating that they have been
unconditionally discharged. The remaining thirteen states have additional
requirements which will be discussed in more detail in what follows. The
requirement to pay all fines and/or court costs as a condition of regaining the
right to vote can be construed as an example of class and racial bias. That is, if
offenders cannot afford to pay, they do not get their voting rights restored. As
has been established previously (Barak, Flavin, & Leighton, 2001; Bridges, 1997;
Cole, 1999; Tonry, 1995), class and therefore racial minorities for the most part
cannot afford these fines and are therefore prevented from restoring voting
rights. Intention or not, the result of the requirement to pay all fines and/or court
costs does support the group threat hypothesis, in that control, through financial
requirements, is exercised over a minority group.
Of the twenty-one states requiring some form of petition to restore voting
rights, thirteen require the completion and approval of either an application or
some other state governmental forms. For example, Arizona requires an
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application for restoration be filed out and filed along with a “certificate of
absolute discharge” and sent to the discharging judge for final decision (Arizona
Revised Statute § 13-906). In Delaware, as long as the offense charged is not a
permanent disqualifying offense the application is made to the local election
board (Delaware Constitution, Article V, § 2; Delaware Code Annotated, Title 15,
§ 1701). Under Virginia law, the process for restoration depends on the nature of
the offense. For non-violent offenders, a one-page application is required
although violent and/or drug offenders are required to complete an extensive
thirteen-page application, both applications must be sent to the Secretary of
Commonwealth (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-231.1). In many cases the
paperwork required of offenders to regain their voting rights is extensive and
difficult. Because of this, offenders often require the assistance of legal counsel
to traverse the requirements. Offenders who cannot afford counsel to assist with
the petition are unable to regain their voting rights. The difficulty of the forms
and/or petitions can be seen as an additional control mechanism in that the forms
do often require legal assistance that most criminal offenders cannot afford.
Rather than simply returning voting rights automatically upon release, states that
require these petitions appear to be attempting to limit the number of offenders
who regain the right to vote. As limiting the right to vote acts to control offending
populations far beyond the prison cell, petitions can be seen as fitting into the
threat hypothesis. That is, these petitions ultimately impact minority populations

123
at a greater rate as they are the ones most likely not to be able to afford legal
representation.
Another form of restoration involves the petitioning of the court of
conviction for the return of voting rights. Four states (Arizona, Nevada,
Tennessee, and Virginia) all state that offenders may petition the court of
conviction or the circuit court in the offender’s area of residence to regain the
right to vote. For example, in Nevada, a former offender may either appeal to the
Board of Pardons Commissioners for a pardon or may seek restoration of their
civil rights by filing an appeal with the court in which they were convicted
(Nevada Revised Statute § 213.090). In order to seek restoration of civil rights
from the court of conviction, the former offender must petition the court,
requesting the sealing of all records pertaining to the conviction, if granted, the
sealing of the court records means that the conviction never occurred and the
former offender is then able to vote (Nevada Revised Statute § 213.090 and §
179.245). The Tennessee statute is similar in regards to the effect of vote
restoration. In Tennessee, for full restoration of the right to vote, the offender
must meet the requirements, regarding time frame and crime type, and must
petition the circuit court in the county of residence (Tennessee Code Annotated §
40-29-101 through § 40-29-105). The petition to the circuit court for full
restoration must be made after notice is provided to both the federal and state
prosecutors (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-102 through § 40-29-104).
Additionally, the petition must be accompanied by proof that the former offender
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“has sustained the character of a person of honesty, respectability and veracity,
and is generally esteemed as such by the petitioner’s neighbors” (Tennessee
Code Annotated § 40-29-102). Once the petition is filed, the court determines
eligibility for restoration of the right to vote. Much like the requirement for filing
written petition and forms, petitioning the court to regain voting rights is often
more difficult for minority offenders who cannot afford the assistance of legal
counsel. Because criminal offenders are often of class and racial minorities the
impact of the requirements of petitions often have a more intense affect on these
minority offenders, often preventing them from regaining their voting rights.
Therefore, much like previous arguments, the requirement of petitioning the court
ultimately acts as a control mechanism to keep minority offenders from voting.
As an additional requirement, ten of the states requiring some form of
petition conduct a background investigation or review of the offender prior to the
restoration of voting rights. Some of these background investigations amount to
merely a review of the offender’s records to ensure compliance with state laws,
although others are more in-depth. In Wyoming, for first time, non-violent
offenders, the parole board conducts an investigation merely to determine
eligibility and then, if eligibility is verified, the board issues the restoration
certificate (Wyoming Statute § 7-13-105). Along similar lines, the parole board in
the state of Kentucky determines whether or not the former offender is eligible for
vote restoration and then forwards the request to the Governor (Kentucky
Revised Statute Annotated, § 196.045). The state of Maryland is an additional
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example, as the parole board reviews and investigates the cases of offenders
and determines eligibility and then forwards the request to the Governor for final
decision (Maryland Regulations Code, Title 12, § 08.01.16). The requirement for
a background investigation of the offender is not uncommon as a requirement for
voting rights restoration. However, the requirement of an often extensive
background investigation is time consuming and often requires the offender to
ensure all fines and/or court costs be paid and that legal counsel to assist with
the petition prior to any investigation into the offenders background. This
additional requirement puts additional strain on offenders, particularly financially.
The financial aspect is often not something that offenders, especially minority
(class and racial) offenders can necessarily afford. Because of this aspect of the
restoration process, it can be seen as a requirement that often eliminates the
possibility of vote restoration. As minority offenders are more likely to be
eliminated due to these requirements the requirements can be viewed as an
additional control mechanism over minority offenders after their release and
therefore is supportive of the threat hypothesis contention that minorities will be
controlled by the dominant class if they are perceived as a threat.
The use of the parole board for reviews and/or investigation is not
unusual, particularly given the role that many parole boards play in the
restoration process. Eleven of the twelve permanent disenfranchisement states,
in fact, require that offenders appeal either directly to a parole or other type of
board of appeals or directly to the Governor of the state in order to be considered
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for voter restoration. In Wyoming for example, for those individuals requesting a
pardon, must wait for ten years after completion of the sentence before applying
directly to the governor. The governor’s office is required to notify the
prosecuting attorney to determine the particulars of the case prior to making any
decision regarding executive pardon (Wyoming Statute § 7-13-803 through 806).
Although West Virginia statue requires permanent disenfranchisement for only
one offense, bribery of an elected official, in a case of a conviction for such a
charge the only alternative for the restoration of voting rights is to apply for a
gubernatorial pardon through application to the state parole board (West Virginia
Constitution, Article VII, § 11). Lastly, under Mississippi law, the only method for
regaining the right to vote is by Gubernatorial pardon or by a two-thirds vote of
the Mississippi legislature (Mississippi Constitution, Article 12, § 253; Mississippi
Code Annotated § 99-19-37). Once all requirements are met by the offender, the
formal pardon is sent to the Governor, via the Parole Board, for investigation and
final decision (Mississippi Constitution, Article 5, § 124). Like many of the other
restoration requirements discussed herein, any sort of appeal, either to a board
or directly to the Governor of the state, often requires legal assistance that must
be paid for by the offenders. Again, the requirement of legal counsel often
places an additional burden on class and therefore racial minorities in that legal
fees often far exceed anything these former offenders can afford. The
requirements then end up acting as an impediment, preventing minority offenders
the opportunity to regain their voting rights. If they cannot regain their rights they
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are limited in the amount of power they can exercise through the election of
political officials. Therefore, there is the affect of further control of minorities by
limiting their voting potential. By limiting the rights of former offenders, the
dominant group in society can further control the offenders and therefore protect
the dominant social system.
Although appeal to a board or to the Governor appears to be the
restoration method of choice for most of the permanent disenfranchisement
states, there are eleven states that place either additional requirements and/or
time periods upon the offender. The most common of these additional
requirements is the addition of some waiting period after final discharge of a
sentence. Arizona, for example, requires two years after discharge before an
offender can even apply for restoration (Arizona Revised Statute § 13-906).
Delaware also requires an additional waiting period of either five years for felony
offenses and ten years for misdemeanors involving a violation of election law
(Delaware Code Annotated, Title 15, § 1701). Under Maryland law the time
requirements are five years for a misdemeanor, ten years for a felony, and for
those requesting a pardon who have been convicted of a violent crime or of a
crime involving drugs the waiting period is twenty years (Maryland Regulations
Code, Title 12, § 08.01.16). Time is not the lone additional requirement,
however. For example Alabama, requires that any offender who seeks
restoration of voting rights, be free of any pending charges and for a serious
violent offense and/or a sexual offense the offender must submit a DNA sample
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to the Alabama DNA database (Alabama Code § 36-18-25(f)). Lastly, Mississippi
requires offenders seeking restoration to not only wait a period of seven years
after the completion of their sentence, but then mandates that the offender place
a notice of the pardon request, along with a statement of why the pardon should
be given, in the newspaper of the county where the conviction took place
(Mississippi Constitution, Article 5, § 124 and Article 12, § 253). Although most
of these additional requirements do not appear to intentionally block minority
offenders, much like the petition requirements discussed above these
requirements may ultimately block minority offenders from regaining the vote.
The requirements themselves do not appear to limit minorities, but due to the
expense of legal fees that often accompany these requirements the affect is to
limit the ability of minority offenders to regaining their rights. Because of this, it
can be argued that these requirements do act to further control minorities in that
they prevent minorities from regaining the vote, which may ultimately assist in
offenders gaining more power. The affect then fits into the theoretical framework
that minorities are further controlled, in this case by limiting voting rights,
because they are perceived as a threat to society. Although racial bias may not
be intentional the effect is substantial.
The state of Iowa provides an example of change that has taken place
due some perceived racial bias. Concerned that the state’s disenfranchisement
statute was racial biased in result, the governor of Iowa, by executive order,
changed the law from permanently disenfranchising felony offenders to one that

129
allows for automatic restoration of the right to vote (Iowa Executive Order
Number 42, July 24, 2005). In addition, other states, like Washington, have
come under fire in recent years for perceived racial bias in their restoration
procedures (Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Circuit, 2003);
United States v. Loucks, 149 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Circuit, 1998)). In these
cases, the court stated that the financial provision of the statute could be
challenged as “racially discriminatory under the Voting Rights Act” (Farrakhan v.
Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Circuit, 2003). The Washington statute
states, however, that if the former offender cannot pay the fines associated with
the offense, they can either petition the court for a reduction or complete
elimination of the fine, as long as “manifest hardship” can be proven (Washington
Revised Code § 10.73.160). Additionally, the former offender may request a
restoration of civil rights or an outright pardon from the governor in cases where
the fines cannot be paid (Washington Revised Code § 9.96.010 and § 9.96.020).
Along the same lines, Nevada statutes normally require the payment of all fines
associated with the criminal offense in order for voting rights to be restored;
however, this requirement may be waived if the former offender is indigent
(Nevada Revised Statute § 176A.850, § 213.155, and § 213.157).
Much like the criteria used to determine who becomes disenfranchised,
the requirements for voting rights restoration indicate support for the group threat
hypothesis in a variety of ways. As previously discussed, the requirement to pay
all court costs and fines as a condition of voting rights restoration is perhaps the
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clearest support for the group threat hypothesis. That is, the group threat
hypothesis argues that a group that is perceived to be threatening to the powerful
in society will be subject to a variety of control mechanisms. A clear mechanism
of control is to reduce the possibility of regaining voting rights through the
imposition of high court costs and/or fines and then conditioning restoration of
voting rights on the payment of such fines. As established (Barak, Flavin, &
Leighton, 2001; Bridges, 1997; Cole, 1999), the large majority of criminal
offenders come from the lowest socioeconomic classes. Additionally, racial
minorities, particularly African Americans, are overwhelming represented in the
lowest of socioeconomic classes. What results then is that African Americans
are impacted by the requirement to pay fines that they cannot afford in order to
regain voting rights lost due to a criminal conviction. This requirement to pay
fines and/or court cost then acts as a control mechanism over African Americans
and therefore exemplifies the group threat hypothesis. An additional example of
restoration criteria that appears supportive of the group threat hypothesis is the
often complicated legal petitions that must be filed in order for voting rights to be
restored. The complicated legal petitions may require attorneys that can fill out
the requisite forms and file the petitions with the appropriate government officials
(different depending on the state). The clear implication here is that if former
offenders cannot afford to pay fines and/or court costs they are also unlikely to
be able to afford legal counsel to assist in the restoration process. Without
assistance then, it can be assumed the restoration process is too difficult to
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traverse by criminal offenders that are most likely poor and undereducated. It
appears then that restoration requirements in disenfranchisement laws also
support the group threat hypothesis in that they are another means of controlling
a population deemed threatening to the majority.
Summary: Disenfranchisement and the Group Threat Hypothesis
Despite the differences noted above, not a single state law made any
indication of a bias toward any particular group, other than criminal offenders.
This statement should be fairly obvious, in that no state could possibly defend a
law that is outwardly racially biased. Unlike the laws in the post-Civil War era,
the current state statutes are racially neutral in their language. However, it
should be clear that they can be detrimental for, or have negative effects on,
African Americans. The previous discussion of institutional discrimination
articulated that what mattered in the law was not the intent, but rather the result
(Georges-Abeyie, 1990). That is, simply because the results of a law may
indicate disparities in outcome, does not mean that there was any intent to
discriminate. These laws may be seen as institutionalized discrimination, in that
disparities in outcomes are often the result of criminal justice policies established
without racist intent (Georges-Abeyie, 1990; Petersilia, 1983; Wilbanks, 1987).
Income plays a major role in the criminal justice system, for example, the
issuance of bail, the payment of court costs, the ability to hire a quality attorney,
and the like are all related to one’s social class status. Those without financial
wherewithal tend to be impacted more by criminal justice sanctions in that
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because they cannot afford bail, court costs, or a quality attorney they are often
unable to avoid jail. Given that the racial minorities, particularly African
Americans, often overlap with issues of class, it comes as no surprise that
African Americans are often overrepresented as offenders in the criminal justice
system. With the increased numbers of African Americans incarcerated in
prisons across the country the impact of disenfranchisement laws on African
Americans is substantial. Although the laws themselves are racially neutral in
intent, the result of increased incarceration of African Americans results in the
increased disenfranchisement of African Americans. That being the case it can
be argued that disenfranchisement laws are an example of institutional
discrimination and do therefore support the group threat hypothesis.
Although states such as Iowa, Washington, and Nevada have seemingly
identified adverse impacts on certain groups, such as racial minorities and the
poor, most of these adverse impacts appear to be ignored by most other states.
Whether or not these racial differences are ignored by the most states because
these states belief their laws to be racially neutral is irrelevant. What is clearly
evident is that despite the racially neutral intent of the laws, the results of the
laws are clearly indicative of racial bias. Because of this bias, it appears clear
that the group threat hypothesis, that argues that a perceived threat is controlled
through legislation, is supported.
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Quantitative Analysis Results
This section deals with the quantitative analysis of data as a test of the
group threat hypothesis. Specifically, this section tests the following hypotheses:
1) The greater the proportion of minorities in a state’s population, the
more restrictive the state’s disenfranchisement laws;
2) The more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement laws, the higher the
state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration; and
3) The higher a state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration, the more
difficult the voting restoration procedures.
This section is broken down into several subsections: the creation of data
for quantitative analysis, three subsections discussing the tests of three
aforementioned hypotheses, and a summary of quantitative analysis, and a
discussion of the limitations of the study.
Creation of Data File for Quantitative Analysis
Based on the qualitative analysis discussed previously, two variables, the
strictness of disenfranchisement legislation (strictness) and the difficulty of the
restoration process (restoration), were created by quantifying information
obtained from state disenfranchisement laws and regulations. The qualitative
analysis of these documents resulted in two categories: the strictness of
disenfranchisement laws and the difficulty of the voting restoration process, with
two separate coding schemes.
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1. Strictness of Disenfranchisement Scale – Each state’s disenfranchisement
law(s) were examined to determine the point at which disenfranchisement
becomes effective in that state (e.g. during pretrial detention, upon
conviction, or upon incarceration), the level of offense required to
disenfranchise (e.g. misdemeanor or felony), the length of time of the
disenfranchisement (e.g. during incarceration, parole, probation and/or a
suspended sentence, or any additional post-release time after parole), and
the permanence of the disenfranchisement (e.g. permanent for 1st offense,
for 2nd offense, or permanent for certain crimes). To quantitatively
determine the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law, one point
was given for each indication of strictness found in the state’s laws.
These indications of strictness were counted and a score was attained
that was used as a measure of strictness of that state’s law. Based on the
above a variable measuring the strictness of disenfranchisement was
created based on eleven distinct criteria: 1) conviction of some
misdemeanor offenses, 2) pretrial detention, 3) conviction of a felony
offense, 4) probation and/or a suspended sentence, 5) incarceration, 6)
parole, 7) additional post-release time after or in addition to parole, 8)
permanence based on conviction of first offense, 9) permanence based on
conviction of a second offense (recidivism), 10) permanence for a
conviction for certain types of crimes, and 11) permanence dependent
upon when the crime was committed (for example, the State of Tennessee
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has different requirements based upon the time period the crime was
committed; a person convicted of a felony before 1973, or between 1981
and 1986, or after 1996 is permanently disenfranchised, restoration is
automatic for any other time period). Each category was assigned a point,
and a total score for a state, which ranges between 0 to 11 represents the
level of disenfranchisement strictness in that state, and the higher the
score the stricter the disenfranchisement law. The result of this analysis is
represented in Table 5-1.
2. Restoration Difficulty Scale – There are two major categories of
restoration of voting rights: 1) automatic restoration and 2) restoration
through petition. To determine the difficulty of the restoration process, the
laws for each state were examined to determine what was required of the
offender to restore voting rights. That is, restoration processes were
examined to determine if the restoration was automatic or if some
additional requirement was mandated (e.g. the payment of all fines, an
investigation or review, a petition or an appeal to a court or board, or
additional requirement). To quantitatively determine the difficulty of a
state’s restoration process, one point was given for each indication of
voting restoration difficulty. The indications of restoration difficulty were
counted and a score was attained that was used as a measure of difficulty
of that state’s restoration process. The variable measuring the difficulty
for voting rights restoration (restoration through petition) was created
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Table 5-1: Criteria of Disenfranchisement Based on State Law

Probation / Suspended
Sentence

Incarceration

Parole

Additional Post-Release
Time after parole

Permanent (1st Offense)

Permanent (2nd Offense)

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1

1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Total

Upon Conviction

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Permanent for certain
crimes
Permanent based on
time period of crime

Pretrial Detention

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma

For some misdemeanors

(Higher total indicates a stricter disenfranchisement law)

8
4
6
4
2
3
2
7
1
7
3
1
4
2
3
5
4
9
1
0
8
1
2
4
8
3
1
5
6
1
4
4
2
4
1
1
3
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Table 5-1: Criteria of Disenfranchisement Based on State Law (Continued)

Probation / Suspended
Sentence

Incarceration

Parole

Additional Post-Release
Time after parole

Permanent (1st Offense)

Permanent (2nd Offense)

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1

0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Total

Upon Conviction

0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Permanent for certain
crimes
Permanent based on
time period of crime

Pretrial Detention

Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

For some misdemeanors

(Higher total indicates a stricter disenfranchisement law)

1
1
4
5
3
8
4
1
0
7
4
4
4
7
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based on seven different requirements including: 1) payment of all fines,
2) a background investigation and/or review, 3) petition to the court of
conviction, 4) appeal to a review board or to the Governor for a pardon, 5)
submission of a DNA sample, 6) having no pending charges, and 7) any
additional waiting period and/or requirement. Each of the seven subcategories was given a value of one. The scores range from 0 to 5, and
the higher score, the more difficult the voting restoration process. States
that apply automatic restoration have a score of 0. The results of this
analysis are represented in Table 5-2.
Distribution of State Disenfranchisement Laws
The sample used for this study consisted of 51 states (the District of
Columbia was treated as a state) and the 49 state disenfranchisement laws. Of
the 51 states, 49, or 96% had disenfranchisement legislation. Among the 49 with
these laws 22, or 45%, had some sort of petition for restoration requirement. The
remaining 27 states with disenfranchisement legislation, 55% of the total had an
automatic restoration process.
In addition, three other variables were created and included in data
analysis. First, percent African American in the population by state
(PercentBlack) was calculated by taking the total number of African Americans in
a state and dividing by the total population of that state. Based on this
calculation the range of percentage of African Americans in states was 0.3% to
60%. Second, African American incarceration rates by state (BIncarB) were
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Table 5-2: Voting Restoration Requirements Based on State Law
(Higher total indicates a more difficult restoration process)

Investigation/Review

Petition Court

Appeal to a board or
Governor for pardon

DNA sample

No pending charges

Additional waiting period
and/or requirement

Total

Alabama
Alaska 1
Arizona
Arkansas 1
California 1
Colorado 1
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C. 1
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii 1
Idaho
Illinois 1
Indiana 1
Iowa 1
Kansas 1
Kentucky
Louisiana 1
Maine 2
Maryland
Massachusetts 1
Michigan 1
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri 1
Montana 1
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire 1
New Jersey 1
New Mexico
New York 1
North Carolina
North Dakota 1
Ohio 1

Payment of all fines

Restoration through petition

1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0

1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

5
0
4
0
0
0
1
3
0
4
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
1
4
0
0
1
4
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
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Table 5-2: Voting Restoration Requirements Based on State Law
(Continued)
(Higher total indicates a more difficult restoration process)

1
2

Investigation/Review

Petition Court

Appeal to a board or
Governor for pardon

DNA sample

No pending charges

Additional waiting period
and/or requirement

Total

Oklahoma
Oregon 1
Pennsylvania 1
Rhode Island 1
South Carolina 1
South Dakota 1
Tennessee
Texas 1
Utah 1
Vermont 2
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin 1
Wyoming

Payment of all fines

Restoration through petition

1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

1
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
4
1
1
0
3

Indicates Automatic Restoration
No Felony Disenfranchisement Law

141
calculated by taking the total number of African Americans incarcerated in a
state, dividing that number by the total number of African Americans of that state
and then multiplying the result by 100,000. Based on this calculation the range
of values for African American incarceration was 780 to 4244 per 100,000
population. Third, African American arrest rates by state (BArrestBl) were
calculated by taking the total number of African Americans arrested in a state,
dividing that number by the total number of African Americans in that state and
then multiplying the result by 100,000. Based on this calculation the range of
values for African American arrest was 1249 to 25811 per 100,000 population.
Table 5-3 summarizes the profile of state legislation on disenfranchisement. The
variables used in data analysis are summarized in Table 5-4.
Table 5-3: Distribution of State Disenfranchisement Laws
Disenfranchisement

Restoration Petition

Yes

49 (96%)

22 (45%)

No

2 (4%)

27 (55%)

Total

51 (100%)

49 (100%)

Table 5-4: Variables used in Data Analysis
Level of
Measurement

Range

Dependent Variables
Strictness
Restoration

Continuous
Continuous

0-9
0-5

Independent Variables
Percentage of African Americans
African American Incarceration Rates
African American Arrest Rates

Continuous
Continuous
Continuous

Variable

0.3 - 60.0
780 - 4244
1249 - 25811
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Data Analysis and Results
In the following sections, statistical procedures utilized for data analysis
are presented and the results are reported and discussed at length. This section
is broken down by the three hypotheses established in Chapter 4.
Hypothesis 1
The study hypothesizes that there is a positive relationship between the
level of strictness of disenfranchisement legislation and the size of state African
American populations. There are two ways to test this hypothesis. First, the
study examined if states with disenfranchisement laws have significant higher
proportion of African American population than states without disenfranchisement
laws. Then, the study examined if states that have higher proportions of African
Americans have stricter disenfranchisement laws than states that have lower
proportions of African Americans. To determine if there is a significant difference
in percent of African American population between states that have
disenfranchisement laws and states that do not, the Mann-Whitney statistic was
used.
The first analysis involves the comparison of the African American
population sizes in states with disenfranchisement laws and those in states
without such laws. For this test, the variable PercentBlack is treated as the
independent variable, and strictness as the dependent variable. The original
variable of disenfranchisement strictness (strictness) was recoded to prepare for
the use of exact statistical methods. For this analysis the researcher used the
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Mann Whitney U test which is used to test whether or not, given two samples,
one variable tends to have higher values than the other. In this case, the Mann
Whitney U is used to test whether states with disenfranchisement laws tend to
have a higher proportion of African Americans in the population than those states
without a disenfranchisement law. Because the Mann Whitney test compares
means of two groups the researcher first had to recode the dependent variable
(strictness) into a dichotomous ordinal-level variable (strictness2). To recode,
the researcher assigned strictness2 two values: 1 = states with
disenfranchisement laws and 0 = states without disenfranchisement laws. The
Mann-Whitney U test was used to determine whether or not there was a
statistically significant relationship between the percentage of minorities in a state
and whether or not that state had a disenfranchisement law. A significant Mann
Whitney U test statistic would indicate that these variables are indeed related.
The statistics should show states with disenfranchisement laws have significantly
higher percentages of African Americans. A comparison of means will confirm
the directionality of any significant effect.
The results of the Mann-Whitney test indicate strong support for a
difference in percent of African American population based upon whether or not a
state has a disenfranchisement law. For states with no disenfranchisement law,
the mean rank of proportion of African Americans in the state’s population is
3.50. For states with disenfranchisement law, the mean rank of African American
population is 26.92. The Mann Whitney U test statistics (Z=-2.184, p=0.013)
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reveals that the difference in the mean ranks is statistically significant. That is,
states with a disenfranchisement law have a significantly higher proportion of
African Americans in the state population than states without a
disenfranchisement law. The hypothesis is therefore supported. Table 5-5
summarize the results of the relationship analysis between proportion of African
Americans and disenfranchisement laws.
The second analysis involves the analysis of the relationship between the
sizes of African American population and levels of disenfranchisement strictness.
It is hypothesized that states with greater African American population have
stricter disenfranchisement laws. For this test, the variable PercentBlack is
treated as the independent variable, and strictness as the dependent variable.
The original variable of disenfranchisement strictness (strictness) was recoded to
prepare for the use of exact statistical methods. For this analysis the researcher
used the Kruskal-Wallis test which is used to test the variance by ranks by
comparing several independent samples. In this case, the Kruskal-Wallis is used
to test whether states with a higher proportion of African Americans in the
population had stricter disenfranchisement laws than states with a lower
Table 5-5: Mann-Whitney Test for Relationship between Proportions of
African Americans and Disenfranchisement Laws
N

Mean Rank

Sum of Ranks

States without disenfranchisement law

2

3.50

7.00

States with disenfranchisement law

49

26.92

1319.00

Z Statistic

-2.184

Exact
Significance
0.013
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proportion of African Americans in the population. Because the Kruskal-Wallis
test compares ranks of independent samples and requires ordinal-level data the
researcher first had to recode the dependent variable (strictness) into a
trichotomous ordinal-level variable (strictness3). Like the earlier test, to conduct
this analysis, the variable determining the strictness of a state’s
disenfranchisement law was recoded into a trichotomous variable strictness3
which indicates whether the state law was of low strictness, average strictness,
or high strictness. The researcher created a third strictness variable, strictness3,
which had three values: 1 = low strictness, 2 = average strictness, and 3 = high
strictness. Values created represented the lowest 25% of the scaled scores of
the original disenfranchisement strictness variable (a score of 0-1 was recoded
into a value of 1 for low strictness), the middle 50% (a score of 2-4 was recoded
into a value of 2 for average strictness), and the highest 25% (a score of 5-9 was
recoded into a value of 3 for high strictness). Using the recoded variable, the
Kruskal-Wallis, was used to test whether there is a significant relationship
between the percentage of African Americans in a state and the strictness level
of the state’s disenfranchisement law. The Kruskal-Wallis, is a non-parametric
statistical test which utilizes mean ranks to determine if the relationship between
two variables. In this case, it tests if the states with a higher proportion of African
Americans have higher scores on disenfranchisement strictness. For this test,
the variable PercentBlack is an interval level variable which indicates the
percentage of blacks in each state and is treated as the independent variable.
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The dependent variable for this test is the recoded variable, strictness3, an
ordinal-level variable indicating whether a state’s disenfranchisement law is of
low strictness, average strictness, or of high strictness. A significant chi-square
statistic would indicate that the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law
varies with the size of that state’s African American population. A significant chisquare statistic would indicate that differences in means are not due to sampling
error, thus indicate support for the hypothesis presented. A comparison of
means confirms the directionality of any significant effect.
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that the mean ranks of the
proportion of African Americans in states with different levels of
disenfranchisement strictness are significantly different. The mean rank of the
percentage of African Americans in the population for states with
disenfranchisement laws that are the least strict is 18.19, for average strictness
the mean is 26.21, and for high strictness the mean is 32.89. A significant chisquare statistic (x2 = 6.602; p = 0.032) indicates that these differences are not
due to sampling error, thus indicating support for hypothesis 1. Statistics from
the Monte Carlo method of the Kruskal-Wallis test was obtained due to
insufficient computer memory. The results the Kruskal-Wallis test are presented
in Table 5-6.
Based on the findings reported above the data appears to support the
hypothesis that states with strict disenfranchisement laws have a higher African
American population than states with less restrictive laws.
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Table 5-6: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Relationship between Proportion of
African Americans and Level of Strictness
N

Mean Rank

Disenfranchisement - low strictness

13

18.19

Disenfranchisement - average strictness

24

26.21

Disenfranchisement - high strictness

14

32.89

df

Chi-Square

2

6.602

Exact
Significance

0.032

Hypothesis 2
This hypothesis states that there is a positive relationship between the level of
strictness of disenfranchisement legislation and state African American
incarceration and African American arrest rates. That is, states that have stricter
disenfranchisement laws also have higher rates of African American arrest and
incarceration than states with less strict disenfranchisement laws. To test this
hypothesis, the strictness3 (level of disenfranchisement strictness) variable was
tested against the state African American incarceration rates as well as state
African American arrest rates. To determine if there is a significant difference
between the level of strictness of the disenfranchisement law of the state and
state African American incarceration and African American arrest rates the
Kruskal-Wallis test was used.
The first analysis involves the comparison of the different levels of
disenfranchisement strictness of a state’s law with the African American
incarceration rate. For this test, the variable strictness3, an ordinal-level variable
indicating whether a state’s disenfranchisement law is of low strictness, average
strictness, or of high strictness is treated as the independent variable. The
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dependent variable for this test is BIncarB, an interval-level variable indicating
the African American incarceration rate for each state. Using the recoded
variable strictness3 (low, average, high strictness) described above, the KruskalWallis, was used to test whether there is a statistical relationship between the
strictness level of the state’s disenfranchisement law and the African American
incarceration rate. The Kruskal-Wallis is a non-parametric statistical test which
utilizes mean ranks to determine if there is a difference between variables. For
this analysis, the Kruskal-Wallis was used to determine if the incarceration rate of
African Americans in a state affected the strictness of the state’s
disenfranchisement law. A significant Kruskal-Wallis statistic would indicate that
the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law varies with the size of that
state’s African American incarceration rate. A significant Kruskal-Wallis statistic
would indicate that differences in means are not due to sampling error, thus
indicate support for the hypothesis presented. A comparison of means confirms
the directionality of any significant effect.
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicate that there is not a significant
difference between the level of strictness of the disenfranchisement law of the
state and state African American incarceration rate. The mean rank of African
American incarceration rates in states with disenfranchisement laws that are the
least strict is 25.08, for average strictness the mean is 25.90, and for high
strictness the mean is 23.27. A Kruskal-Wallis statistic (x2 = 0.285; p = 0. 868)
indicates no support for the hypothesis presented. Exact methods were not
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reported for the Kruskal-Wallis test, as there was insufficient computer memory
for the performance of the exact method. The results the Kruskal-Wallis test are
presented on Table 5-7.
The second analysis involves the comparison of the different levels of
disenfranchisement strictness of a state’s law with the African American arrest
rate. For this test, the variable strictness3, an ordinal-level variable indicating
whether a state’s disenfranchisement law is of low strictness, average strictness,
or of high strictness is treated as the independent variable. The dependent
variable for this test is BArrestBl, an interval-level variable indicating the African
American arrest rate for each state. Using the recoded variable discussed in the
first hypothesis, strictness3 (low, average, high strictness), the Kruskal-Wallis,
was used to test whether there is a statistical relationship between the strictness
level of the state’s disenfranchisement law and the African American arrest rate.
For this analysis, the Kruskal-Wallis was used to determine if the arrest rate of
African Americans in a state affected the strictness of the state’s
disenfranchisement law. A significant Kruskal-Wallis statistic would indicate that

Table 5-7: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Relationship between African American
Incarceration Rate and Level of Strictness
N

Mean Rank

Disenfranchisement - low strictness

12

25.08

Disenfranchisement - average strictness

24

25.90

Disenfranchisement - high strictness

13

23.27

df

Chi-Square

2

0.285

Exact
Significance

0.868
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the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law varies with the size of that
state’s African American arrest rate. A significant Kruskal-Wallis statistic would
indicate that differences in means are not due to sampling error, thus indicate
support for the hypothesis presented. A comparison of means confirm the
directionality of any significant effect.
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that the mean ranks of the
percentage of African American in states with different levels of
disenfranchisement strictness are not significantly different. The mean
percentage of African American arrest rates in states with disenfranchisement
laws that are the least strict is 27.17, for average strictness the mean is 24.17,
and for high strictness the mean is 26.36. A Kruskal-Wallis statistic (x2 = 0.406; p
= 0. 817) indicates no support for the hypothesis presented. Again, exact
methods were not reported for the Kruskal-Wallis test, as there was insufficient
computer memory for the performance of the exact method. The results the
Kruskal-Wallis test are presented on Table 5-8.
Based on the findings reported above, the data fails to support the
hypothesis. That is, there is no support for the relationship between the level of
strictness of the disenfranchisement law of the state and the state African
American incarceration rate. Additionally, the data also fails to support the
relationship between the level of strictness of the disenfranchisement law of the
state and the state African American arrest rate.
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Table 5-8: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Relationship between African American
Arrest Rate and Level of Strictness
N

Mean Rank

Disenfranchisement - low strictness

12

27.17

Disenfranchisement - average strictness

24

24.17

Disenfranchisement - high strictness

14

26.36

df

Chi-Square

Significance

2

0.406

0.817

Hypothesis 3
This study hypothesizes that there is a positive relationship between the
difficulty in state voting restoration procedures and the size of a state’s African
American population, state African American arrest rates, and state African
American incarceration rates. That is, states with more difficult voting
restoration procedures have a higher African American population, and higher
African American arrest and incarceration rates than states with more lenient
voting restoration procedures. This hypothesis was tested in two ways.
First, the study examined if states that require a petition for vote restoration have
a significantly higher proportion of African Americans in the population, have
significantly higher African American arrest rates, and have significantly higher
African American incarceration rates than states that have automatic vote
restoration. Then the study examined if states with significantly higher proportion
of African Americans in the population, significantly higher African American
arrest rates, and significantly African American incarceration rates have more
difficult restoration procedures than states with a lower proportion of African
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Americans in the population and lower African American arrest and incarceration
rates.
The first analysis involves the comparison of the African American
population sizes of states (population, arrest rate, and incarceration rate) with
states with automatic restoration and states requiring some form of petition for
restoration. For this test, the variable PercentBlack is an interval level variable
which indicates the percentage of blacks in each state, BArrestBl is an intervallevel variable indicating the African American arrest rate for each state, and
BIncarB is an interval-level variable indicating the African American incarceration
rate for each state. Each of the aforementioned variables (PercentBlack,
BArrestBl, BIncarB) were treated as independent variables. The dependent
variable for this test is restoration. For this analysis the researcher used the
Mann Whitney U test which is used to test whether or not, given two samples,
one variable tends to have higher values than the other. In this case, the Mann
Whitney U is used to test whether states that require a petition for the restoration
of voting rights tend to have a higher proportion of African Americans in the
population (general, arrest, and incarceration) than those states with an
automatic restoration process. Because the Mann Whitney test compares
means of two groups the researcher first had to recode the dependent variable
(restoration) into a dichotomous ordinal-level variable (restoration2). To recode,
the researcher assigned restoration2 two values: 0 = automatic restoration and 1
= petition required for restoration. After recoding the variables, the Mann-
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Whitney test statistic was used to determine whether or not there was a
statistically significant relationship between the percentage of African Americans
in a state, the African American arrest rate, and the African American
incarceration rate of a state and whether or not that state required a petition for
vote restoration (restoration2). A significant Mann Whitney test statistic would
indicate that these variables are indeed related. It is expected that states with a
larger percentage of African Americans in the population (in general population,
arrest rates, and incarceration rates) will require a petition for vote restoration
while states with smaller African American populations will not. A comparison of
means confirm the directionality of any significant effect.
The results of the Mann-Whitney test indicate no support for a difference
in percent of African American population based upon whether or not a state
restoration law requires a petition. For states with automatic restoration, the
mean rank of African American in the state’s population is 24.09. For states that
require a petition for vote restoration, the mean percentage of African American
is 26.11. The Mann Whitney test statistics (Z=-0.493, p=0.629) reveal that any
difference in means is not statistically significant. The hypothesis is therefore not
supported. Table 5-9 illustrates the findings of the Mann-Whitney test.
Table 5-9: Mann-Whitney Test for Relationship between Proportions of
African Americans and Restoration Petition
N

Mean Rank

Sum of Ranks

Automatic restoration

27

24.09

650.50

Petition required for restoration

22

26.11

574.50

Z Statistic

Significance

-0.493

0.629
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Additionally, the results of the Mann-Whitney test indicates no significant
difference in African American arrest rates based upon whether or not a state
disenfranchisement law requires a petition for vote restoration. For states with
automatic restoration, the mean rank of African American arrest rates is 23.77.
For states that require a petition for vote restoration, the mean rank for African
American arrest rates is 25.36. The Mann Whitney test statistics (Z=-0.393,
p=0.700) reveal that any difference in means is not statistically significant. The
hypothesis is therefore not supported. Exact methods were not reported for the
Mann-Whitney test, as there was insufficient computer memory for the
performance of the exact method. Table 5-10 illustrates the findings of the
Mann-Whitney test utilizing the Monte Carlo method.
Lastly, the results of the Mann-Whitney test indicate no significant
difference in African American incarceration rates based upon whether or not a
state disenfranchisement law requires a petition for vote restoration. For states
with automatic restoration, the mean rank of African American incarceration rates
is 24.52. For states that require a petition for vote restoration, the mean rank for
African American incarceration rates is 23.36. The Mann Whitney test statistic
(Z=-0.289, p=0.778) reveals that any difference in means is not statistically
significant. The hypothesis is therefore not supported. Exact methods were not
reported for the Mann-Whitney test, as there was insufficient computer memory
for the performance of the exact method. Tables 5-11 illustrate the findings of
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Table 5-10: Mann-Whitney Test for Relationship between African American
Arrest Rates and Restoration Petition
N

Mean Rank

Sum of Ranks

Automatic restoration

26

23.77

618.00

Petition required for restoration

22

25.36

558.00

Z Statistic

Significance

-0.393

0.700

Table 5-11: Mann-Whitney Test for Relationship between African American
Incarceration Rates and Restoration Petition
N

Mean Rank

Sum of Ranks

Automatic restoration

26

24.52

637.50

Petition required for restoration

21

23.36

490.50

Z Statistic

Significance

-0.289

0.778

the Mann-Whitney test utilizing the Monte Carlo method.
Secondly, this study involves the analysis of the relationship between the
sizes of the African American population (in general population, arrest rates, and
incarceration rates) and the level of difficulty of vote restoration. It is
hypothesized that states with greater African American population have more
difficult vote restoration procedures. For this test, the variable PercentBlack is an
interval level variable which indicates the percentage of blacks in each state,
BArrestBl is an interval-level variable indicating the African American arrest rate
for each state, and BIncarB is an interval-level variable indicating the African
American incarceration rate for each state. Each of the aforementioned variables
(PercentBlack, BArrestBl, BIncarB) were treated as independent variables. The
dependent variable for this test is restoration. To conduct this analysis, the
variable determining the difficulty of a state’s vote restoration process was
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recoded into a trichotomous variable restoration4 which indicates whether the
restoration process was of low difficulty, average difficulty, or high difficulty. The
researcher created an additional restoration variable, restoration4, which had
three values: 1 = low restoration difficulty, 2 = average restoration difficulty, and 3
= high restoration difficulty. Values created represented the lowest 25% of the
scaled scores of the original restoration difficulty variable (a score of 0-1 was
recoded into a value of 1 for low restoration difficulty), the middle 50% (a score of
2-3 was recoded into a value of 2 for average restoration difficulty), and the
highest 25% (a score of 4-7 was recoded into a value of 3 for high restoration
difficulty). Using the recoded variable, the Kruskal-Wallis, was used to test
whether there is a statistical relationship between the difficulty level of the voting
restoration process and percentage of African Americans in a state, the arrest
rate of African Americans, and the incarceration rate of African Americans in a
state. The Kruskal-Wallis is a non-parametric statistical test which utilizes mean
ranks to determine if there is a difference between variables. For this analysis,
the Kruskal-Wallis was used to determine if the percentage of African Americans
in a state, the arrest rate of African Americans, and the incarceration rate of
African Americans in a state affected difficulty level of the voting restoration
process. A significant Kruskal-Wallis statistic would indicate that the difficulty
level of a state’s restoration process varies with the size of that state’s African
American population (in general population, arrest rate, or incarceration rate). A
significant Kruskal-Wallis statistic would indicate that differences in means are
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not due to sampling error, thus indicate support for the hypothesis. A
comparison of means confirm the directionality of any significant effect.
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that the mean ranks of the
proportion of African Americans in states with different levels of vote restoration
difficulty are not significantly different. The mean rank for African Americans in
the population for states with restoration procedures that are the least difficult is
9.18, for average difficulty the mean is 10.00, and for high difficulty the mean is
15.25. The chi-square statistic (x2 = 4.232; p = 0.121) indicates that these
differences are not significant and therefore fail to support the hypothesis
presented. The results the Kruskal-Wallis test is presented in Table 5-12.
Additionally, to test whether or not states with more difficult voting
restoration procedures have higher African American arrest rates than states with
less difficult restoration procedures, the researcher attempted to determine the
relationship between the level of difficulty of voter restoration of the state and the
African American arrest rates of the state. The mean rank of African American
arrest rates in states with restoration procedures that are the least difficult is
12.27, for average difficulty the mean is 10.67, and for high difficulty the mean is
10.75. The chi-square statistic (x2 = 0.312; p = 0. 870) indicate no support for the
hypothesis presented. Exact methods were attempted, but there was insufficient
computer memory to attain results, therefore they are not presented here. The
results of the Kruskal-Wallis test are presented in Table 5-13.
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Table 5-12: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Relationship between Proportion of
African Americans and Level of Restoration Difficulty
N

Mean Rank

Restoration - low difficulty

11

9.18

Restoration - average difficulty

3

10.00

Restoration - high difficulty

8

15.25

df

Chi-Square

Significance

2

4.232

0.121

Table 5-13: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Relationship between African
American Arrest Rate and Level of Restoration Difficulty
N

Mean Rank

Restoration - low difficulty

11

12.27

Restoration - average difficulty

3

10.67

Restoration - high difficulty

8

10.75

df

Chi-Square

Significance

2

0.312

0.870

Lastly, to test whether or not states with more difficult voting restoration
procedures have higher African American incarceration rates than states with
less difficult restoration procedures, the researcher attempted to determine the
relationship between the level of difficulty of voter restoration of the state and the
African American incarceration rates of the state. The mean rank of African
American incarceration rates in states with restoration procedures that are the
least difficult is 11.09, for average difficulty the mean is 15.67, and for high
difficulty the mean is 8.86. The chi-square statistic (x2 = 2.534; p = 0. 298)
indicates no support for the hypothesis presented. Exact methods were not
reported for the Kruskal-Wallis test, as there was insufficient computer memory
for the performance of the exact method. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test is
presented on Table 5-14.
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Table 5-14: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Relationship between African
American Incarceration Rate and Level of Restoration
Difficulty
N

Mean Rank

Restoration - low difficulty

11

11.09

Restoration - average difficulty

3

15.67

Restoration - high difficulty

7

8.86

df

Chi-Square

2

2.534

Exact
Significance

0.298

Based on the findings reported above, the hypothesis that states with
more difficult voting restoration procedures have higher African American
populations, and higher African American arrest and African American
incarceration rates than states with more lenient voting restoration procedures is
not supported.
Summary
Based on the findings reported above, the data appear to support hypothesis
one and fail to support either hypothesis two or three. That is, there is a relationship
between the strictness of state disenfranchisement laws and the proportions of African
Americans. However, there is no connection between the strictness of the
disenfranchisement law and African American arrest and incarceration rates. There is
also no support for the hypothesis that there is a relationship between difficulty in
restoration procedures and proportion of African Americans or African American
arrest and incarceration rates. As such, the test of the group threat hypothesis by
utilizing felony disenfranchisement legislation is also only partially supported.
Discussion of the research results is in the final chapter of this project
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion
This study was designed to test the group threat hypothesis by utilizing
felony disenfranchisement legislation. The group threat hypothesis, based on the
conflict perspective, states that the law is designed to control those who are
perceived threatening to the powerful in society (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958).
Qualitative and quantitative analyses of disenfranchisement legislation in 48
states and the District of Columbia were performed to determine if the group
threat hypothesis was supported by the study’s data.
Qualitative analysis indicates that the group threat hypothesis is supported
by two main aspects of the laws: first, the criteria for disenfranchisement and
second, the vote restoration procedure. Various criteria for disenfranchisement,
including, conviction, incarceration, the type of crime committed, criminal history,
and whether or not the offender was granted probation, parole, or received a
suspended sentence, have been identified. Each one of these criteria appears to
have a greater impact on minorities, particularly African Americans. Literature
indicates that African Americans are more likely than whites to have criminal
histories because of past and current race relations in the United States and are
also more likely than whites to be convicted of felony criminal offenses (Tonry,
1995). Uniform Crime Report statistics support this by indicating that while
African Americans make up approximately 12 percent of the United States
population, they represent nearly 27 percent of all arrests, 47 percent of all arrest
for homicide, 32 percent for rape, and 53 percent of all arrests for robbery (U. S.
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Department of Justice, 2004). Additionally, the incarceration rate for African
Americans in the United States was substantially higher (4,919 per 100,000) than
for whites (717 per 100,000) during the same time period (U. S. Department of
Justice, 2004). Further, based on government statistics, African American males
have a 1 in 4 chance of going to prison at some point during his lifetime, while
white males face a 1 in 23 chance of prison time (Bonczar and Beck, 1997).
Since criminal histories, which are based on number of criminal convictions,
sentencing and incarceration, and type of offense (e.g. felony offenses) are
representative of the criteria for disenfranchisement it appears that African
Americans are disproportionately impacted by these laws. More generally, as a
large proportion of those individuals entering the criminal justice system (through
conviction and incarceration) are African American it follows that African
Americans are more likely to be effected. As such, African Americans are more
likely to be disenfranchised which, following the group threat hypothesis, can be
viewed as another method of controlling African Americans as a group threat.
Secondly, the analysis of voting restoration procedures also shows
support for the group threat hypothesis. An examination of voting restoration
procedures in the twenty-one states that require some sort of petition to restore
voting rights, indicate various requirements including the full payment of all
related fines, the completion of extensive legal forms that often requires
assistance of legal counsel, and the often complex appeal or pardon process that
requires the assistance of legal counsel to traverse the process. Each of these
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aspects of the vote restoration process appears to hamper offenders who have
limited economic resources. If they cannot afford to pay the fines and/or hire an
attorney to assist in the process the opportunity to regain voting rights is limited.
Because African American ex-offenders often come from the lower class
(Western, 2002; Western and Pettit, 2000) they are most likely to face difficulties
in satisfying the financial requirements for voting right restoration and are the
least able to hire legal counsel due to those same economic conditions.
Therefore, because the requirements for vote restoration often necessitate
financial means unavailable to former offenders it is difficult for them to regain
their voting rights. As such, voting restoration procedures appear to act as a legal
control mechanism over former offenders by controlling and/or limiting their ability
to vote.
Quantitative analysis involved testing the following three hypotheses:
1) The greater the proportion of African Americans in a state’s population,
the more restrictive the state’s disenfranchisement laws;
2) The more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement laws, the higher the
state’s rate of African American arrest and incarceration; and
3) The higher a state’s rate of African American arrest and incarceration,
the more difficult the voting restoration procedures.
The results of data analysis support Hypothesis #1, showing a significant
relationship between the strictness of state disenfranchisement laws and the
proportions of African Americans in a particular state (states with greater
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proportion of African Americans have stricter disenfranchisement laws).
However, Hypothesis #2 and Hypothesis #3 are not supported by the study’s
data. There is no significant relationship between disenfranchisement strictness
and the state’s arrest and incarceration rates for African Americans. Neither is
there a significant relationship between a state’s rate of African American arrest
and incarceration and the difficulty level of the state’s voting rights restoration
procedure.
Prior research indicates that African Americans are more impacted by
disenfranchisement than are whites (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Fellner
and Mauer, 1998; Fletcher, 1999; Hench, 1998; King and Mauer, 2004). This
impact is believed to be primarily due to the number of African Americans under
criminal justice supervision (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Fellner and
Mauer, 1998; Fletcher, 1999; Harvey, 1994; King and Mauer, 2004). Much of the
previous research makes the argument that because African Americans are
overrepresented among criminal offenders in the criminal justice system that they
are therefore more damaged by felony disenfranchisement (Behrens, Uggen,
and Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Fletcher, 1999; Hench, 1998; King
and Mauer, 2004; Mauer, 2004b; McLeod, White, and Gavin, 2003). Additional
research regarding race and disenfranchisement indicates that aside from the
criminal justice system population, there is a correlation between the numbers of
African Americans in the general population of a state and disenfranchisement
legislation (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998).
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Hypothesis #1 confirms previous findings in this regard by demonstrating that the
proportion of African Americans in a state’s population is significantly correlated,
not merely to whether or not a state utilizes felony disenfranchisement, but also
to the strictness of the state’s disenfranchisement law. Because this study
quantified the strictness of the disenfranchisement laws in each state rather than
merely utilizing the existence of such a law the significant finding of hypothesis 1
represents a better measure of impact of disenfranchisement on African
Americans.
Although prior research has indicated that African Americans are more
likely to suffer the consequences of disenfranchisement due to disproportionately
high rates of arrest, conviction, and incarceration (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza,
2003 Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Fletcher, 1999; Hench, 1998; King and Mauer,
2004; Mauer, 2004b) the results of this study, particularly the testing of
hypotheses #2 and #3, challenge those findings. In other words, the testing of
hypotheses #2 and #3 revealed no support for the contention that higher rates of
African American arrest and/or incarceration are correlated with
disenfranchisement. Nor did this study find a significant relationship between
African American arrest and incarceration rates and the difficulty of the vote
restoration process. There are a few possible explanations for the lack of
support of hypotheses #2 and #3 and the challenge this presents to previous
research in the area. First, this study quantified both the strictness of the laws
and the difficulty of the restoration process as opposed to previous research that
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merely observed that because African Americans were overrepresented in the
criminal justice system that they were more likely to be impacted by the laws
(Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Fletcher, 1999;
Harvey, 1994; Hench, 1998; King and Mauer, 2004; Mauer, 2004b). By
quantifying the strictness of the law and the difficulty of the restoration process,
this study was able to clarify the extent of the relationship between race and
disenfranchisement and determine that the relationship found in previous studies
may not fully explain the nature of the relationship.
The second of the possible explanations for a non-significant finding for
hypotheses #2 and #3 is perhaps due to a lack of a connection between the civil
sanction of disenfranchisement and criminal arrest and incarceration rates. That
is, disenfranchisement is a civil sanction, not a criminal sanction like arrest or
incarceration. Although the sanctions of criminal laws primarily function to punish
criminal activity and to deter future criminal acts, civil sanctions act primarily to
restore or “make-right” an injured party, typically through financial awards
(Fletcher, 1998; Hall, 2002; Mousourakis, 2003). The differences in the function
of these two types of law (criminal and civil) makes finding a correlation between
the two types of sanctions difficult. A third possible explanation, and one related
to the second, is that lawmakers have no control over arrest or incarceration
rates, they merely make laws, they do not make arrests, nor do they adjudicate
criminal trials. Additionally, law enforcement officials who make arrests and
judicial officials who punish criminal offenders neither make arrest for nor punish
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individuals for civil offenses. There is no evidence to state that
disenfranchisement laws created by lawmakers have a direct impact on arrest
and incarceration rates. There is also no evidence to state that arrest and
incarceration rates have any impact on whether these laws are created in the first
place. In essence, there appears no way to connect the laws and arrest and
incarceration rates; any causal relationship found would appear to be spurious.
Despite the lack of support for hypotheses #2 and #3 this study has improved the
understanding, not only of the applicability of the group threat hypothesis, but
also the limitation of the hypothesis as well. That is, although the hypothesis can
explain why laws may be created in the first place, as an indication of the need to
control a perceived threat to the ruling class (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003;
Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958) and can therefore be applied to law making, the
hypothesis is limited in its ability to explain the impact these laws have in terms of
outcomes such as arrest and incarceration rates.
Although this study improved on the research of Behrens, et.al. (2003) by
utilizing rates of arrest and incarceration as opposed to using actual numbers of
arrests and incarceration, the reason for the failure of this study to find support
for hypothesis #1 and hypothesis #2 may lie in using arrest and incarceration as
a measure of group threat. Utilizing arrest and incarceration rates as a measure
of group threat presupposes that the rates of arrest and incarceration are known
to those in power and that they view the disproportionate arrest and confinement
of African Americans as a threat to society at large. An alternative explanation
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for group threat and its relationship to arrest and incarceration is that the
population deemed as threatening to the powerful in society is dealt with by the
arrest and conviction. If this is the case, utilizing arrest and incarceration rates
as a measure of group threat would fail to show any significance as was the
case. Therefore, arrest and incarceration are not measures of threat, but rather
an indication that the threat has been dealt with.
The use of the group threat hypothesis to understand the nature of
disenfranchisement legislation provides a better understanding of the social
problems associated with these legal codes. Social problems associated with
being disenfranchised, such as the inability to vote, inability to voice community
concerns, and the inability to affect change can be seen as consequences of the
desire to control a perceived threat to the majority in society. That is, if the
majority can control a population by disenfranchising a significant portion of the
population, it becomes easier for the majority to control all of society because it
reduces the ability of those not in power to affect change. Therefore, social
problems present in minority communities, for example, poverty, social
disorganization, poor or non-existent education opportunities, among others, are
more readily understood by appreciating how the idea of a group threat is
perceived and how it is subsequently dealt with. Disenfranchisement then not
only contains the consequences of individual offenders losing their right to vote,
the effect of disenfranchisement reaches into the community or society as a
whole. The democratic ideals of justice and equality are damaged by policies
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that disenfranchise entire segments of the population in that, not everyone is
equally represented (Altman, 2005; Dhami, 2005; Ochs, 2006). Dealing with
social problems, such as those mentioned above, becomes increasingly difficult
for those communities if they do not share in the constitutional rights afforded
other segments of society.
The social consequences of disenfranchisement go deeper than merely
not being able to exercise the constitutional right to vote. Disenfranchisement
impacts community cohesion and the general investment people have in their
community (Ochs, 2006). By not being able to vote, individuals have little reason
to be concerned with their community and have less reason to foster community
ties. This is not only unfortunate, but likely to further damage communities by
increasing the chance of criminal activity (Braithwaite, 1989). Braithwaite (1989),
for example, argued that individuals and groups with strong social ties are less
likely to commit criminal offenses. If this is the case, “people who are a part of
the decision making process not only have a greater investment in the decisions,
but a greater investment in society as well” (Ochs, 2006, p. 89).
Disenfranchisement damages any attempt to foster stronger community ties and
may in turn lead to further criminal activity because there is little need to invest
oneself in a society that continues to deny the right to vote.
The findings presented in this study have social justice policy implications.
In this case, social justice means that all persons, regardless of class, race,
gender, and the like, have an equal opportunity to live and be productive
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members of society; justice is about equal opportunities stipulated in the United
States Constitution (Miller, 1979; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, and Huo, 1997). In
other words, justice is not only for the rich or powerful, it is supposed to be for all
members of society (Miller, 1979; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, and Huo, 1997).
The ability to vote enhances the very ideas of social justice. According to
Reinman (2005), “what is important here is not so much that voting gives me
power to govern others, but that voting gives me as much power over them as
they have over me” (p. 13, emphasis in the original). In essence, the ability to
vote establishes equality and equal opportunity. The concepts imbedded in the
group threat hypothesis, perceived threat and control of threat, however, are
contrary to very ideals of social justice. Understanding that disenfranchisement
laws are supportive of the group threat and reflect social injustice is an important
first step. Eradicating disenfranchisement will not, of course, automatically make
American society equal in all regards; however, it is worth considering that of all
other democratic nations, the United States remains the most stringent when it
comes to disenfranchisement even while reprimanding other countries for human
rights violations (Ispahani, 2006). In fact, “disenfranchisement of people with
criminal convictions is not the democratic norm … [m]any nations which share
the same Western philosophical foundations as the United States have opted for
dramatically different policies” (Ispahani, 2006, p. 33). Many of the policies from
other democratic nations articulate narrow guidelines for the disenfranchising of
those convicted of offenses, such as disenfranchising only those who have
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violated election law as opposed to the often blanket disenfranchisement policies
of many American states (Easton 2006; Ispahani, 2006). In order to bring
American policies in line with both the ideas of social justice and with policies of
other democratic nations, disenfranchisement laws should be reconstructed
along the same narrow lines exhibited by other democratic nations. Included in
this, should be the alteration of American laws to disenfranchise “only those it
makes sense to bar,” such as those convicted of an election law offense
(Ispahani, 2006, p. 4).
The ideas of democracy, community, social justice and constitutional
rights should be central to any argument for the eradication of
disenfranchisement. Writing in dissent in the case of Richardson v. Ramirez,
Justice Thurgood Marshall epitomized this argument and simultaneously
dismissed the argument that there is a need to disenfranchise offenders because
“their likely voting pattern might be subversive to the interests of an orderly
society” (Marshall in dissent, Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 1974).
According to Marshall:
The process of democracy is one of change. Our laws are not
frozen into immutable form, they are constantly in the process
of revision in response to the needs of a changing society. The
public interest, as conceived by the majority of the voting public,
is constantly undergoing reexamination. This Court’s holding in
Davis, supra, and Murphy, supra, that a State may disenfranchise
a class of voters to “withdraw all political influence from those who
are practically hostile” to the existing order, strikes at the very
heart of the democratic process. A temporal majority could use
such a power to preserve inviolate its view of the social order
simply by disenfranchising those with different views. Voters who
opposed the repeal of prohibition could have disenfranchised
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those who advocated repeal “to prevent persons from being
enabled by their votes to defeat the criminal laws of the country.”
The ballot is the democratic system’s coin of the realm. To
condition its exercise on support of the established order is to
debase that currency beyond recognition (Richardson v. Ramirez,
418 U.S. 24, 1974).
Although Marshall’s main concern was with the democratic process, there
are other far reaching effects. The ability to vote impacts many aspects of our
society. Voting affects our ability not just to voice our concerns, but it legitimately
impacts the society in which we live. The ability to vote gives an individual as
well as individual groups power to make changes that might enhance the quality
of life. For example, a poor neighborhood (or voting district) could vote for more
school funds for better educational opportunities or vote to get better garbage
service or increased police patrols. Whatever the needs may be for any
individual or group, the ability to voice those needs is an important aspect of
social justice. To be more in tune with the ideals of social justice then, as
opposed to the ideas of social threat, serious examination of disenfranchisement
and its connection to the control of threat should be conducted.

172

References

173

References
Albonetti, C.A. (1986). Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and
Uncertainty: Toward a Theory of Discretionary Decision Making in Felony Case
Processing. Criminology, 24, 623-644.
Allard, P. & Mauer, M. (2000). Regaining the Vote: An Assessment of
Activity Relating to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws. The Sentencing Project,
Washington, D.C.
Altman, A. (2005). Democratic Self-Determination and the
Disenfranchisement of Felons. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22(3), 263-273.
Anonymous. (2002). Prisoners and the Right to Vote. America, 187, 3.
Anonymous. (2001). The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship,
Criminality, and the “The Purity of the Ballot Box”. In Tyson, M.J. (Ed.), Race,
Voting, Redistricting and the Constitution: Sources and Explorations on the
Fifteenth Amendment (pp. 372-390). New York: Routledge.
Arvanities, T.M. (1992). The Mental Health and Criminal Justice Systems:
Complementary Forms of Coercive Control. In Liska, A.E. (ed.) Social Threat and
Social Control. (pp. 131-149).
Barak, G., Flavin, J.M., & Leighton, P.S. (2001). Class, Race, Gender, and
Crime: Social Realities of Justice in America. Los Angles: Roxbury.
Beard, C. & Beard, M. (1927). The Rise of American Civilization. New
York: The MacMillan Company.
Behrens, A., Uggen, C., & Manza, J. (2003). Ballot Manipulation and the
“Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in
the United States, 1850-2002. American Journal of Sociology, 109, 559-605.
Beirne, P. & Quinney, R. (1982). Marxism and Law. New York: John Wiley
& Sons.
Black, D. (1980). The Manners and Customs of Police. New York:
Academic Press.
Blalock, H.M. (1967). Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations. New
York: John Wiley & Sons

174
Blumer, H. (1958). Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position. Pacific
Sociological Review, 1, 3-7.
Bobo, L.D. & Gilliam, F.D. (1990). Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and
Black Empowerment. American Political Science Review, 84, 2.
Bobo, L.D. & Hutchings, V.L. (1996). Perceptions of Racial Group
Competition: Extending Blumer’s Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social
Context. American Sociological Review, 61, 951-972.
Bonacich, E. (1972). A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor
Market. American Sociological Review, 37, 547-559.
Bonczar, T.P. & Beck, A.J. (1997). Lifetime Likelihood of Going to State of
Federal Prison. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
Bonger, W.A. (1916/1969). Criminality and Economic Conditions.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Boswell, T. & Dixon, W.J. (1993). Marx’s Theory of Rebellion: A CrossNational Analysis of Class Exploitation, Economic Development, and Violent
Revolt. American Sociological Review, 58, 681-702.
Bourdieu, P. (1988). Vive la Crise! For Heterodoxy in Social Sciences.
Theory and Society, 17, 774-775.
Boyd, T.M. & Markman, S.J. (2001). The 1982 Amendments to the Voting
Rights Act: A Legislative History. In Tyson, M.J. (Ed.), Race, Voting, Redistricting
and the Constitution: Sources and Explorations on the Fifteenth Amendment (pp.
243-324). New York: Routledge.
Bridges, G.S. (1997). A Study on Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Superior
Court Bail and Pre-Trial Detention Practices in Washington. Olympia, WA:
Washington State Minority and Justice Commission.
Bushway, S.D. & Piehl, A.M. (2001). Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal
Factors and Racial Discrimination in Sentencing. Law & Society Review, 35, 733765.
Butler, P. (1995). Racially Biased Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System. Yale Law Journal, 105, 677-725.

175
Cain, M. & Hunt, A. (1979). Marx and Engels on Law. London: Academic
Press.
Cardinale, M. (2004). Triple-Decker Disenfranchisement: First-Person
Accounts of Losing the Right to Vote Among Poor, Homeless Americans with a
Felony Conviction. Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project.
Chamblin, M.B. (1992). Intergroup Threat and Social Control: Welfare
Expansion among States during the 1960s and 1970s. In Liska, A.E. (ed.) Social
Threat and Social Control. (pp. 131-149).
Chamblin, M.B. and Liska, A.E. (1992). Social Structure and Crime
Control Revisited: The Declining Significance of Intergroup Threat. In Liska, A.E.
(ed.) Social Threat and Social Control. (pp. 131-149).
Chambliss, W.B. (1995). Crime Control and Ethnic Minorities: Legitimizing
Racial Oppression by Creating Moral Panics. In D.F. Hawkins (ed.), Ethnicity,
Race, and Crime: Perspectives Across Time and Place. Albany: State University
of New York Press.
Chambliss, W.B. & Seidman, R.B. (1971). Law, Order, and Power.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Chin, G.J. (2004a). Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the
Right to Vote: Did Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment? Georgetown Law Journal, 92, 259-322.
Chin, G.J. (2004b). The “Voting Rights Act of 1867”: The Constitutionality
of Federal Regulation of Suffrage During Reconstruction. North Carolina Law
Review, 82, 1582-1608.
Chiricos, T., Welch, K., & Gertz, M. (2004). Racial Typification of Crime
and Support for Punitive Measures. Criminology, 42, 2, 358–390.
Clegg, R. (2004). Should Ex-Felons be Allowed to Vote? On-Line Debate
(November, 1 2004). Legal Affairs Debate Club.
Clegg, R. (1999). Testimony of Roger Clegg Regarding H.R. 906 (October
21, 1999). Center for Equal Opportunity.
Cole, D. (1999). No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American
Criminal Justice System. New York: The New Press.
Collins, H. (1984). Marxism and Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

176
Conn, J.B. (2003). Excerpts from the Partisan Politics of Ex-Felon
Disenfranchisement Laws. Unpublished senior thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca,
New York.
Dahrendorf, R. (1959). Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
DeJong, C. & Jackson K.C. (1998). Putting Race into Context: Race,
Juvenile Justice Processing, and Urbanization. Justice Quarterly, 15, 487-504.
Demuth, S. (2003). Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release
Decisions and Outcomes: A comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony
Arrestees. Criminology, 41, 3, 873-907.
Dhami, M.K. (2005). Prisoner Disenfranchisement Policy: A Threat to
Democracy? Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy, 5, 235-247.
Dilts, A. (2004). Being/Becoming Felon: Identity and Felon
Disenfranchisement. Unpublished briefing paper, Political Theory Workshop,
University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.
Easton, S. (2006). Electing the Electorate: The Problem of Prisoner
Disenfranchisement. Modern Law Review, 69(3), 443-461.
Engel, R.S., Calnon, J.M., & Bernard, T.J. (2002). Theory and Racial
Profiling: Shortcomings and Future Directions in Research. Justice Quarterly, 19,
248-274.
Ewald, A.C. (2003). Of Constitutions, Politics, and Punishment: Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law in Comparative Context. Manuscript, Department of
Political Science, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Amherst, MA.
Ewald, A.C. (2002). ‘Civil Death’: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States. University of Wisconsin Law
Review, 2002, 1045-1137.
Farmer, A. & Terrell, D. (2001). Crime versus Justice: Is There a TradeOff? The Journal of Law and Economics, 44, 345-366.
Fellner, J. & Mauer, M. (1998). Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States. The Sentencing Project,
Washington, D.C.

177
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services
Division (2004). State minority arrest and incarceration statistics provided
through phone request June, 2006.
Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States. (2005).
Washington, D.C.: The Sentencing Project.
Felony Disenfranchisement Rates for Women. (2004). Washington, D.C.:
The Sentencing Project.
Fletcher, G.P. (1998). Basic Concepts of Criminal Law. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Fletcher, G.P. (1999). Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflection on
the Racial Uses of Infamia. UCLA Law Review, 46, 1197-1231.
Franklin, J.H. (1994). The Emancipation Proclamation. Arlington Heights,
IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc.
Fredrickson, G. M. (2002). Racism: A Short History. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Furman, J. (1997). Political Liberalism: The Paradox of
Disenfranchisement and the Ambivalences of Rawlsian Justice. Yale Law
Journal, 106, 1895-1907.
Garland, D. (2001). The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in
Contemporary Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Georges-Abeyie, D. E. (1990). Criminal Justice Processing of Non-White
Minorities. In MacLean, B.D. & Milovanovic, D. (Eds.), Racism, Empiricism, and
Criminal Justice, 28. Vancouver: Collective.
Giles, M.W. & Kaenan, H. (1994). Racial Threat and Partisan
Identification. American Political Science Review, 88, 317-326.
Goldberg, J. (2005). The Cellblock Voting Bloc: For Democrats, Allowing
Felons to Exercise the Franchise isn’t a Matter of Justice, it’s a Way to Get
Votes. LATimes.com, commentary March 8, 2005, retrieved from
www.latimes.com/news/opinion, March 13, 2005.
Goldkamp, J.S. (1993). Questioning the Practice of Pretrial Detention:
Some Empirical Evidence from Philadelphia. Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, 74, 4, 1556-1588

178
Goldman, R.M. (2001). “A Free Ballot and a Fair Count”: The Department
of Justice and the Enforcement of Voting Rights in the South, 1877-1893. New
York: Fordham University Press.
Guinier, L. (1994). The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in
Representative Democracy. New York: The Free Press.
Greenberg, D.F. (1981). Crime and Capitalism: Readings in Marxist
Criminology. Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield.
Grofman, B. & Lijphart, A. (1986). Electoral Laws and their Political
Consequences. New York: Agathon Press.
Groves, W.B. (1985). Marxism and Positivism. Crime and Social Justice,
23, 129-150.
Hage, J. (1994). Formal Theory in Sociology: Opportunity of Pitfall. New
York: State University of New York Press.
Hall, K.L. (Ed.). (2002). The Oxford Companion to American Law. New
York: Oxford.
Hall, K.L. (Ed.). (1992). The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of
the United States. New York: Oxford.
Handelsman, L. (2005). Giving the Barking Dog a Bite: Challenging Felon
Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Fordam Law Review,
73, 1875-1940.
Hannah, J.A. (1965). The Voting Rights Act … the First Months.
Washington, DC: The United States Commission on Civil Rights.
Hannah, J.A. (1965). Voting in Mississippi. Washington, DC: The United
States Commission on Civil Rights.
Harvey, A.E. (1994). Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and its Influence on
the Black Vote: The Need for a Second Look. University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, 152, 1145-1184.
Hench, V.E. (1998). The death of voting rights: The Legal
Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 48,
4, 727-798.

179
Hindelang, M.J. (1978). Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal
Crimes. American Sociological Review, 43, 93-109.
Holmes, M.D., Hosch, H.M., Daudistel, H.C., Perez, D.A., & Graves, J.B.
(1996). Ethnicity, Legal Resources, and Felony Dispositions in Two
Southwestern Jurisdictions. Justice Quarterly, 13, 11-30.
Huemann, M., Pinaire, B.K., & Clark, T. (2005). Beyond the Sentence:
Public Perceptions of Collateral Consequences for Felony Offenders. Criminal
Law Bulletin, 41, 1, 24-46.
Hull, E. (2004). Felons Deserve the Right to Vote. USA Today, 132, 2704,
50-53.
Hull, E. (2003). Disenfranchising Ex-Felons: What’s the Point? Social
Policy, 33, 3, 46-52.
Inverarity, J. (1992). Extralegal Influences on Imprisonment: Explaining
the Direct Effects of Socioeconomic Variables. In Liska, A.E. (ed.) Social Threat
and Social Control. (pp. 131-149).
Ispahani, L. (2006). Out of Step with the World: An Analysis of Felony
Disenfranchisement in the U.S. and Other Democracies. Washington, D.C.:
American Civil Liberties Union.
Ispahani, L. & Williams, N. (2004). Purged! How a Patchwork of Flawed
and Inconsistent Voting Systems Could Deprive Millions of American of the Right
to Vote. Washington, D.C.: American Civil Liberties Union.
Jackson, P.I. (1992). Minority Group Threat, Social Context, and Policing.
In Liska, A.E. (ed.) Social Threat and Social Control. (pp. 131-149).
Jones, J. M. (1997). Prejudice and Racism. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Kalogeras, S. (2003). Legislative Changes on Felony Disenfranchisement,
1996-2003. Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project.
Karlen, P.S. (2005). Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation,
and the Debate Over Felon Disenfranchisement. Stanford Public Law and Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, 75, 1-28.
Kautt, P. & Spohn, C. (2002). Cracking Down on Black Drug Offenders?
Testing for Interactions Among Offenders’ Race, Drug Type, and Sentencing
Strategy in Federal Drug Sentences. Justice Quarterly, 19, 2-35.

180
Kennedy, R. (1999). Suspect Policy. The New Republic, September
13/20, 30-35.
Kennedy, R. (1997). Race, Crime, and the Law. New York: Pantheon
Books.
Key, V.O. (1949). Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York:
Vintage Books.
Keyssar, A. (2000). The Right to Vote: The Contested History of
Democracy in the United States. New York: Basic Books.
King, R.S. & Mauer, M. (2004). The Vanishing Black Electorate: Felony
Disenfranchisement in Atlanta, Georgia. The Sentencing Project, Washington,
D.C.
Klarman, M.J. (2004). From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court
and the Struggle for Racial Equality. New York: Oxford.
Kleinig, J., & Murtagh, K. (2005). Disenfranchising Felons. Journal of
Applied Philosophy, 22, 217-239.
Klinger, D. (1994). Demeanor or Crime? Why ‘Hostile’ Citizens are More
Likely to be Arrested. Criminology, 32, 475-493.
Knowles, L. & Prewitt, K. (1969). Institutional Racism in America. New
York: Prentice Hall.
Kousser, J.M. (1974). The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage
Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Kousser, J.M. (1999). Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the
Undoing of the Second Reconstruction. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North
Carolina Press.
Kuzma, S.M. (1998). Civil Disabilities of Convicted Felons. Corrections
Today, 60, 5, 68-70.
Laney, J.P. (2003). The Voting Rights Act of 1965: Historical Background
and Current Issues. New York: Novinka.

181
Lippke, R.L. (2001). The Disenfranchisement of Felons. Law and
Philosophy, 20, 553-580.
Liska, A. E. (1992). Social Threat and Social Control. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Lott, J.R. & Glassman, J.K. (2005). The Felon Vote. The New York Post,
March 1, 2005, retrieved from www.nypost.com, March 13, 2005.
Love, M.C. (2005). Relief from the Collateral Consequences of a Criminal
Conviction: A State-by-State Resource Guide. The Sentencing Project,
Washington, D.C.
Lynch, P.J. (2005). Should N.Y. Felons Vote? No. The New York Daily
News, February 13, 2005, retrieved from www.nydailynews.com, March 13,
2005.
MacDonald, H. (2003). Are Cops Racist? Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.
Maguire, B. (1990). The Police in the 1800s: A Three City Analysis.
Journal of Crime and Justice, 13, 103-132.
Mann, C.R. (1993). Unequal Justice: A Question of Color. Bloomington:
University of Indiana Press.
Manza, J. & Uggen, C. (2006). Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement
and American Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Manza, J. & Uggen, C. (2003). Punishment and Democracy: The
Significance of the Disenfranchisement of Nonincarcerated Felons and ExFelons. Briefing Paper, Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University,
Evanston, IL.
Manza, J., Brooks, C., & Uggen, C. (2002). “Civil Death” or Civil Rights?
Public Attitudes Towards Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States. Institute
for Policy Research, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.
Mark, D. (2002). Felons Voting? Campaigns & Elections, 23, 6, 11-13.
Marks, A. (2003). Fairness and Velons: A Push to Enfranchise Prisoners.
The Christian Science Monitor, September 25, 2003, retrieved from
www.csmonitor.com, March 13, 2005.

182
Marx, K. (1848/1998). The Communist Manifesto: A Modern Edition. New
York: Verso.
Marx, K. (1859/1970). A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.
New York: International.
Marx, K. (1867/1967). Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production.
New York: International.
Marx, K. (1997). Class Conflict and Law. In Jocoby, J.R. (ed.), Classics of
Criminology, 2nd Edition (pp. 89-95).
Massey, D. G. (2001). Residential Segregation and Neighborhood
Conditions in U.S. Metropolitan Areas. In Smelser, N.J., Wilson, W.J. & Mitchell,
F. (Eds.), America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences, Vol. 1,
391–434. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Mauer, M. (2003). Mass imprisonment and the disappearing voters. In
Mauer, M. & Chesney-Lind, M. (eds.), Invisible Punishment: The Collateral
Consequences of Mass Imprisonment (pp. 50-58). New York, NY: The New
Press
Mauer, M. (2004a). Felon Disenfranchisement: A Policy Whose Time has
Passed? Human Rights, 31, 1, 16-17.
Mauer, M. (2004b). Disenfranchising Felons Hurts Entire Communities.
Focus, May/June, 5-6.
Mauer, M. (2002). Disenfranchisement of Felons: The Modern-Day Voting
Rights Challenge. Civil Rights Journal, 6, 1, 40-44.
Mauer, M. (1999). Race to Incarcerate. New York: The New Press.
Mauer, M. & Kansal, T. (2005). Barred for Life: Voting Rights Restoration
in Permanent Disenfranchisement States. The Sentencing Project, Washington,
D.C.
Maxfield, L.D. & Kramer, J.H. (1998). Substantial Assistance: An Empirical
Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current Federal Policy and Practices. United States
Sentencing Commission. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
McCrary, P. (2001). Keeping the Courts Honest: The Role of Historians as
Expert Witness in Southern Voting Rights Cases. In Tyson, M.J. (Ed.), Race,

183
Voting, Redistricting and the Constitution: Sources and Explorations on the
Fifteenth Amendment (pp. 457-484). New York: Routledge.
McCrudden, C. (1982). Institutional Discrimination. Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies, 2, 3, 303-367.
McDonald, M.P. & Popkin, S.L. (2001). The Myth of the Vanishing Voter.
American Political Science Review, 95, 4, 963-974.
McLeod, A., White, I.K., & Gavin, A.R. (2003). The Locked Ballot Box: The
Impact of State Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws on African American Voting
Behavior and Implications for Reform. Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law,
11, 67-94.
McPherson, J.M. (1988). Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Miles, T.J. (2004). Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout. Journal
of Legal Studies, 33, 85-129.
Milkovits, A. (2005). Voting Rights for Felons Approved. Providence
Journal, June 22, 2005, retrieved from www.projo.com, November 24, 2005.
Miller, D. (1979). Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Milovanovic, D. & Russell, K.K. (2001). Petit Apartheid in the U.S. Criminal
Justice System: The Dark Figure of Racism. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic
Press.
Mondesire, J.W. (2001). The New Jim Crow? Felon Disenfranchisement:
The Modern Day Poll Tax. Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review, 10, 435443.
Moran, G. and Cutler, B.L. (1997). Bogus Publicity Items and the
Contingency Between Awareness and Media-Induced Pretrial Prejudice. Law
and Human Behavior, 21, 3, 339-344.
Mousourakis, G. (2003). The Historical and Institutional Context of Roman
Law. Burlington, VT: Ashgate/Dartmouth.
NAACP (2005). Democracy for All: Ending Felon Disenfranchisement.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., New York.

184
Ochs, H.L. (2006). “Colorblind” Policy in Black and White: Racial
Consequences of Disenfranchisement Policy. The Policy Studies Journal, 34, 1,
81-93.
Olzak, S. (1992). The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Parkes, D. (2003). Ballot Boxes Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of
Prisoner Disenfranchisement Laws. Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review,
71, 73-112.
Pashukanis, E.B. (1978). Law and Marxism: A General Theory. London:
Ink Links Ltd.
Petersilia, J. (1983). Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System.
Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
Pettus, K.I. (2002). Felony Disenfranchisement in the Contemporary
United States: An Ancient Practice in a Modern Polity. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Columbia University, New York.
Phillips, P. (1980). Marx and Engels on Law and Laws. Totowa, NJ:
Barnes & Noble Books.
Pinaire, B., Huemann, M., & Bilotta, L. (2003). Barred from the Vote:
Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement of Felons. Fordham Urban Law
Journal, 30, 1519-1550.
Porter, K.H. (1969). A History of Suffrage in the United States. Westport,
CT: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Portugal, C.M. (2003). Democracy Frozen in Devonian Amber: The Racial
Impact of Permanent Felon Disenfranchisement in Florida. University of Miami
Law Review, 57, 1317-1339.
Quinney, R. (1977). Class, State and Crime: On the Theory and Practice
of Criminal Justice. New York: McKay.
Quillian, L. (1996). Group Threat and Regional Change in Attitudes
Toward African Americans. American Journal of Sociology, 102, 816-860.
Rae, D.W. (1967). The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

185
Rapoport, M. (2001). Restoring the Vote. American Prospect, 12, 14, 1314.
Reiman, J. (2005). Liberal and Republican Arguments Against the
Disenfranchisement of Felons. Criminal Justice Ethics, 24, 3-18.
Richey W. (2002). Bans on Ex-con Voting Reviewed. The Christian
Science Monitor, October 1, 2002, retrieved from www.csmonitor.com, March 13,
2005.
Rose, D. & Clear, T. (2002). Incarceration, Reentry and Social Capital:
Social Networks in the Balance. Paper prepared for the "From Prison to Home"
Conference (January 30-31, 2002), John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City
University of New York, New York.
Rosen, R. (2001). Ex-Convicts and Civil Death. Dissent, 48, 2, 44-45.
Roth, S.K. (1998). Disenfranchised by Design: Voting Systems and the
Election Process. Information Design Journal, 9, 1, 1-8.
Russell, K.K. (2001). Toward Developing a Theoretical Paradigm and
Typology for Petit Apartheid. In Milovanovic, D. & Russell, K.K. (eds). Petit
Apartheid in the U.S. Criminal Justice System: The Dark Figure of Racism.
Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
Russell, K. (1998). The Color of Crime: Racial Hoaxes, White Fear, Black
Protectionism, Police Harassment, and Other Macroaggressions. New York: New
York University Press.
Saxonhouse, E. (2004). Unequal Protection: Comparing Former Felons’
Challenges to Disenfranchisement and Employment Discrimination. Stanford
Law Review, 56, 1597-1639.
Schall, J. (2004). The Consistency of Felon Disenfranchisement with
Citizenship Theory. Working paper, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA.
Schlesinger, T. (2005). Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Criminal
Processing. Justice Quarterly, 22, 2, 170-192
Serr, B.J. & Maney, M. (1988). Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance. Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology, 19, 1-65.

186
Shapiro, A.L. (2001). Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering
and the Voting Rights Act. In Tyson, M.J. (Ed.), Race, Voting, Redistricting and
the Constitution: Sources and Explorations on the Fifteenth Amendment (pp.
351-371). New York: Routledge.
Shapiro, A.L. (1997). The Disenfranchised: Prisoners and Ex-Felons.
American Prospect, 35, 60-62.
Shapiro, A.L. (1993a). Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under
the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy. Yale Law Journal, 103, 537-566.
Shapiro, A.L. (1993b). Giving Cons and Ex-Cons the Vote: The
Disenfranchised. The Nation, 257, 21, 767-769.
Simmons, J.E. (2003). Beggars Can’t be Voters: Why Washington’s Felon
Re-enfranchisement Law Violates the Equal Protection Clause. Washington Law
Review, 78, 297-333.
Smedley, A. & Smedley, B.D. (2005). Race as Biology is Fiction, Racism
as a Social Problem is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives on the
Social Construction of Race. American Psychologist, 60, 1, 16-26.
Smith, D.A., Visher, C. & Davidson, L.A. (1984). Equity and Discretionary
Justice: The Influence of Race on Police Arrest Decisions. Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology, 75, 234-249.
Spohn, C. (2000). Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: A Quest for a
Racially Neutral Sentencing Process. Politics, Processes, and Decisions of the
Criminal Justice System, Volume 3, Criminal Justice. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Spohn, C., & DeLone, M. (2000). When Does Race Matter? An Analysis of
the Conditions Under Which Race Affects Sentence Severity. Sociology of
Crime, Law, and Deviance, 2, 3-37.
Spohn, C., Gruhl, J. & Welch, S. (1987). The Impact of the Ethnicity and
Gender of Defendants on the Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges.
Criminology, 25, 175-191.
Steffensmeier, D. & Demuth, S. (2000). Ethnicity and Sentencing
Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts: Who is Punished More Harshly? American
Sociological Review, 65, 705-729.

187
Steffensmeier, D., Ulmer, J., & Kramer, J. (1998). The Interaction of Race,
Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being Young,
Black, and Male. Criminology, 36, 363-397.
Strauss, D.A. (2001). The Myth of Colorblindness. In Tyson, M.J. (Ed.),
Race, Voting, Redistricting and the Constitution: Sources and Explorations on the
Fifteenth Amendment (pp. 391-428). New York: Routledge.
Taormina, R.M. (2003). Defying One-Person, One-Vote: Prisoners and the
“Usual Residence” Principle. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 152, 431,
431-462.
Thompson, N. (2001). Locking up the Vote. Washington Monthly, January,
17-23.
Thompson, M.E. (2002). Don’t do the Crime if you Ever Intend to Vote
Again: Challenging the Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual
Punishment. Seton Hall Law Review, 33, 167-209.
Tonry, Michael (2004). Thinking About Crime. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Tonry, M. (1995). Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in
America. New York: Oxford University Press.
Turk, A.T. (1969). Criminality and Legal Order. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Turner, B.M., Lovell, R.D, Young, J.C., & Denny, W.F. (1986). Race and
Peremptory Challenges During Voir Dire: Do Prosecution and Defense Agree?
Journal of Criminal Justice, 14, 61-69.
Twohey, M. (2001). Once a Felon, Never a Voter? National Journal, 33, 1,
46-50.
Tyler, T.R., Boeckmann, R.J., Smith, H.J., & Huo, Y.J. (1997). Social
Justice in a Dierse Society. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Uggen, C. & Manza, J. (2002). Democratic Contraction? Political
Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States. American
Sociological Review, 67, 6, 777-803.
Uggen, C., Manza, J., Thompson, M., & Wakefield, S. (2002). Impact of
Recent Legal Changes in Felon Voting Rights in Five States. Briefing paper, The
National Symposium on Felony Disenfranchisement, Washington, D.C.

188
U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2
U.S. Constitution, Amendment 13, 1865
U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14, 1868
U.S. Constitution, Amendment 15, 1870
U.S. Constitution, Amendment 19, 1920
U.S. Constitution, Amendment 26, 1971
U.S. Department of Justice. (2004). Prisoners in 2003. Bureau of Justice
Statistics. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Justice. (2003). Uniform Crime Report - 2003. Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Justice. (2001). Felony Defendants in Large Urban
Counties, 1998. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
Verba, S., Scholzman, K.L., & Brady, H.E. (1995). Voice and Equality:
Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Vold, G.B. (1958). Theoretical Criminology. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Vold, G.B. & Bernard, T.J. (1986). Theoretical Criminology. 3rd Edition.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Walker, S. (1993). Taming the System: The Control of Discretion in
Criminal Justice, 1950-1990. New York: Oxford University Press.
Walker, S., Spohn, C., & DeLone, M. (2004). The Color of Justice: Race,
Ethnicity and Crime in America. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Weedon, J.R. (2004). Voting Rights Restored. Corrections Today, 66, 6,
16-17.
Weitzer, R. (1996). Racial Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System:
Findings and Problems in the Literature. Journal of Criminal Justice, 24, 313.

189
Western, B. (2002). The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and
Inequality. American Sociological Review, 67, 526-546.
Western, B. & Pettit, B. (2000). Incarceration and Racial Inequality in
Men’s Employment. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 54, 3-16.
Wilbanks, W. (1987). The Myth of a Racist Criminal Justice System.
Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Will, G.F. (2005). Give Ballots to Felons? MSNBC, March 13, 2005,
retrieved from www.MSNBC.com, April 10, 2005.
Wolfinger, R.E. & Rosenstone, S.J. (1980). Who Votes? New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Zatz, M.S. (1987). The Changing Form of Racial/Ethnic Biases in
Sentencing. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 25, 69-92.
Zelden, C.L. (2002). Voting Rights on Trial. Santa Barbara, CA: ABCCLIO.

190

Appendices

191

Appendix 1 – Legislation Referenced
(All state laws, constitutions, and executive orders obtained online from http://www.lexis.com)

Alabama Constitution, Amendment 579
Alabama Code § 15-22-36.1
Alabama Code § 36-18-25(f)
Alaska Statute § 15.05.030
Alaska Statute § 15.60.010
Arizona Revised Statute §§ 13-904 through 13-906, 13-912
Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 51, § 11(a)(4)
California Constitution, Article II, § 4
California Election Code § 2101
Colorado Constitution, Article 7, § 10
Colorado Revised Statute, § 1-2-103
Connecticut General Statute Annotated § 9-46a
Delaware Constitution, Article V, § 2
Delaware Constitution, Article VII, § 2
Delaware Code Annotated, Title 15, § 1701
District of Columbia Code § 1-1001.02(7)
District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, Title 3, § 500.3
Florida Constitution, Article VI, § 4
Florida Statute § 97.041(2)(b)
Florida Statute, Chapter 944.292(a)
Georgia Constitution, Article II, § 1 paragraph III(a)
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Georgia Code Annotated § 21-2-216(b)
Hawaii Revised Statute § 831-2(a)(1)
Idaho Code § 18-310
Illinois Constitution, Article III, § 2
730 Illinois Complete Statute 5/5-5-5
Indiana Constitution, Article 2, § 8
Indiana Code Annotated § 3-7-13-5
Iowa Constitution, Article II, § 5
Iowa Code, Chapter 914
Iowa Code, Title XVI, § 701.7
Iowa Code § 48A.6(1)
Iowa Executive Order Number 42, July 24, 2005
Kansas Statute Annotated § 21-4615
Kansas Statute Annotated § 22-3722
Kentucky Constitution §§ 77, 145 and 150
Kentucky Revised Statute Annotated, § 196.045
Louisiana Constitution, Article I, § 10 and § 20
Louisiana Revised Statute Annotated § 18:102
Maryland Annotated Code, Election Law, § 1-101
Maryland Annotated Code, Election Law, § 3-102
Maryland Constitution, Article I, § 4
Massachusetts Constitution, Article III
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Massachusetts Annotated Laws, Chapter 51, § 1
Michigan Constitution, Article 2, § 2
Michigan Complete Laws Annotated § 168.758b
Minnesota Constitution, Article VII, § 1
Minnesota Statute § 201.014 and § 609.165
Mississippi Constitution, Article 5, § 124
Mississippi Constitution, Article 12, § 241 and § 253
Mississippi Code Annotated § 23-15-11
Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-19-37
Missouri Revised Statute § 115.133
Montana Constitution, Article IV, § 2
Montana Code Annotated § 13-1-111
Nebraska Revised Statute §§ 29-112, 29-2264, and 32-313
Nevada Constitution, Article 2, § 1
Nevada Revised Statute §§ 176A.850, 179.245, 213.020, 213.090, 213.155,
213.157
New Hampshire Revised Statute Annotated § 607-A:2
New Jersey Statute Annotated § 2C:51-3 and § 19:4-1
New Mexico Constitution, Article VII, §§ 1, 2
New Mexico Statute Annotated § 1-4-27.1 and § 31-13-1
New York Election Law § 5-106
North Carolina Constitution, Article VI, § 2
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North Carolina General Statute § 163-55 and § 13-1
North Dakota Central Code § 12.1-33-01
Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 2961.01
Oklahoma Statute Annotated, Title 26, § 4-101
Oregon Revised Statute § 137.275 and § 137.281
Pennsylvania Attorney General Opinion 186 (number 47), 1974
25 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statute Annotated § 1301
Rhode Island Constitution, Article 2, § 1
Rhode Island State Bill 458, 2005-2006 Legislative Session, R.I., 2005
Rules of Executive Clemency of Florida
South Carolina Code Annotated § 7-5-120
South Dakota Codified Laws §§ 12-4-18, 23A-27-35, 24-5-2 and 24-15A-7
Tennessee Constitution, Article 1, § 5
Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-20-112, §40-29-101 through § 40-29-105
Texas Constitution, Article 6, § 1
Texas Election Code Annotated § 11.002 and § 13.001
Utah Code Annotated § 20A-2-101 and § 20A-2-101.5
Virginia Constitution, Article II, § 1 and Article V, § 12
Virginia Code Annotated §§ 8.01-338, 24.2-101, 53.1-231.1, 53.1-231.2, 53.1136
Washington Constitution, Article 6, § 3
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Washington Revised Code §§ 9.94A.030, 9.94A.637, 9.94A.885, 9.96.010,
9.96.020, 10.73.160, 29A.04.079
West Virginia Constitution, Article IV, § 1
West Virginia Code § 3-1-3 and § 3-2-2
51 West Virginia Attorney General Opinion 182 (1965)
Wisconsin Statute § 6.03 and § 304.078
Wyoming Constitution, Article 4, § 5
Wyoming Statute §§ 6-10-106, 7-13-105, 7-13-803 through 7-13-806, 22-3-102
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(All cases obtained online from http://www.lexis.com)

Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (1988)
Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Circuit, 2003)
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)
State v. Collins, 124 P.903 (WA, 1912)
Taylor v. State Election Board, 616 N.E. 2d 380
United States v. Loucks, 149 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Circuit, 1998)
Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (1884)
Webb v. County Court of Raleigh County, 168 S.E. 760 (WV, 1933)
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898)
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Appendix 3 – Data Used to Calculate African American
Arrest and Incarceration Rates for 2004
State

African American
Population

# African American
Arrests

# African American
Incarcerations

Alabama

1155930

13469

12630

Alaska

21787

2236

1022

Arizona

158873

8363

6311

Arkansas

418950

7752

5828

California

2263882

63850

33872

Colorado

165063

6043

3010

Connecticut

309843

6813

3847

Delaware

150666

3431

1755

D.C.

343312

30259

1

Florida

2335505

65652

28768

Georgia

2349542

21914

30535

Hawaii

22003

5022

2714

Idaho

5456

338

233

Illinois

1876875

27047

32166

Indiana

510034

11773

7904

Iowa

61853

3606

1756

Kansas

154198

2663

2204

Kentucky

295994

3654

5658

Louisiana

1451944

21983

20423
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Appendix 3 – Data Used to Calculate African American
Arrest and Incarceration Rates for 2004 (Continued)
State

African American
Population

# African American
Arrests

# African American
Incarcerations

Maine

6760

333

77

Maryland

1477411

28294

12023

Massachusetts

343454

3559

2794

Michigan

1412742

20059

21169

Minnesota

171731

7504

2607

Mississippi

1033809

9375

11806

Missouri

629391

20426

12925

Montana

2692

2

2

Nebraska

68541

2950

993

Nevada

135477

6522

2558

New
Hampshire

9035

179

136

New Jersey

1141821

19376

10518

New Mexico

34343

1665

928

New York

3014385

22203

21443

North Carolina

1737545

30402

13523

North Dakota

3916

641

340

Ohio

1301307

15203

15554

Oklahoma

260968

7580

8523
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Appendix 3 – Data Used to Calculate African American
Arrest and Incarceration Rates for 2004 (Continued)
State

African American
Population

# African American
Arrests

# African American
Incarcerations

Oregon

55662

4991

1745

Pennsylvania

1224612

29082

14983

Rhode Island

46908

1265

409

South Carolina

1185216

19654

11475

South Dakota

4685

1005

1238

Tennessee

932809

17882

9216

Texas

2404566

43381

37533

Utah

17657

1697

491

Vermont

3063

98

134

Virginia

1390293

17232

15714

Washington

190267

8698

2947

West Virginia

57232

762

543

Wisconsin

304460

8110

4827

Wyoming

3722

277

173

1
2

The District of Columbia does not operate a prison and therefore does not have incarceration
statistics
No data was available for Montana for the year 2004
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Appendix 4 – Summary of State Disenfranchisement Laws
Alabama
Alabama Constitution, amendment 579, which amends Article VIII of the
1901 Constitution of Alabama states, “No person convicted of a felony involving
moral turpitude … shall be qualified to vote” (AL Constitution, Amend 579, (b)).
The Alabama Supreme Court has identified crimes that are not disqualifiers, such
as assault, felony drug possession, and felony DUI offenses. Additionally,
several crimes, such as murder, rape, robbery, drug possession for resale, and
bigamy have been identified as crimes that would disenfranchise under Alabama
law. There is however, no actual comprehensive list of the felonies that
disenfranchise an individual. The disenfranchisement becomes effective once an
individual is convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude.
The State of Alabama disenfranchises those convicted of felonies for life.
There is no difference in length of disenfranchisement based on type of crime.
However, Alabama Code § 15-22-36.1 states that a disenfranchised individual
may apply to the Board of Pardons and Parole for a certificate, which would
reinstate voting rights to some ex-felons. This reinstatement is authorized to
those who have completed their entire sentence (includes parole), paid all fines
associated with the crime and court proceedings, and are free of any pending
felony charges. While this reinstatement includes most crimes, it excludes other
serious crimes such as murder, rape, and sodomy (Alabama Code § 15-22-36.1).
If an individual is convicted of a serious violent offense or of a sexual offense,
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they must seek a pardon from the Board of Pardons and Parole and meet all
other aforementioned requirements (Alabama Code § 15-22-36.1). As an
additional requirement to attain a pardon for a serious violent offense and/or a
sexual offense the offender must submit a DNA sample to the Alabama DNA
database (Alabama Code § 36-18-25(f)).
Despite Alabama’s lifetime disenfranchisement, voting rights restoration is
attainable. The State of Alabama updated the restoration process in 2003 in an
attempt to expedite the restoration of voting rights. With the updating, the
process currently takes approximately one year for those individuals eligible to
apply.
Alaska
Alaska Statute § 15.05.030 states that an individual is disenfranchised
upon conviction of a “felony involving moral turpitude.” These felonies are
considered, by state law, as “those crimes that are immoral or wrong in
themselves” (Alaska Statute § 15.60.010(7)). While there is not a list of nondisqualifying felonies, the list of those felonies involving moral turpitude is quite
extensive. These crimes include murder, sexual assault, promoting prostitution,
bribery, promoting gambling, criminal mischief, drug offenses, and theft, among
others (Alaska Statute § 15.60.010(7)).
The disenfranchisement period extends from the time of conviction until
the sentence is complete. The completion of the sentence requires the
“unconditional discharge” of those who have been convicted of a felony offense
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under Alaskan law (Alaska Statute § 15.60.010(34)). Essentially, once a person
has served their entire sentence, including any period of parole or probation, they
are automatically eligible to vote. There is no additional documentation
necessary to register to vote for those who have received an unconditional
discharge.
Arizona
Under Arizona law, a felony conviction results in the suspension of the
right to vote (Arizona Revised Statute § 13-904). For first time felony offenders,
the disenfranchisement period begins upon conviction of a felony and ends upon
an unconditional discharge of probation, imprisonment, parole, and the payment
of any fines and/or related court costs (Arizona Revised Statute § 13-904, 13912). Much like the Alaskan statute, once an individual has completed their
entire sentence, their voting rights are automatically restored.
A secondary felony conviction results in lifetime disenfranchisement.
Much like other lifetime disenfranchisement states, however, Arizona does have
a process for restoration. A second felony conviction requires the offender to
apply for the restoration of voting rights. The application for restoration depends
upon the sentence. That is, a person sentenced to probation for a second felony
offense, may apply, to the discharging judge, immediately upon the discharge of
the probation sentence (Arizona Revised Statute § 13-905). An individual
sentenced to a prison term for a second offense, must wait for a period of two
years after an unconditional discharge before applying for restoration of voting
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rights (Arizona Revised Statute § 13-906). The application for those imprisoned
for a second felony, must be accompanied by a “certificate of absolute discharge”
from the Arizona Department of Corrections (Arizona Revised Statute § 13-906).
Although it is not clear in state law, the restoration of voting rights appears to be
based upon judicial discretion. There is no clear state law mandating restoration
of voting rights upon the completion of a sentence for a second felony offense.
Arkansas
Arkansas has one of the clearest state laws regarding disenfranchisement
and restoration. Simply, once convicted of a felony offense, offenders are not
eligible to vote until they complete their sentence. Upon completion of any
sentence for a felony conviction, whether probation, imprisonment, or parole, an
offender’s voting rights are automatically restored (Arkansas Constitution,
Amendment 51, § 11(a)(4)).
California
Similar to the disenfranchisement law in Arkansas, California’s
disenfranchisement statute is straightforward. Under California law, an individual
may not vote while in “prison or on parole for the conviction of a felony offense”
(California Constitution, Article II, § 4; California Election Code § 2101).
Disenfranchisement occurs from the time the offender enters prison until they are
released from prison and/or any period of parole (California Constitution, Article
II, § 4; California Election Code § 2101). Therefore, a person convicted of a
felony, but not sentenced to prison does not lose their right to vote.
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Colorado
Unlike the other states discussed herein, Colorado disenfranchisement
law also prevents incarcerated misdemeanor offenders from voting. According to
Colorado law, any individual confined in either a prison or jail is prevented from
voting (Colorado Constitution, Article 7, § 10; Colorado Revised Statute, § 1-2103). Additionally, someone who is on parole, is considered to be under some
form of state confinement and is, therefore, not authorized to vote (Colorado
Constitution, Article 7, § 10; Colorado Revised Statute, § 1-2-103). However, an
individual sentenced to probation, and not any other sentence, is eligible to vote.
The determining factor in Colorado law, is “detention or confinement” other than
probation (Colorado Constitution, Article 7, § 10; Colorado Revised Statute, § 12-103). The disenfranchisement due to detention, however, does not include
pretrial detention. Individuals held in custody awaiting trial, who have not been
convicted are eligible to vote by mail (Colorado Revised Statute, § 1-2-103).
Restoration of voting rights is automatic upon release from state custody. Once
a person has exited prison or has been released from parole they may register to
vote (Colorado Constitution, Article 7, § 10; Colorado Revised Statute, § 1-2103).
Connecticut
Connecticut law disenfranchises felony offenders for the period of
confinement and any period of parole (Connecticut General Statute, § 9-46(a)).
Under Connecticut law the confinement for a felony, includes prison
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incarceration, confinement in a community residence, and any period of parole
(Connecticut General Statute, § 9-46(a)).
The restoration of voting rights in Connecticut is not automatic. In order to
have voting rights reinstated, former offenders must have served out their entire
sentence (including parole), must pay all fines associated with the criminal case,
and must submit written documentation to the registrar of voters that all
requirements have been met (Connecticut General Statute, § 9-46(a)). The
written documentation requirement consists of a document from the
Commissioner of Correction certifying that the offender has been discharged
from a period of confinement and/or parole (Connecticut General Statute, § 946(a)). There is no additional requirement. Restoration is granted if all proper
documentation is provided to the registrar.
Delaware
Delaware law states that an individual convicted of a felony offense forfeits
the right to vote (Delaware Constitution, Article V, § 2). Disenfranchisement in
Delaware begins at conviction. The voting prohibition is permanent for some
offenses, such as murder, sexual offenses, and certain public corruption charges
(Delaware Constitution, Article V, § 2). In addition to the felony offenses listed
above, misdemeanors involving election law also result in disenfranchisement,
but disenfranchisement is limited to ten years after the completion of a sentence
(Delaware Code Annotated, Title 15, § 1701). For all other felony offenses, the
restoration of voting rights is possible upon completion of the sentence and a
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five-year waiting period (Delaware Code Annotated, Title 15, § 1701). Much like
the other states mentioned, Delaware considers a sentence to be incarceration,
probation, and any period of parole. The completion of a sentence also requires
full payment of all related fines.
While the time requirement for the voting restoration process varies
depending on the nature of the offense, the process, for all non-permanent
offenses, is the same. An offender, after completing the sentence, paying all
related fines, and waiting the mandatory time period (either five or ten years),
may apply to the local election board for restoration. Once an application is
made and the board establishes eligibility, voting rights are restored to the exoffender (Delaware Constitution, Article V, § 2; Delaware Code Annotated, Title
15, § 1701). For those convicted of a permanent offense (murder, sexual
offenses, and public corruption) disenfranchisement is for life, unless granted a
pardon by the Governor (Delaware Constitution, Article V, § 2). Each request for
pardon is reviewed by the Board of Pardons and then sent to the Governor for
final decision (Delaware Constitution, Article VII, § 2).
District of Columbia
The District of Columbia’s disenfranchisement statute requires the
suspension of voting rights for the period of incarceration only (District of
Columbia Code § 1-1001.02(7); District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, Title
3, § 500.3). Once released from incarceration for commission of a felony
offense, voting rights are automatically restored to the offender (District of
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Columbia Code § 1-1001.02(7); District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, Title
3, § 500.3).
Florida
Florida is a permanent disenfranchisement state. In fact, Florida’s state
law is one of the strictest in terms of both disenfranchisement, as well as
restoration, in the country. All persons who have been convicted of a felony
offense, forfeit all civil rights, unless granted a pardon or restoration of those civil
rights by the Governor (Florida Constitution, Article VI, § 4; Florida Statute
97.041(2)(b); Florida Statute, Chapter 944.292(a)). Disenfranchisement
becomes effective upon conviction and is not tied to any specific felony, but
rather all felony offenses.
Like other states with permanent disenfranchisement legislation, Florida
does have a restoration process. There are two methods that may be used to
reestablish voting rights. First, upon completion of a sentence, including the
payment of all fines associated with the crime, an individual may seek the
restoration of rights, which restores some civil rights, including the right to vote
(Rules of Executive Clemency of Florida). Second, an individual, ten years after
the completion of their sentence and payment of all associated fines, may apply
for a pardon (Rules of Executive Clemency of Florida). Regardless of which
method is used the Governor, assisted by the Clemency Board, makes the final
determination (Rules of Executive Clemency of Florida).
The process for attaining either restoration of rights or a pardon is
essentially the same. Upon completion of the sentence, the Florida Department
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of Corrections sends the name of the former offender to the Parole Commission
to determine whether or not a hearing for restoration is necessary (Rules of
Executive Clemency of Florida). If a hearing is necessary, the Clemency Board
may request to hear evidence of rehabilitation and whether or not the former
offender has met all the requirements for restoration of rights (Rules of Executive
Clemency of Florida). The former offender is allowed to speak at the hearing, but
is limited to five minutes and may be questioned, by the board, on matters
related to the individual’s character, among other items (Rules of Executive
Clemency of Florida). Once a hearing is complete, or if a hearing is not deemed
necessary, the Clemency Board determines whether or not to grant the
restoration of rights or an outright pardon.
Georgia
The right to vote in the state of Georgia may be removed for the conviction
of any felony offense “involving moral turpitude” (Georgia Constitution, Article II,
§ 1 paragraph III(a); Georgia Code Annotated § 21-2-216(b)). Georgia state law
and the Georgia Constitution unfortunately have a problem similar to other state
laws in this area, the concept of “moral turpitude” is not clearly defined. In other
words, while a felony offense involving moral turpitude will result in
disenfranchisement, it is not clear what that crime might be.
Georgia law disenfranchises felony offenders for the period of
confinement, probation, and any period of parole (Georgia Constitution, Article II,
§ 1 paragraph III(a); Georgia Code Annotated § 21-2-216(b)). The period of
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disenfranchisement ends automatically and voting rights are restored upon the
completion of the sentence (Georgia Constitution, Article II, § 1 paragraph III(a)).
This completion includes the payment of any fines associated with the crime
(Georgia Constitution, Article II, § 1 paragraph III(a)).
Hawaii
Hawaii suspends the voting rights of those convicted of a felony offense
from the time the sentence begins, rather than from the time of conviction
(Hawaii Revised Statute § 831-2(a)(1)). This distinction allows those individuals
convicted of a felony, but not sentenced, to vote in elections. Additionally, once
an offender is released from prison and placed on parole and/or they are given
probation in lieu of a prison sentence the offender is authorized to vote. Once
the period of incarceration has been completed, voting rights are automatically
restored (Hawaii Revised Statute § 831-2(a)(1)).
Idaho
A conviction of a felony offense in the state of Idaho results in a period of
disenfranchisement from time of conviction to time of “final discharge” (Idaho
Code § 18-310). According to state law, final discharge means that the offender
is no longer incarcerated, no longer on parole, or probation, and that all fines
related to the offense have been paid (Idaho Code § 18-310). Additionally, once
final discharge has been reached, voting rights are automatically restored.
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Illinois
An individual convicted of a felony offense is prohibited from voting in the
state of Illinois for only the period of incarceration (Illinois Constitution, Article III,
§ 2; 730 Illinois Complete Statute 5/5-5-5). Under Illinois law, misdemeanor
offenders are also, if incarcerated to a prison term, impacted by
disenfranchisement for any period of incarceration (Illinois Constitution, Article III,
§ 2; 730 Illinois Complete Statute 5/5-5-5). The restoration of the right to vote is
automatic upon release from confinement, thereby allowing those offenders on
parole and/or probation to vote in elections (Illinois Constitution, Article III, § 2;
730 Illinois Complete Statute 5/5-5-5).
Indiana
Under the Indiana Constitution, any person convicted of an “infamous
crime” is deemed ineligible to vote (Indiana Constitution, Article 2, § 8). An
“infamous crime” has, for the purpose of the Indiana Code, been defined by state
case law as a felony offense (Taylor v. State Election Board, 616 N.E. 2d 380;
Indiana Code § 3-7-13-5(a)). Disenfranchisement is for the time of incarceration
and any time period where the offender is “subject to lawful detention” (Indiana
Code § 3-7-13-5(a)(2)). Although not clearly defined, it appears evident, from
state law, that the phrase “subject to lawful detention” means any period of
incarceration, probation, and parole (Indiana Code § 3-7-13-5). Voting rights are
restored automatically upon completion of the sentence (Indiana Constitution,
Article 2, § 8; Indiana Code § 3-7-13-5).
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Iowa
Article II, § 5 of the Iowa Constitution states that any individual convicted
of an “infamous crime” is ineligible to vote. For the purposes of this section,
“infamous crime” has been defined in state law as any felony offense (Iowa
Constitution, Article II, § 5). Further, conviction of an aggravated misdemeanor
also results in disenfranchisement (Iowa Constitution, Article II, § 5; Iowa Code §
48A.6). Although, not clearly defined, an aggravated misdemeanor appears to
be one that involves serious bodily injury to the victim, where if the crime did not
involve serious bodily injury, it would be considered a misdemeanor (Iowa Code,
Title XVI). Crimes such as domestic violence and driving under the influence fall
under this category (Iowa Code, Title XVI). The time period of
disenfranchisement begins upon conviction and, unless granted restoration of
civil rights or a pardon from the Governor, continues through the lifetime of the
offender (Iowa Constitution, Article II, § 5; Iowa Code § 48A.6).
While there has been no other means of retaining voting rights other than
through restoration or Gubernatorial pardon, a recent decision by the Iowa
Governor has resulted in automatic restoration of voting rights (Executive Order
Number 42, July 24, 2005). Utilizing authority granted him under Iowa Code,
Chapter 914, the Governor restored “citizenship rights” for all individuals who
have completed their sentence (Executive Order Number 42, July 24, 2005).
The completion of sentence includes imprisonment, probation, parole, or any
version of supervised release (Executive Order Number 42, July 24, 2005). The
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Governor stated that one reason for granting such an order was due to evidence
indicating that the “disenfranchisement of offenders has a disproportionate racial
impact” which has resulted in “diminishing the representation of minority
populations” (Executive Order Number 42, July 24, 2005). This Executive Order
is currently in effect and will remain so, until otherwise overturned by a future
Governor or by the courts. There is a challenge to this order, made by the
District Attorney of Muscatine County, currently working its way through the Iowa
Courts.
Kansas
In the state of Kansas, a person who commits a felony offense is ineligible
to vote (Kansas Statute Annotated § 21-4615). The disenfranchisement period
begins upon conviction and continues until the completion of the “authorized
sentence” (Kansas Statute Annotated § 21-4615). The authorized sentence
includes, confinement in prison, probation, parole, and any other sentence
placed upon an offender by the court (Kansas Statute Annotated § 21-4615).
Once the authorized sentence has been completed, voting rights are
automatically restored with the issuance of a certificate of discharge, issued by
the parole board (Kansas Statute Annotated § 21-4615, § 22-3722).
Kentucky
The Constitution of the state of Kentucky states that any person convicted
of a felony offense, or of “bribery in an election, or of such high misdemeanor as
the General Assembly may declare” is unauthorized to vote (Kentucky
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Constitution, § 145). This period of disenfranchisement is permanent upon
conviction of one of the aforementioned offenses (Kentucky Constitution, § 145).
Additionally, any individual who, although not convicted, is being held “in
confinement under the judgment of a court for some penal offense” during an
election may not vote in that election (Kentucky Constitution, § 145). This
provision of the state constitution appears to include all persons being held in jail
or prison awaiting trial. Therefore, those unable to post bail, or not provided bail,
would be disenfranchised for that election.
Although Kentucky does disenfranchise for life, the Governor may issue a
full or partial pardon, either of which would result in the reinstatement of voting
rights (Kentucky Constitution, § 77, § 150). In order to receive a pardon, a
former offender, after completion of the entire sentence, including any fines, must
appeal to the parole board and submit three letters of reference (Kentucky
Revised Statute Annotated, § 196.045). The parole board determines whether or
not the former offender is eligible and then forwards the request to the Governor
(Kentucky Revised Statute Annotated, § 196.045).
Louisiana
Louisiana disenfranchises those individuals who have been convicted of a
felony offense only for the period of incarceration (Louisiana Constitution, Article
I, § 10; Louisiana Revised Statute Annotated § 18:102). Once an offender is
released from custody their “basic rights,” including the right to vote are
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automatically restored with no further action required (Louisiana Constitution,
Article I, § 10).
Maryland
Maryland’s felony disenfranchisement statute is one of the most complex
in the country. Under Maryland law, anyone convicted of an “infamous of other
serious crime” is disenfranchised (Maryland Constitution, Article I, § 4). Maryland
law defines an infamous crime as “any felony, treason, perjury, or any crime
involving an element of deceit, fraud, or corruption” (Maryland Annotated Code,
Election Law, § 1-101). According to the definition, all felony offenses, and some
misdemeanors, such as perjury, theft, and prostitution are considered infamous
crimes (Maryland Annotated Code, Election Law, § 1-101).
The period of disenfranchisement depends upon the type of crime,
whether it is a first or subsequent offense, and whether or not the entire sentence
has been completed (Maryland Annotated Code, Election Law, § 3-102).
“Completion of the sentence” means, completion of any time on probation or
parole and the payment of any fines associated with the crime (Maryland
Annotated Code, Election Law, § 3-102). For a first time offender, the right to
vote is restored automatically upon the completion of the sentence (Maryland
Annotated Code, Election Law, § 3-102). In the case of a subsequent conviction
of an infamous crime, the offender must complete the sentence, as described
above, and wait for three years before being eligible to vote (Maryland Annotated
Code, Election Law, § 3-102). Once the sentence is complete, and the three-
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year time period has expired, voting rights are restored automatically (Maryland
Annotated Code, Election Law, § 3-102). Those offenders who are convicted of
two or more violent crimes are permanently disenfranchised unless they receive
a pardon from the Governor (Maryland Annotated Code, Election Law, § 3-102).
Additionally, individuals “convicted of buying or selling votes” or of bribery or
attempted bribery are also disenfranchised for life unless pardoned (Maryland
Constitution, Article I, § 6 and Article III, § 50; Maryland Annotated Code,
Election Law, § 3-102).
Eligibility for a pardon depends on the type of crime and the time since
completion of the sentence. To receive a pardon, a felony offender, must not
have committed a crime for ten years, whereas a misdemeanor offender must
have five years free of crime (Maryland Regulations Code, Title 12, § 08.01.16).
For those requesting a pardon who have been convicted of a violent crime or of a
crime involving drugs the waiting period is twenty years (Maryland Regulations
Code, Title 12, § 08.01.16). Once the time period has been met, the former
offender may appeal to the Maryland Parole Commission, who determines
eligibility and forwards the pardon request to the Governor for final decision
(Maryland Regulations Code, Title 12, § 08.01.16).
Massachusetts
Under Massachusetts law an individual convicted of a felony offense is
disenfranchised only for the period of incarceration (Massachusetts Constitution,
Article III; Massachusetts Annotated Law, Chapter 51, § 1). Once an individual is
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released from incarceration voting rights are automatically restored with no
further documentation (Massachusetts Annotated Law, Chapter 51, § 1).
Michigan
Michigan law states that any individual who has been convicted of a crime
“for which the penalty imposed is confinement in jail or prison” is disenfranchised
only for that period of confinement (Michigan Constitution, Article 2, § 2A;
Michigan Complete Laws § 168.758b). As confinement in jail is a disqualification
for voting, those persons convicted of misdemeanors are also disenfranchised
until their release from custody (Michigan Constitution, Article 2, § 2A; Michigan
Complete Laws § 168.758b). Upon release from jail or prison, voting rights are
restored automatically.
Minnesota
The right to vote in Minnesota is removed from those individuals convicted
of “treason or felony” (Minnesota Constitution, Article VII, § 1; Minnesota Statute
§ 201.014). The disenfranchisement period lasts until the conviction has been
discharged, which includes the completion of incarceration, probation, parole,
and any fines associated with the court case (Minnesota Statute § 609.165).
Upon discharge of the sentence all civil rights are automatically restored without
any further action necessary (Minnesota Statute § 609.165).
Mississippi
The Mississippi Constitution lists all the crimes for which an individual will
be disenfranchised (Article 12, § 241). The crimes of murder, rape, bribery, theft,
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arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretense, perjury, forgery,
embezzlement, and bigamy are the only crimes listed as disqualifying in the state
constitution (Mississippi Constitution, Article 12, § 241). However, since the
court decision in Cotton v. Fordice, which stated that the state constitution was to
be narrowly read, the Attorney General of Mississippi has expanded upon the list
of theft-related crimes that are disqualifying while simultaneously limited such
thefts to felony cases only. The disenfranchisement period for a conviction of
any of the aforementioned crimes is for the lifetime of the offender (Mississippi
Constitution, Article 12, § 241; Mississippi Code Annotated § 23-15-11).
The only method for regaining the right to vote is by Gubernatorial pardon
or by a two-thirds vote of the Mississippi legislature (Mississippi Constitution,
Article 12, § 253; Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-19-37). In order to receive a
pardon, the former offender must wait a period of seven years after the
completion of their sentence (Mississippi Constitution, Article 12, § 253). Once
the seven years have passed, the offender must place a notice of the pardon
request, along with a statement of why the pardon should be given, in the
newspaper of the county where the conviction took place (Mississippi
Constitution, Article 5, § 124). This requirement must be completed at least thirty
days prior to making a formal pardon request of the Governor (Mississippi
Constitution, Article 5, § 124). Once those requirements are met the formal
pardon is sent to the Governor, via the Parole Board, for investigation and final
decision (Mississippi Constitution, Article 5, § 124).
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Missouri
An individual convicted of any felony in the state of Missouri is
disenfranchised for the period of incarceration, probation, and parole (Missouri
Revised Statute § 155.133). Once the sentence is complete, however, voting
rights are restored to the former offender automatically (Missouri Revised Statute
§ 155.133).
Montana
Offenders incarcerated in a Montana prison for a felony offense are not
allowed to vote (Montana Constitution, Article IV, § 2; Montana Code Annotated
§ 13-1-111). The period of disenfranchisement for a felony conviction is only for
the time the offender is actually incarcerated; once released from prison all voting
rights are automatically restored with no further requirements (Montana
Constitution, Article IV, § 2; Montana Code Annotated § 13-1-111).
Nebraska
The state of Nebraska mandates that all persons convicted of a felony
offense forfeit their right to vote upon conviction (Nebraska Revised Statute § 29112 and § 32-313). The disenfranchisement period last for the time of
incarceration, probation, parole, and for a two-year time period after final
discharge of incarceration, probation, or parole (Nebraska Revised Statute § 29112 and § 29-2264). Once the two-year waiting period has passed no further
action is necessary.
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Nevada
An individual who has been convicted of “treason or felony in any state” is
not authorized to vote in the state of Nevada (Nevada Constitution, Article 2, § 1).
The time period of the disenfranchisement depends on the conviction. For first
time non-violent felony offenders, the disenfranchisement period begins upon
conviction and ends upon the completion of the sentence, whether the sentence
is incarceration, probation, or parole (Nevada Revised Statute § 176A.850, §
213.155, and § 213.157). The completion of the sentence normally includes all
payments of fines associated with the criminal offense; however, this requirement
may be waived if the former offender is indigent (Nevada Revised Statute §
176A.850, § 213.155, and § 213.157).
For offenders who have been convicted of a violent felony or have been
convicted of more than one felony offense, disenfranchisement is permanent
(Nevada Revised Statute § 213.090). In cases of permanent
disenfranchisement, a former offender may either appeal to the Board of Pardons
Commissioners for a pardon or may seek restoration of their civil rights by filing
an appeal with the court in which they were convicted (Nevada Revised Statute §
213.090). To seek a pardon the former offender must notify, in writing, at least
30 days in advance, the county attorney, the convicting court, and the
department of corrections (Nevada Revised Statute § 213.020). Once this thirtyday period has passed, the former offender sends the request for pardon to the
Board of Pardons Commissioners, who investigates and makes the final
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determination regarding pardon (Nevada Revised Statute § 213.020). In order to
seek restoration of civil rights from the court of conviction, the former offender
must petition the court, requesting the sealing of all records pertaining to the
conviction (Nevada Revised Statute § 213.090 and § 179.245). Although not
specified in state law, regardless of which method a former offender chooses,
pardon or restoration, a significant time period must have passed for either
method to be considered (Nevada Revised Statute § 213.020, § 213.090 and §
179.245).
New Hampshire
Under New Hampshire law an individual convicted of a felony offense is
disenfranchised only for the period of incarceration (New Hampshire Revised
Statute Annotated § 607-A:2). Once an individual is released from incarceration
voting rights are automatically restored with no further documentation (New
Hampshire Revised Statute Annotated § 607-A:2).
New Jersey
A conviction of a felony offense in the state of New Jersey results in a
period of disenfranchisement from time of conviction to time of sentence
completion (New Jersey Statute Annotated § 2C:51-3 and § 19:4-1). Sentence
completion means that the offender is no longer incarcerated, on parole, or on
probation (New Jersey Statute Annotated § 2C:51-3 and § 19:4-1). Additionally,
once the sentence has been completed, voting rights are automatically restored.
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New Mexico
An individual convicted of “a felonious or infamous crime” in the state of
New Mexico is disenfranchised (New Mexico Constitution, Article VII, § 1). More
clearly defined, a disenfranchising crime is one that is considered a felony
offense under state law (New Mexico Statute Annotated § 1-4-27.1 and § 31-131). The period of disenfranchisement begins upon conviction of a felony offense
and ends upon completion of the sentence (New Mexico Statute Annotated § 3113-1). To complete the sentence the former offender must have been released
from prison, completed any period of parole, not be on probation, and must have
paid all fines associated with the offense (New Mexico Statute Annotated § 3113-1). Once the sentence is complete, restoration of voting rights is automatic
with no further action necessary (New Mexico Statute Annotated § 31-13-1).
New York
Any person convicted of a felony offense and is sentenced to
imprisonment is ineligible to vote in the state of New York (New York Election
Law § 5-106). Under this provision, even if an individual is convicted of a felony,
they are still eligible to vote as long as they are not imprisoned (New York
Election Law § 5-106). Voting rights are automatically restored to those
offenders who have either completed the “maximum sentence of imprisonment”
or has been released from any period of parole, whichever is longer (New York
Election Law § 5-106).
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North Carolina
Conviction of a felony offence, in the state of North Carolina, results in
disenfranchisement from the time of conviction (North Carolina Constitution,
Article VI, § 2; North Carolina General Statute § 163-55). To restore the
franchise the offender must be “unconditionally discharged” from their sentence,
which includes the release from prison, parole, probation, and the payment of
any fines associated with the crime (North Carolina General Statute § 13-1).
Although restoration is automatic upon an unconditional discharge, the former
offender must file a “certificate,” with the court of conviction, indicating that they
have been unconditionally discharged before their voting rights are restored
(North Carolina General Statute § 13-1).
North Dakota
Those convicted of a felony offense and sentenced to imprisonment, in the
state of North Dakota, are prohibited from voting during the period of
incarceration (North Dakota Central Code § 12.1-33-01). Once the offender is
released from prison their voting rights are automatically restored with no further
requirements (North Dakota Central Code § 12.1-33-01). The voting prohibition
is only for the period of actual incarceration, thereby allowing the offenders to
vote while on probation and/or any period of parole.
Ohio
Ohio’s disenfranchisement statute requires the suspension of voting rights
for the period of incarceration only (Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 2961.01).
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Once released from incarceration, for commission of a felony offense, voting
rights are automatically restored to the offender with no additional requirement
placed on the offender (Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 2961.01).
Oklahoma
In the state of Oklahoma, an individual who has been convicted of a felony
offense is denied the right to vote “for a period of time equal to the time
prescribed in the judgment and sentence” (Oklahoma Statute Annotated, Title 26,
§ 4-101). This means that an offender convicted of a felony may not vote while
in prison, on parole, on probation, or if any fines associated with the crime are
outstanding. Once the sentence has been completed voting rights are restored
automatically with no further action needed (Oklahoma Statute Annotated, Title
26, § 4-101).
Oregon
An individual convicted of a felony offense is prohibited from voting in the
state of Oregon for only the period of incarceration (Oregon Revised Statute §
137.275 and § 137.281). The restoration of the right to vote is automatic upon
release from confinement, thereby allowing those offenders on parole and/or
probation to vote in elections (Oregon Revised Statute § 137.275 and §
137.281).
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania law states that any individual “confined to a penal institution”
is unauthorized to vote (25 Pennsylvania Constitution Statute Annotated § 1301).
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“Confined to a penal institution” has been interpreted to mean a conviction of a
felony offense (Pennsylvania Attorney General Opinion 186 (number 47) 1974).
Once an offender is released from prison and placed on parole and/or they are
given probation, the offender is authorized to vote. Once the period of
imprisonment has been completed, voting rights are automatically restored (25
Pennsylvania Constitution Statute Annotated § 1301).
Rhode Island
Once convicted of a felony offense in Rhode Island, offenders are not
eligible to vote until they complete their sentence. In order for the sentence to be
complete the sentence of the offender must be “served or suspended” and the
offender must not be on probation or parole (Rhode Island Constitution, Article 2,
§ 1). Upon completion of the sentence, voting rights are automatically restored
(Rhode Island Constitution, Article 2, § 1). However, an additional amendment to
the Rhode Island Constitution is currently working its way through the legislature
that would disenfranchise felony offenders only for the time of incarceration
(State Bill 458, 2005-2006 Legislative Session, R.I., 2005). This amendment is
expected to be voted on, by the citizens of Rhode Island, in November of 2006
(Milkovits, 2005).
South Carolina
Any individual convicted of a crime in the state of South Carolina is
disenfranchised (South Carolina Code Annotated § 7-5-120). The state code
makes no distinctions as to the type of crime, be it misdemeanor or felony
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offense. The only statement made in regards to a felony offense, states that a
person “convicted of a felony or offense against the election laws” is not allowed
to vote (South Carolina Code Annotated § 7-5-120). Therefore, a person
convicted of a crime and sentenced to a term of incarceration loses their voting
rights upon conviction. The term of disenfranchisement is for any term of
incarceration, probation, and/or parole (South Carolina Code Annotated § 7-5120). Once an individual has completed the sentence their right to vote is
restored automatically with no further action required of the former offender
(South Carolina Code Annotated § 7-5-120).
South Dakota
Once convicted of a felony in South Dakota, where the punishment is a
term of incarceration “in the state penitentiary,” an offender loses their voting
rights (South Dakota Codified Laws § 12-4-18 and § 23A-27-35). This
disenfranchisement occurs at the time of conviction and includes those whose
term of incarceration has been suspended (South Dakota Codified Laws § 23A27-35). The termination of voting rights for those with a suspended sentence
lasts as long as the original term of incarceration (South Dakota Codified Laws §
23A-27-35). For example, if an individual is convicted of a felony and is
sentenced to five years in the state penitentiary, but that sentence is suspended,
the individual cannot vote for that five-year period.
The disenfranchisement period for anyone convicted of a felony and
sentenced to a term of incarceration is only for the time sentenced. Once the
offender completes the actual sentence, voting rights are restored (South Dakota
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Codified Laws § 23A-27-35). Those on parole are allowed to vote. When an
individual is discharged from state custody they are “restored to the full rights of
citizenship” (South Dakota Codified Laws § 24-5-2 and § 24-15A-7). The
restoration is automatic, and requires the Secretary of Corrections to send notice
of discharge to the court where the offender was originally convicted (South
Dakota Codified Laws § 24-5-2 and § 24-15A-7).
Tennessee
The state of Tennessee has changed its laws on disenfranchisement so
many times over the last three decades, that it has created the most complex
system in the United States. Any individual who has been convicted of an
“infamous crime” is disenfranchised (Tennessee Constitution, Article 1, § 5). An
“infamous crime” has been defined as a felony offense (Tennessee Code
Annotated § 40-20-112). Disenfranchisement begins upon conviction of a felony
offence (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-20-112).
The disenfranchisement period is permanent, but a pardon or restoration
of civil rights may be obtained, depending upon the time the crime was
committed as well as the type of crime committed. Any conviction for the crime
of murder, rape, treason, or voter fraud results in permanent disenfranchisement
with no possibility of restoration (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-105). A
person convicted of any other felony before 1973, or between 1981 and 1986, or
after 1996 may request a gubernatorial pardon or may petition the circuit court of
the county in which they reside for the restoration of their civil rights (Tennessee
Code Annotated §40-29-101 and § 40-29-105). Individuals convicted of any
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other felony (other than the permanent disqualifiers) between 1973 and 1981
and/or between 1986 and 1996 are automatically eligible to vote upon completion
of their sentence (Tennessee Code Annotated §40-29-101 and § 40-29-105).
Completion of the sentence includes any period of parole, probation, and the
payment of any fines associated with the crime. In order to attain the automatic
restoration, the released offender must obtain a “certificate of restoration” from
the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (Tennessee Code Annotated § 4029-105).
While state law allows for a pardon to restore “full rights of citizenship,” a
former offender, who is granted a pardon, must still petition the court for full
restoration of voting rights (Tennessee Code Annotated §40-29-105). A pardon,
in and of itself, does not restore the right to vote. For full restoration of the right
to vote, the offender must meet the requirements, regarding time frame and
crime type, and must petition the circuit court in the county of residence
(Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-101 through § 40-29-105). The petition to
the circuit court for full restoration must be made after notice is provided to both
the federal and state prosecutors (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-102
through § 40-29-104). Additionally, the petition must be accompanied by proof
that the former offender “has sustained the character of a person of honesty,
respectability and veracity, and is generally esteemed as such by the petitioner’s
neighbors” (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-102). Once the petition is filed,
the court determines eligibility for restoration of the right to vote. It is assumed, if
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the requirements are met, the former offender’s voting rights will be restored
(Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-105).
Texas
Article 6, § 1 of the Texas Constitution, states that an individual is
disenfranchised upon conviction of a felony. The disenfranchisement period
extends from the time of conviction until the sentence is complete. The
completion of the sentence requires the full discharge of those who have been
convicted of a felony offense under Texas law (Texas Election Code Annotated §
11.002 and § 13.001). Essentially, once a person has served their entire
sentence, including any period of parole or probation, they are automatically
eligible to vote. There is no additional documentation necessary to register to
vote for those who have received an unconditional discharge.
Utah
Under Utah law, any individual convicted of a felony offense loses the right
to vote (Utah Code Annotated § 20A-2-101). The period of disenfranchisement
is only for the period of actual incarceration in a penal institution (Utah Code
Annotated § 20A-2-101). If an offender is convicted of a felony, but is given
probation or a suspended sentence then the disenfranchisement statute does not
apply (Utah Code Annotated § 20A-2-101.5). Once an inmate is release from
physical custody either through parole or outright release their voting rights are
automatically restored with no further action necessary (Utah Code Annotated §
20A-2-101.5).
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Virginia
The state of Virginia is a permanent disenfranchisement state. Under
Virginia law, any individual who has been convicted of a felony offense loses
their right to vote (Virginia Constitution, Article II, § 1; Virginia Code Annotated §
8.01-338 and § 24.2-101). The period of disenfranchisement begins upon
conviction and is permanent unless the former offender is granted a restoration
of rights or a pardon by the Governor (Virginia Constitution, Article V, § 12;
Virginia Code Annotated § 24.2-101).
A former offender may request either the restoration of rights or a pardon
from the governor. The restoration of rights reinstates, among others, the right to
vote (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-231.1). To qualify for a restoration of rights
the offender must have three years crime free years (for non-violent offenses)
after the completion of their sentence (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-231.1).
For violent offenders and those convicted of drug offenses the waiting period is
five years after the completion of their sentence (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1231.1). The process for restoration depends on the nature of the offense. For
non-violent offenders, a one-page application is required to be sent to the
Secretary of Commonwealth who is responsible for investigating the offender’s
case (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-231.1). Additionally, non-violent offenders
may also petition the court for a restoration recommendation to the governor
(Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-231.2). For violent and/or drug offenders, an
extensive thirteen-page application is required to be sent to the Secretary of
Commonwealth (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-231.1).
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The restoration of rights process, as described above, is the first step in
the process to attain a pardon (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-136 and § 53.1231.1). A gubernatorial pardon, either simple or absolute, constitutes “official
forgiveness” and restores all civil rights lost due to conviction (Virginia Code
Annotated § 53.1-136). To qualify for a pardon, the offender must have five
years crime free years after the completion of their sentence and must show
“evidence of good citizenship” (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-136). The
pardon process requires the long-form restoration application be sent to the
Parole board, which will investigate and make an official recommendation to the
governor (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-136).
Washington
In the state of Washington, “all persons convicted of an infamous crime
are excluded from the elective franchise” (Washington Constitution, Article 6, §
3). An infamous crime is defined as one either “punishable by death” or
“imprisonment in a state correctional facility” (Washington Revised Code §
29A.04.079). Essentially, any felony conviction in Washington results in the
disenfranchisement of the offender (Washington Revised Code § 29A.04.079;
State v. Collins, 124 P.903 (WA, 1912)). The period of disenfranchisement
begins upon conviction of the felony offense and ends upon the completion of the
sentence (Washington Revised Code § 9.94A.637). To complete the sentence
the offender must be free of all forms of supervision and must pay all the fines
associated with the crime (Washington Revised Code § 9.94A.637).
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The restoration of the right to vote is automatic upon the completion of the
sentence (Washington Revised Code § 9.94A.637). However, there have been
some challenges to Washington’s restoration process due to the financial
restitution requirement (Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th
Circuit, 2003); United States v. Loucks, 149 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Circuit, 1998)).
In these cases, the court stated that the financial provision of the statute could be
challenged as “racially discriminatory under the Voting Rights Act” (Farrakhan v.
Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Circuit, 2003). Washington statute states,
however, that if the former offender cannot pay the fines associated with the
offense, they can either petition the court for a reduction or complete elimination
of the fine, as long as “manifest hardship” can be proven (Washington Revised
Code § 10.73.160). Additionally, the former offender may request a restoration
of civil rights or an outright pardon from the governor in cases where the fines
cannot be paid (Washington Revised Code § 9.96.010 and § 9.96.020).
To request a restoration of rights or a pardon, the former offender must file
a petition with the Clemency and Pardons Board (Washington Revised Code §
9.94A.885). The Board is required to hold a hearing on the merits of each case
and to notify the prosecuting attorney and those with interest in the case, such as
victims and the arresting agency, at least thirty days prior to the hearing
(Washington Revised Code § 9.94A.885). If restoration is granted it has the
effect of removal of the unpaid portion of any fines associated with the offense
and makes the offender immediately eligible to vote (Washington Revised Code
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§ 9.96.010 and § 9.96.020). A pardon removes the conviction completely
thereby returning the right to vote (Washington Revised Code § 9.94A.030).
West Virginia
Anyone convicted of “treason, felony, or bribery in an election” is
disenfranchised until the completion of their sentence (West Virginia Constitution,
Article IV, § 1). Completion of a criminal sentence requires the end of
confinement, probation, and parole (West Virginia Code § 3-1-3 and § 3-2-2).
Although not clear in state law, according to case law, the right to vote is restored
automatically upon the completion of the sentence except where the conviction is
for the crime of bribery of a state official (Webb v. County Court of Raleigh
County, 168 S.E. 760 (WV, 1933); 51 WV Attorney General Opinion 182 (1965)).
In a case of a conviction for the bribery of a state official the only alternative for
the restoration of voting rights is to apply for a gubernatorial pardon through
application to the state parole board (West Virginia Constitution, Article VII, § 11).
Wisconsin
Much like West Virginia Law, an individual convicted of “treason, felony, or
bribery” is disenfranchised in the state of Wisconsin until the completion of their
sentence (Wisconsin Statute § 6.03 and § 304.078). The period of
disenfranchisement begins upon conviction and the right to vote is restored
automatically upon the unconditional release of the former offender from any
form of supervision; no further action is needed when the sentence expires
(Wisconsin Statute § 6.03 and § 304.078).
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Wyoming
According to Wyoming law, an individual who commits a felony is
prohibited from voting (Wyoming Statute § 6-10-106 and § 22-3-1-2). This voting
prohibition begins from the date of conviction and continues until voting rights are
restored either through the restoration of rights or via gubernatorial pardon
(Wyoming Constitution, Article 4, § 5). In essence, there are three ways to
restore an offender’s right to vote. First time, non-violent offenders, must wait a
period of five years and then apply to the parole board for a restoration certificate
(Wyoming Statute § 7-13-105). In cases of a first time, non-violent offender, the
parole board conducts an investigation to determine eligibility and then, if
eligibility is verified, “shall” issue the restoration certificate (Wyoming Statute § 713-105). Any other offender (recidivist and/or violent), must apply for a
gubernatorial pardon or the restoration of rights in order to regain the right to vote
(Wyoming Statute § 7-13-105 and § 7-13-803 through 806).
When seeking a restoration of rights, the former offender must wait for a
period of five years after completion of the sentence before applying. Once the
five-year period has passed, the former offender applies to the parole board,
which makes the determination of eligibility for restoration, then makes a
recommendation to the governor (Wyoming Statute § 7-13-803 through 806).
For those individuals requesting a pardon, they must wait for ten years after
completion of the sentence before applying directly to the governor. The
governor’s office is required to notify the prosecuting attorney to determine the
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particulars of the case prior to making any decision regarding executive pardon
(Wyoming Statute § 7-13-803 through 806).
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